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For the Eldridges
Abstract
This thesis examines the contention that effective regulation has as much to do with the capacity 
for co-operation between inter-dependent actors as it has to do with the state’s capacity for 
control. This contention, and the alternative conception of regulation that it implies, is 
significant because it is associated with a tension that runs through many areas of public policy: 
does cooperation between the public and the private, or between the regulators and the 
regulated, lead to effective collective action or to regulatory capture?
Following a conceptual examination of the nature of regulation and implementation, the thesis 
considers the explanatory value of two different perspectives on cooperation and collective 
action: the rational choice perspective, which suggests that the behaviour of economically 
responsive actors is shaped by the incentives for cooperation that stem from their inter­
dependence, and the institutional perspective, which contends that as particular forms of 
behaviour emerge, evolve and become institutionalised, so the implementation process becomes 
’ embedded in particular institutional structures that enable the continuation of existing 
approaches whilst restricting the potential for change.
In seeking to examine the explanatory value of these perspectives, the thesis considers the 
factors shaping the implementation of two frameworks of environmental regulation, namely the 
frameworks of Integrated Pollution Control and Local Air Pollution Control as applied in 
England and Wales. Based on a comparative analysis of the factors that shape the nature and 
influence of each implementation process, the thesis concludes that the explanatory value of the 
rational choice perspective is fundamentally limited and that the value of the institutional 
perspective is much more complete.
On this basis, the thesis proposes an institutional perspective on regulation and implementation 
that recognises the significance of resource inter-dependencies and the ways in which 
cooperative approaches can increase the prospects for collective action whilst reducing the 
accountability and the manageability of the implementation process. As is discussed, this 
conclusion has significant implications for broader debates on regulation and governance.
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Links with Previous Research
The rationale for this thesis emerged from the conclusions of preceding research on the 
implementation and impact of different forms of environmental regulation in England and 
Wales and the Netherlands. This research, which was funded by the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council as Project No L323 25 301 501, was conducted by the author of this thesis, 
who designed the research project, was grant holder and principal investigator, and Joseph 
Murphy, who was the research assistant. The results of the ESRC research project are presented 
in Gouldson and Murphy (1998).
Conceptually, the ESRC project considered the nature of debates on ecological modernisation 
and the influence that different regulatory styles can have on the development and diffusion of 
new technologies and techniques. Although it touched upon the influence of cooperative 
regulatory styles, it did not consider the factors that gave rise to cooperation in the 
implementation process or the extent to which cooperation led either to collective action or to 
regulatory capture. By focusing specifically on these factors, the thesis develops entirely new 
lines of conceptual enquiry from those examined in the preceding ESRC project.
Empirically, the ESRC research project had four components: it considered the influence of two 
types of environmental regulation (mandatory and voluntary) in two settings (England and 
Wales and the Netherlands). In accordance with the conceptual framework developed by the 
author, data in each of these four areas was collected both by the author and by Joseph Murphy. 
The subsequent data set included raw data that related to the aims of this thesis. Consequently, 
approximately one quarter of it (i.e. only that relating to mandatory regulation in the form of 
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) regulations as applied in England and Wales) was drawn 
upon as secondary data within this thesis. However, this data was up-dated and extended 
through a series of follow-up interviews with both the regulators and the regulated firms 
associated with IPC. To enable a comparative approach to be adopted, a second framework of 
mandatory environmental regulation (i.e. the framework of Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC) 
regulations adopted in England and Wales) was selected where primary data was collected and 
analysed by the author specifically for the purpose of this thesis.
Therefore, although this thesis draws upon some secondary data, the text presented within this 
thesis is entirely new and the conceptual and empirical analysis entirely original.
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PREFACE
Introduction
The traditional conception of regulation, as embodied in the very terminology of 'command and 
control’, implies that the regulators somehow have the capacity to control the activities of the 
regulated. However, numerous theoretical analyses and empirical studies have challenged the 
validity of this conception, arguing that the power and resources of the public sector are limited 
and that hierarchical relationships between the regulators and the regulated are much less 
influential than has often been assumed.
Against this backdrop, this thesis sets out to examine the contention that effective regulation has 
as much to do with the capacity for co-operation between inter-dependent actors as it has to do 
with the state’s capacity for control. This contention, and the alternative conception of 
regulation that it implies, is significant because it is associated with a tension that runs through 
many areas of public policy and regulatory decision-making. For some, co-operation between 
the regulators and the regulated can enable problems to be effectively resolved through 
collective action (Olsen, 1965; Axelrod, 1984,1997; Ostrom, 1990; Glasbergen, 1998; Lahusen,
2000). However, for others 'the very conditions that foster the evolution of co-operation are also 
the conditions that promote the evolution of [regulatory] capture and indeed corruption’ (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992, p55). It is apparent therefore that cooperation between the regulators and 
the regulated can lead to conflict between different measures of policy performance: although it 
can increase the administrative viability and the efficacy of regulation, it can also reduce the 
accountability and therefore the political acceptability of regulatory decision-making processes.
In seeking to examine the significance of these issues, this thesis focuses particularly on the 
implementation process and on the relationships between the regulators and the regulated that 
are at the heart of this process. The focus on implementation is adopted as although regulations 
are designed during the formulation stage, the realities of regulation are made during the 
implementation stage (Rees, 1990; Gouldson and Murphy, 1998). The focus on interactions 
between the regulators and the regulated is adopted as these continue to be the main actors that 
are engaged in the implementation process at the 'street-level’ (Lipsky, 1980) despite calls for 
the adoption of more participatory regulatory decision-making processes (see Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999). Finally, the focus on the interactions 
between the regulators and the regulated is adopted as many macro-level issues are played out 
in the micro-level interactions that shape the implementation process. By studying these issues
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at the micro-level therefore, this thesis aims to inform broader debates about the capacities of 
the state, the nature of public policy and the methods of policy analysis.
Conceptual Focus and Hypotheses
In seeking to understand the origins and influence of co-operation in the implementation 
process, the thesis considers the relevance and explanatory value of certain economic theories of 
cooperation and collective action. These theories were selected as the conceptual basis for the 
thesis because they argue that resource inter-dependencies generate incentives for cooperation. 
On this basis, the thesis hypothesises that:
i) that implementation processes will be shaped not only by the ability of public sector
regulators to resort to the hierarchical application of legal authority but also by the 
extent to which regulated actors derive influence in the implementation process from 
their access to a broader range of resources;
ii) that various resource interdependencies will emerge in the implementation process
which mean that compliance depends upon co-operation and the exchange of resources 
as regulatory objectives effectively become 'collective action problems’;
iii) that cooperative interactions within the implementation process will be institutionalised
within different forms of network that will influence both the outputs (i.e. the practical 
nature of the demands made by regulators) and outcomes (i.e. the ways in which the 
regulated firms responded to these demands) of the implementation process;
iv) that because of these inter-dependencies, the implementation process will display some
of the advantages of co-operation (i.e. increases in administrative viability and an 
enhanced ability to secure compliance through collective action) and some of the 
disadvantages of regulatory capture (i.e. reduction of standards and loss of 
accountability).
In examining the empirical validity of these hypotheses, the thesis also seeks to test the 
explanatory value of two contrasting perspectives on the basis for cooperation and collective 
action in the implementation process. On the one hand, the rational choice perspective contends 
that resource inter-dependencies generate the incentives that shape the strategies that are 
adopted within the implementation process. This perspective, which reflects the principles of 
neo-classical economics, is associated with a relatively simple chain of causality whereby 
resource inter-dependencies generate the incentives that shape the strategies that are adopted by 
the different actors. This suggests that the strategies that are adopted by the different actors are
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responsive to different resource allocations and incentives and therefore that the implementation 
process can be readily changed by altering the nature of these factors. On the other hand, the 
institutional perspective contends that these inter-dependencies, incentives and strategies are 
shaped by the broader institutional context within which the implementation process takes place 
and by the presence of various institutionalised forms of behaviour. As a result, this perspective, 
which is closely aligned with the principles of new institutional economics, implies that various 
'feedback loops’ might generate self-reinforcing forms of behaviour. This suggests that actors 
can become embedded in particular institutional structures and trajectories and that the 
implementation process will be hard to change. These different perspectives are significant not 
only because they might help to explain the presence or absence of cooperation within existing 
approaches to implementation therefore. They are also significant because they can inform the 
extent to which cooperation within the implementation process can be encouraged if it is seen to 
enable collective action or discouraged if it is associated with regulatory capture.
The Structure of the Thesis
Within the discussion that follows, Chapter 1 establishes the basis for the analysis by examining 
the nature of regulation and the significance of the implementation process in more detail. 
Chapter 2 then examines the central tenets of different economic theories of cooperation and 
collective action and their relevance to discussions on regulation, implementation and 
compliance. On the basis of this conceptual discussion, attention is then focused on the extent to 
which inter-dependence and the need for co-operation can help to explain the nature and 
influence of the implementation process empirically. Chapter 3 introduces the empirical focus 
for this thesis, namely the systems of Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) and Local Air Pollution 
Control (LAPC) that have been applied in England and Wales since 1990. After discussing the 
rationale for studying the implementation processes associated with these regulatory 
frameworks empirically, the chapter revisits the hypotheses outlined above in order to establish 
more detailed questions for empirical research. It then outlines the methodological issues 
associated with such empirical research and discusses the particular approaches to data 
collection and analysis that were applied within the thesis.
The results of the empirical analysis are then presented in a way that reflects the perspectives of 
both the regulators and the regulated actors that are associated with the implementation of these 
regulatory frameworks. Chapter 4 presents the perspective of the inspectors within the specialist 
national agency who are charged with implementing IPC regulations while Chapter 5 presents 
the perspective of the managers of the large industrial facilities that are affected by these
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regulations. Similarly, Chapter 6 presents the perspectives of the inspectors within the generalist 
local authorities that are responsible for the implementation of LAPC while Chapter 7 presents 
the views of the managers of the small and medium sized firms that are affected by these 
regulations. Thus, there are a number of comparative dimensions to the empirical study as it 
contrasts the approaches to implementation adopted by specialist/generalist and national/local 
agencies as they seek to influence the behaviour and performance of large/small firms.
Chapter 8 analyses the findings of the empirical analysis to consider the basis for and the 
influence of co-operation in each of the two case study regulations. On the basis of the 
comparative review, the discussion considers the explanatory value of the different theoretical 
perspectives and the validity of the different hypotheses. While no specific claims are made 
about the wider relevance of this case-based empirical study, Chapter 9 discusses the wider 
implications of an institutional perspective on regulation and implementation. These relate both 
to the role that command and control regulations can play as part of a broader policy mix and to 
the ways in which cooperative approaches to regulation can be applied as part of a broader 
strategy for governance.
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CHAPTER 1 
Regulation and its Reform
Structure
> Definitions of Regulation
> The Rationality of Regulation
> The Search for Better Regulation
> The Nature and Influence of the Implementation Process
> Related Research on the Implementation of Environmental Regulation 
The Nature o f the Implementation Process
The Influence o f the Implementation Process
> The Rationale for Further Research on the Implementation Process
Definitions of Regulation
Regulation can take on many forms, and different interpretations of what constitutes 
'regulation’ abound. Baldwin, Scott and Hood (1998, p3), for example, distinguish between 
three forms of regulation. At its broadest, regulation encompasses all mechanisms of social 
control, an interpretation which sees regulation by governments as being but one element in the 
broader framework of social governance. A somewhat narrower interpretation holds that all 
forms of direct state intervention in the economy are forms of regulation. This view 
acknowledges the role of regulation in steering economic development and accepts that 
regulation is as much to do with facilitating and enabling desirable forms of social and 
economic activity as it is to do with restricting and controlling undesirable forms of activity. 
The narrowest and perhaps the most traditional interpretation is that regulation involves the 
introduction, application and enforcement of rules, typically by a public agency, commonly in 
the form of rule-based command and control regulations. Therefore, Baldwin, Scott and Hood 
(1998) argue that as the general framework of social governance provides the context for 
government activity, so the wider policy framework provides the context for the introduction 
and application of specific rule-based command and control regulations.
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Within the broader context, this thesis is primarily concerned with the narrowest interpretation 
of regulation, namely the nature of command and control regulation. There are various 
interpretations of what constitutes command and control regulation. Selznick (1985, p363) 
states that command and control regulation involves 'sustained and focused control exercised by 
a public agency over activities that are valued by a community’. Similarly, Ball and Bell (1995, 
p88) consider that mandatory regulation involves 'the application of rules and procedures by 
public bodies so as to achieve a measure of control over activities carried on by individuals and 
firms’. In each instance, command and control regulation is based upon legislation which 
assigns the public sector the formal authority to exert some degree of control over regulated 
activities in the private sector by establishing controls. These controls come either in the form of 
an imperative ‘you must’ or of a prohibitive ‘you must not’.
While the legislative basis for regulation is of course significant, the implementation process is 
central to any discussion on regulatory practice as the practical substance of any regulatory 
framework is defined by the nature of the interactions between the regulators and the regulated 
actors (Rees, 1990). Thus, broadening the definitions of regulation introduced above to take the 
significance of the implementation process into account, Gouldson and Murphy (1998, p41) 
define command and control regulation as being:
a system of direct control over market organisations and activities, operated by 
government and its representatives, which has a legal basis and is operationalised 
through a range of implementing structures and procedures.
As can be seen, these conceptions of command and control regulation associate it with some 
degree of public sector control over private sector activities. These conceptions are associated 
with a hierarchical notion of the implementation process that implies that regulatory agencies 
must have the capacity to control the behaviour of the targets of regulation if compliance is to 
be effectively achieved. Before moving on to assess the validity of this hierarchical conception, 
the discussion will first consider the factors that shape the design of regulation and that motivate 
and guide the search for better forms of regulation.
The Rationality of Regulation
The classical justification for regulation is that it should be introduced to protect the public 
interest from the consequences of market failure. Thus, regulations in various forms may be 
adopted in an attempt to limit monopoly power or to curb predatory pricing, to encourage
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continuity of service over time and through space, to compensate for inadequate access to 
information and for unequal bargaining power and to respond to the under-provision or the 
over-consumption of public goods and to the imposition of externalities (Breyer, 1982, 1990; 
Kay and Vickers, 1990; Baldwin, 1995a; Majone, 1996; Baldwin, Scott and Hood, 1998).
Whilst it is generally assumed that regulations should serve the collective public interest if they 
are to be effective, in practice it is widely acknowledged that governments commonly fail to 
search for, adopt and apply those approaches to regulation that would serve the public interest in 
the optimal way. Hanf and O’Toole (1992, p i64) for example argue that:
Recent years have constituted an era of sober realism among those who specialise in the 
study and practice of governance. Grand hopes and bright visions have given way to 
reports of multiple policy failures, pernicious unintended consequences, and persistent 
budget problems... Not so long ago, the standard image was that of the 'can-do’, nearly 
omnipotent state. More recently, the picture has altered to one of an overloaded and 
perhaps chronically weakened system of governance, one which [has] but a limited 
ability to direct the course of the broad-scale action needed to address policy 
difficulties.
These limited capacities for effective governance, and more particularly for effective regulation, 
are widely held to be the consequence of a range of factors that bound the rationality of the 
policy process and that influence the nature of regulatory decision-making in ways that may not 
always further the public interest. These factors manifest themselves in a range of ways. At the 
most basic level, problems that might create a justification for regulatory intervention may not 
be recognised due to limited scientific understanding and imperfect information. Particularly 
where governments are reluctant to intervene in the absence of an 'objective scientific 
understanding’ of cause and effect relations, government intervention can become dependent 
upon and may therefore lag behind advances in scientific understanding (Weale, 1992; 
Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea, 1990). This is critically important if scientific and technical 
systems are always one step away from the understanding which would control their current 
impacts while always being on their way to creating new and possibly more complex problems 
(Christoff, 1996). Because regulation often lags behind advances in scientific understanding, it 
has been argued that regulation has a tendency to be reactive and crisis-oriented rather than 
proactive and precautionary (Janicke, 1997).
Even where problems are recognised and a case for government action is established, the time, 
resources and capacities needed to identify and evaluate all of the impacts of each of the
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possible alternative responses to a problem are rarely if ever available (Simon, 1957; Peters,
2001). Under such conditions, the intended and unintended consequences of particular decisions 
can seldom be accurately predicted, the functional merits of alternative approaches cannot 
normally be fully compared and an overall optimum can rarely be identified. Furthermore, 
particularly under conditions of uncertainty, regulatory decision makers tend to be risk averse 
and to resort to conventional modes of operation where possible (Rees, 1990). Thus, the 
potential to explore innovative forms of intervention is often limited, especially where such 
approaches might require radical changes to administrative structures and institutionalised 
modes of behaviour. Consequently, regulatory decision-making tends to display a degree of 
continuity and even path-dependency that limits the potential use of those forms of regulation 
that are difficult to assimilate into pre-existing structures or trajectories.
Because of the presence of these factors that 'bound’ the rationality of regulatory decision­
making, it is widely accepted that decision makers tend to pursue only incremental change and 
to seek a satisfactory rather than an optimum solution (Simon, 1957; Lindblom, 1959, 1979). 
This is particularly the case where policies have multiple or competing objectives that can lead 
to fragmentation and conflict both within and between policy areas that often can only be 
resolved through contestation or compromise. When faced with such a situation, policy makers 
commonly establish only vague and ambiguous policy objectives whilst delegating 
responsibility for the pursuit of these poorly articulated objectives to implementing agencies. 
Indeed, at the extreme, regulations can be adopted largely for symbolic purposes, for example 
when regulations are adopted by governments that subsequently fail to establish the structures, 
or assign the resources, that are needed for effective implementation.
It is this recognition that the design of regulatory frameworks is commonly sub-optimal that 
drives the search for better regulation. This search can be based upon initiatives that are 
designed to raise the capacity of the state and improve the rationality of the decision-making 
process. However, the search for better regulation is commonly complicated by the presence of 
many different and sometimes competing rationalities and interests within the policy process. 
As the arguments of institutional rational choice theory contend, regulatory decision making is 
likely to be influenced not only by the results of any rational analysis that does take place, but 
also by the institutional context for decision making and by the interactions between those 
organisations and individuals who take decisions and the wide range of interest groups that seek 
to influence decision making so that it better reflects their political and economic interests (see 
Simon, 1957; Downs, 1967; Perlman, 1976; Dunleavy, 1980, 1991). Institutional contexts, 
incentive structures and power relations therefore become significant factors in the regulatory 
decision making process.
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The Search for Better Regulation
The search for better regulation is variously taken to include the search for forms of regulation 
that are politically acceptable and administratively viable and that generate effective, efficient 
and equitable outcomes through accountable and in some instances participatory decision­
making process (see Jacobs, 1991; Baldwin, 1995a; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999). 
Reflecting the discussion above, it is unlikely that any one approach will satisfy all of these 
objectives simultaneously and that trade-offs have to be made between the different measures of 
policy performance. As a result, debates on regulation and its reform are often based on 
contestation between different actors with contrasting views on what might constitute 
'successful’ regulation.
While the different actors commonly offer different prescriptions, the search for better 
regulation has commonly been based on the perceived weaknesses of traditional approaches to 
regulation. Majone (1996) for example suggests that the framework of public policy has become 
increasingly complex as new forms of regulation have been introduced to both encourage and 
facilitate economic change and to respond to the negative impacts of such change and that this 
increased complexity has reduced the effectiveness of command and control forms of 
regulation. Gunningham and Grabosky (1999, pp4-5) go further and argue that those approaches 
to regulation that rely on the application of command and control instruments are seriously sub- 
optimal as they 'are not effective in delivering their purported goals; or efficient in doing so at 
least cost; nor do they perform well in terms of other criteria such as equity, administrative 
viability or political acceptability’. Thus, they suggest that command and control regulations 
often perform badly in almost every respect.
Whilst some of these weaknesses are likely to have been associated with the manner of their 
application, Gunningham and Grabosky (1999, p9) argue that the limits of command and 
control 'can only be overcome by invoking a broader vision of regulation and by the pursuit of 
broader policy mixes, utilising combinations of instruments and actors and taking advantage of 
the synergies and complementarities between them’. In response to criticisms such as these, 
many programmes of regulatory reform have sought to explore the potential of less intrusive 
and less centralised forms of government intervention through the application of a broader range 
of policy instruments (see for example Sigler and Murphy, 1988; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). 
Indeed, much has been made of the potential benefits of applying economic and information- 
based instruments, voluntary agreements and other enforced forms of self-regulation alongside 
more flexible and less interventionist forms of command and control regulation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Baldwin, Scott and Hood, 1998; Ogus, 1999).
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Aside from calls for the application of a wider range of policy instruments, there have also been 
calls for a broader and more inclusive and cooperative conception of the regulatory process 
based on the direct involvement not only of government, business and other 'targets’ of 
regulation but also of a range of other interested actors and stakeholders (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999). In this way it is argued that regulation can become 
more responsive to the conditions faced by the private sector and to the concerns of the various 
stakeholders. Whilst some have argued that such inclusive processes are desirable, not least 
because they can offer some protection against the prospect of regulatory capture, others have 
argued that they are becoming an effective necessity. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), for 
example, argue that as governments are limited by political and fiscal constraints they may need 
to secure the support and harness the resources of the private sector to realise public objectives. 
Similarly, Hancher and Moran (1989) suggest that as private organisations have commonly 
acquired important attributes of public status through their contribution to social objectives, they 
should be invited into the public 'regulatory space’ to influence the policy process and 
regulatory decision making. In essence, Hancher and Moran (1989) recognise the significance 
of inter-dependence between the regulators and the targets of regulation and hence the need for 
cooperation in regulatory decision-making processes. Through such open, inclusive and 
cooperative approaches to regulation then it is argued that the draw-backs associated with the 
centralised and hierarchical imposition of command and control regulations can be reduced, that 
the capacities and resources of the private sector can be harnessed to improve the efficacy and 
efficiency of regulation, and that the regulatory process can be made more participatory and 
accountable (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999; Rydin, 1999).
These calls for the introduction of a broader range of instruments and a more inclusive and 
cooperative approaches to regulation are compatible with the view that regulatory reform has 
been and should be associated with a broader reappraisal of the nature of government. Rydin 
(1999, p61), for example, suggests that a transition is taking place as traditional forms of 
government, based on hierarchical relationships between tiers of state, a strong element of top- 
down control and a firm boundary between the state and outside organisations, are being 
replaced by broader forms of governance which recognise and utilise the proliferation of quasi- 
govemmental agencies and the growing formal role of non-state organisations within the policy 
process. Similarly, Osbome and Gaebler (1992, p24) suggest that traditional forms of 
'government’ should be seen as just one instrument in the broader framework of 'governance’ 
or social regulation. This proposed shift from traditional conceptions of government to broader 
notions of governance is closely related to the view that regulation should not only impose 
restrictions on the undesirable aspects of private activity through hierarchical control, but that it
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should also seek to enable and facilitate more desirable forms of private activity through public- 
private partnerships or cooperation.
While these contributions have undoubtedly been influential, throughout the debate on 
regulation and its reform most of the emphasis has been placed on the design of regulations and 
on the combination of policy instruments to be adopted. Although authors such as Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) and Gunningham and Grabosky (1999) emphasise the significance of 
inclusive or participatory forms of regulatory decision-making, within the wider discourse 
relatively little emphasis has been placed on the central role that the implementation process 
plays in shaping the performance of policy. But it is possible that the performance of existing 
frameworks of command and control regulation might yet be enhanced by building a better 
understanding of the influence that different approaches to implementation can have on the 
outcomes of the implementation process and therefore on regulatory performance.
The Nature and Influence of the Implementation Process
While a theoretical distinction can be drawn between the political process of policy formulation 
and the bureaucratic process of policy implementation, in practice it is widely acknowledged 
that a clear distinction between the formulation and implementation phases is unlikely to exist 
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981). While the implementation process can be 'preconditioned’ from 
above, for example through the precise drafting of legislation or the rigid programming of 
implementation activities, the agencies and officials that are charged with realising regulatory 
objectives continue to shape the practical substance of regulations by exercising discretion in 
the way that they interpret, apply and enforce the generic principles of regulation in specific 
situations (Rees, 1990). Indeed, when faced with limited resources, regulators can use their 
discretion and the flexibility that it implies to find ways of operationalising regulations within 
practical constraints. Consequently, an analysis of the influence that discretion plays in the 
informal interactions that are at the heart of the implementation process is central to an 
understanding of the practical nature of regulation.
Any actor in the implementation process is able to exercise discretion when the effective limits 
on their power leave them free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction 
(Davis, 1969). Discretion can be exercised both by the implementing agency as a corporate 
body and by the 'street-level bureaucrats’ within the agency who enact policy on a day-to-day 
basis (Lipsky, 1980). It can be exercised in the way that the key principles and objectives of a 
regulation are interpreted, prioritised and delivered. It can influence the provision of assistance
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or support and the level of sanction that is applied in cases of non-compliance. It can also allow 
actors to change the substance of regulation or the style of its delivery. Discretionary elements 
in the implementation process therefore establish the potential for implementing agencies and 
individuals to change their strategies or styles as a response to the conditions or incentives that 
they encounter.
Discretionary elements can be deliberately incorporated into legislation to allow implementing 
agencies to take decisions at a level and with a degree of specificity that is not available during 
policy formulation. As Hill (1993) notes, it may be that those top-level decision makers 
involved in policy formulation do not want, or are not able, to set clear policy goals but would 
rather leave responsibility for defining the practical nature of policy to those who are expected 
to implement it. By incorporating discretionary elements into the design of regulations, top-level 
decision makers can also allow regulations to take into account the diversity and the variability 
of the conditions that are encountered by both regulators and the targets of regulation 
(Richardson et al, 1982; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999). To 
this extent discretion may be desirable in the implementation process as it allows regulators the 
freedom to 'fine tune’ regulations to fit with specific circumstances and to find the most 
effective ways of meeting regulatory objectives.
While the exercise of discretion in the implementation process may generate some benefits, it 
can also reduce the democratic basis for decision-making, the accountability of the regulatory 
agency and the rationality, transparency, predictability, consistency and fairness of regulatory 
decision-making (Baldwin, 1995b). Many of these concerns stem from the fact that the exercise 
of discretion in the implementation phase is likely to demand that public interest decisions are 
taken by non-elected civil servants in an unaccountable process of negotiation with the parties 
that they regulate. This process of negotiation may not be open to external scrutiny or legal 
challenge, particularly where negotiations are based upon complex, heterogeneous and dynamic 
criteria that are not readily monitored or communicated. Furthermore, these negotiations are 
likely to be based on asymmetrical access to information between the regulator and the 
regulated (Weale, 1992; Ogus, 1994; Smith, 1997). This commonly means that the 
implementing agency or individual with discretionary powers has to choose between alternative 
courses of action on the basis of the potentially incomplete or inaccurate information that has 
been supplied by the party that they are regulating. This raises the prospect of regulatory 
capture. As Ogus (1994, p58) notes, regulatory capture may occur in a number of ways:
There are various hypothesized methods of influencing agency policy: the information
required by the [implementing] agency may only be obtainable from the regulated
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industries; lack of expertise in the subject-matter may mean that the agency has to 
recruit its officials from those industries; and the industries may threaten the agency 
with costly, or even trivial, time wasting appeals should it fail to be 'cooperative’.
It has also been suggested that, intentionally or otherwise, implementing agencies and the 
individuals within them may be more lenient in their interpretation of the requirements of 
regulation if they aspire to eventual employment with the bodies they regulate, if such a style of 
enforcement is more pleasant as it incurs the least resistance or if they are reluctant to impose 
sanctions on offenders with high social status (Richardson et al, 1982; Makkai and Braithwaite, 
1995). Regulated organisations may also be able to influence or resist the demands of regulatory 
agencies as a consequence of the political leverage that they derive from their economic power 
(see Blowers, 1984).
Thus, as well as establishing the potential for the efficacy and efficiency of policy to be 
enhanced over time, the exercise of discretion can also generate uncertainty, allow arbitrary 
decision making and increase the prospect of regulatory capture. To explore these issues further, 
this chapter now reviews the central findings of previous research on the implementation of 
environmental regulation in order to identify and examine the factors that have influenced the 
nature of the implementation process in different contexts.
Related Research on the Implementation of Environmental Regulation
- The Nature o f Different Approaches to Implementation
Many of the arguments that are outlined above are reflected in research on the implementation 
of environmental regulation. Richardson, Ogus and Burrows (1982) for example argue that the 
implementation of environmental regulation necessarily involves the exercise of discretion and 
that this discretion affects the forms of control introduced by regulators. They suggest that the 
flexibility that such discretion allows may be welcome, not least in avoiding the problems 
associated with legalism, or the mechanical application of rules without regard to their purpose. 
However, they also propose that the exercise of discretion may engender uncertainty and 
arbitrariness in decision making and that it may not be exercised in a way that furthers the 
declared regulatory objectives. In this respect, they suggest that those who are required or who 
are able to exercise discretion in the implementation process seldom possess all of the 
information needed to select the optimum course of action, and that they may be 'improperly
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influenced’ by interested parties so that they interpret and apply regulatory requirements 
leniently to accommodate the concerns of the targets of regulation.
Related to this, Hawkins (1984) highlights the potential for regulators to adopt different styles 
of regulation when he suggests that the implementation and enforcement of environmental 
regulation can be based either on compulsion, coercion and the imposition of sanctions or on 
conciliation, compromise and the promotion of compliance. Other authors such as Vogel 
(1986), Majone (1996) and Hutter (1997) have shown that some approaches to environmental 
regulation, particularly in the United States, have tended to be based on compulsion and the 
adoption of sanctions-based strategies. However, Hawkins (1984) suggests that styles of 
implementation and enforcement are generally conciliatory and compliance-based and that they 
commonly follow 'a  loosely structured but none the less organised process relying heavily upon 
negotiated conformity, with a gradual increase in pressure being applied to the uncooperative...' 
(1984, p7). He suggests that since effective compliance-based strategies are likely to be more 
concerned with preventing harm than with punishing breaches of the law, they are likely to be 
associated with a lack of formal legal action. However, he also recognises that rather than 
communicating regulatory success, a lack of legal action is commonly associated with 
perceptions of regulatory failure and with suspicions of regulatory capture.
The studies by Richardson, Ogus and Burrows (1982) and Hawkins (1984) are both significant 
as they suggest that a close and co-operative working relationship between regulators and the 
targets of regulation has the potential to enhance the efficacy of regulation. Importantly, 
however, they also recognise that such approaches to implementation can reduce the efficacy of 
regulation by increasing the prospect of regulatory capture whilst also reducing the transparency 
and the accountability of regulatory decision-making processes. Thus, it is apparent that there 
may be conflict between different criteria for evaluating policy success, for example in instances 
where co-operation between regulators and the targets of regulation enhances the efficacy and 
efficiency of regulation but at the expense of the accountability or equitability of regulatory 
decision making processes.
These findings are closely related to those of Hutter (1997), who argues that those compliance- 
based approaches to implementation and enforcement that are seen to be effective by some may 
be seen to be ineffective and unaccountable by others. In this respect, she draws a distinction 
between theories of regulation that are based on accommodation and consensus and those that 
are based on adversarialism and conflict. She suggests that consensual theorists argue that 
regulations are introduced to further the public interest in a way that accommodates the 
demands of competing interest groups. Accordingly, regulations are seen to be the result of a
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pluralistic process of negotiation and compromise, and as such are neither as demanding as 
those that are primarily concerned with the social and environmental benefits of regulation 
would want, nor as lenient as those that are primarily concerned with private costs of 
compliance would prefer. By contrast, conflict theorists argue that regulations reflect the views 
of the dominant interests in society who are able to exert influence to ensure that regulations do 
not seriously affect their interests.
Hutter (1997) suggests that these different views of the nature of regulation are reflected in 
different interpretations of the implementation process, where conflict theorists argue that 
regulation can be weakened to the point of ineffectiveness, while consensual theorists believe 
that improvements can be effected, although not always on the scale that some would have 
wished. Thus, judgements about the success or failure of regulation are likely to be influenced 
by the perspective taken by those who adjudicate. Nonetheless, despite their different 
perspectives, both of the theories outlined by Hutter (1997) accept that implementation is an 
inherently negotiated process and that the practical substance of environmental regulation is 
determined by the nature of interaction between regulators, the targets of regulation, and in 
some, but not all, instances, other third parties. The discussion by Hutter therefore reinforces the 
view that there may be competing rationalities in the policy process and that no single optimum 
may exist. Instead, particularly where there are multiple or competing objectives for policy and 
even more so where the articulated objectives for policy are vague or ambiguous, there may be 
different perspectives on what constitutes successful regulation.
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) attempt to go beyond the distinctions between both the sanctions- 
based and compliance-based strategies and the theories of regulation based on consensus and 
conflict that have been outlined above. They suggest a need to introduce 'responsive’ 
approaches to implementation and enforcement that recognise the wide range of potentially 
contradictory motivations that typically influence the behaviour of particular sectors, firms, 
departments and individuals. Particularly in relation to the different motivations affecting 
individual decision-makers within regulated firms, they argue that 'business executives have 
profit-maximising selves and law-abiding-selves, at different moments, in different contexts, the 
different selves prevail’ (p i9). They contend that compliance-based strategies based on 
persuasion will be exploited by the targets of regulation when they are motivated by economic 
rationality, while sanctions-based strategies based on punishment will undermine the good-will 
of the targets of regulation when they are motivated by a sense of responsibility. They also 
argue (p20) that:
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a strategy based mostly on punishment fosters an organised business subculture of 
resistance to regulation... Punitive enforcement engenders a game of regulatory cat- 
and-mouse whereby firms defy the spirit of the law by exploiting loopholes, and the 
state writes more and more specific rules to cover the loopholes.
Consequently, they suggest that a 'pyramid’ of different approaches to implementation and 
enforcement should be adopted that would subject the targets of regulation to gradually 
escalating forms of regulatory intervention if they continually refuse to respond to regulatory 
demands. They argue that such a pyramid of implementation and enforcement would begin by 
exploiting the benefits of self-regulation and would then move on to explore the potential of 
enforced self-regulation before resorting to command and control regulation. Where command 
and control regulation was deemed to be necessary, implementation and enforcement would 
initially involve the exercise of discretion. Non-discretionary or legalistic approaches to 
implementation and enforcement would only be adopted in extreme circumstances. Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) therefore argue that responsive approaches to implementation and 
enforcement would allow regulators to respond to the different motives and forms of behaviour 
that are likely to be exhibited at various times and in different contexts by the targets of 
regulation. This is significant because they challenge the view that particular approaches to 
implementation should be adopted and maintained over time.
By suggesting that non-discretionary or legalistic approaches to implementation and 
enforcement should only be adopted in extreme circumstances, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) 
place considerable faith in the merits of co-operation, flexibility and the exercise of discretion in 
the implementation and enforcement process. However, they also recognise that attempts to 
foster such co-operation between regulators and the targets of regulation can lead to corruption 
and capture. They suggest that while the traditional response to the possibility of corruption and 
capture has been to introduce measures to limit discretion and to maintain the relational distance 
between regulators and regulated, these measures also restrict the potential of regulators to 
realise the benefits of co-operation. By way of a response, they call for the empowerment and 
wider involvement of public interest groups in the regulatory process so that the benefits of co­
operation and flexibility can be exploited but in a process that is inclusive, transparent and 
accountable. Thus, they suggest that public interest groups should be involved in regulatory 
processes and that such groups should either be able to sanction non-compliance directly, or, as 
is perhaps more likely, to sanction regulators who fail to punish non-compliance. Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) also argue that the behaviour of the public interest groups who act as the 
'guardians’ of a co-operative regulatory process needs to be made accountable through the
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publication of information on the regulatory process and its outcomes and by establishing 
opportunities for other interest groups to replace them if they do not perform adequately.
Significantly, therefore, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that while there may appear to be 
competition between different performance measures, as may be the case where co-operation 
between regulators and the targets of regulation enhances the efficacy and efficiency of 
regulation but at the expense of the accountability of regulatory decision making, the relations 
between different performance measures need not be fixed. This raises the possibility that new 
approaches to implementation can improve the performance of regulation when it is judged 
from a range of different perspectives using a variety of different criteria for evaluation.
- The Influence o f Different Approaches to Implementation
These conceptual distinctions between various approaches to implementation and enforcement, 
and the related concerns about the relative significance of co-operation, corruption and capture, 
are reflected in practice in many instances. Vogel's (1986) study of the different approaches to 
the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulation adopted in the UK and the 
USA in the period up to the 1980s has provided a reference point for much of the subsequent 
comparative research on the nature and influence of different regulatory structures and styles. 
This may be because the approaches to implementation that Vogel describes appear to lie at 
opposite ends of a spectrum. As Vogel (1986, p21) states:
On balance, the American approach to regulation is the most rigid and rule-oriented to 
be found in any industrial society, the British the most flexible and informal. The 
United States makes more extensive use of uniform standards for emissions and 
environmental quality than does any other nation; the British, with a handful of 
exceptions, employ neither... The United States makes virtually no use of self­
regulation to improve environmental quality; the British rely on it extensively. 
Regulatory authorities in America take companies to court more frequently than those 
of any other country; prosecution in Great Britain is rare. The thrust of American 
environmental regulation has been to restrict administrative discretion as much as 
possible; in Britain regulatory officials remain relatively insulated from both 
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny... [However] the most striking difference between 
the environmental policies of Great Britain and the United States has to do with the 
relationship between business and government... no other business community is so 
dissatisfied with its nation’s system of environmental controls as the American business
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community. In Great Britain, by contrast, the relations between the two sectors have 
been relatively co-operative.
Thus, Vogel (1986) identifies a range of different criteria that can be used to characterise 
different approaches to regulation and to implementation. Despite the notable differences in the 
approaches to regulation adopted in the UK and the USA, and whilst recognising that it is 
difficult to make cross-country comparisons of regulatory performance, Vogel (1986, p23) goes 
on to suggest that the results of regulation are broadly similar in both countries:
Britain’s emphasis on voluntary compliance has not proved any more -  or less -  
effective in achieving its objectives than the more adversarial and legislative approach 
adopted by policy makers in the United States. American regulatory policy has been 
more ambitious, but as a result, it has produced greater resistance from business. British 
regulatory authorities demand less, but because their demands are perceived as 
reasonable, industry is more likely to comply with them.
Therefore, it is possible that contrasting approaches to implementation can generate different 
regulatory outputs (meaning the practical demands that regulators impose upon the targets of 
regulation) and that the relationship between these outputs and the outcomes (meaning the ways 
in which regulated actors respond to these demands) of regulation is not fixed. This is 
significant because it suggests that the performance of different regulatory frameworks cannot 
be assessed by focusing only on the stringency of the demands that are made by regulators and 
that effective policy need not only be found where there are demanding standards that are 
rigidly enforced (Hawkins, 1984). Instead, it highlights the significance of the way that the 
targets of regulation respond to the practical outputs of the regulatory process and the prospect 
that the process of implementation, as well as its outputs, can affect the outcomes and impacts 
of policy. This may be the case where the implementation process serves to persuade the targets 
of regulation to behave in different ways, thereby avoiding the need for the regulators to impose 
requirements that compel them to behave differently. Consequently, as well as beginning to 
classify different approaches to implementation, Vogel’s (1986) study suggests that any 
assessment of regulatory performance must consider the implementation process, its outputs and 
outcomes if it is to accurately evaluate regulatory performance.
Despite some important changes in the formal substance of environmental regulation in the 
period since Vogel’s study, in the UK some authors have argued that there has been a 
considerable degree of continuity, particularly in relation to the styles of implementation and 
enforcement (see Smith, 1997; Skea and Smith, 1998). For example, the picture that Vogel
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paints of a flexible, co-operative, secretive and compliance-based approach to the 
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulation in Britain in the period up to the 
1980s is seen by authors such as Allott (1994), Smith (1997) and Skea and Smith (1998) to have 
been sustained into the 1990s.
In an empirical assessment of the implementation of Integrated Pollution Control regulations, a 
central pillar of the wider framework of environmental regulation in the UK, Smith (1997) 
argues that there have been attempts to change both the structure and the style of environmental 
regulation. He suggests that this framework of environmental regulation sought to introduce 
more formal regulatory procedures, to encourage the regulator to adopt a more arms-length 
relationship with regulated firms and to facilitate external scrutiny by ensuring public access to 
information on regulatory demands and industrial performance. However, reflecting the 
interpretations of the conflict theorists described by Hutter (1997), Smith (1997) argues that 
despite its stated intentions, the regulator was unable to break with tradition and to move away 
from the close, co-operative relationship that had historically characterised the implementation 
and enforcement of environmental regulation in the UK. The primary reason posited by Smith 
for this continuity in the style of implementation and enforcement is that the regulator depends 
on regulated firms for the information it needs to interpret and apply the qualitative principles 
introduced by the IPC framework. He also suggests that these information dependencies were 
made more acute by organisational constraints within the regulatory agency and by the lack of 
political support for effective implementation and enforcement. Consequently, he argues that 
despite its intention to maintain an arms-length relationship, the regulator was drawn back into 
an informal process of interaction and negotiation with regulated firms that ultimately allowed 
industry to set the pace and direction of the controls introduced by IPC. The result of this 
informal process of interaction and negotiation, according to Smith (1997, p211), is that IPC has 
suffered an 'implementation deficit’ and that it has not been effective in realising its original 
intentions.
This is significant because it highlights the negotiated and inter-dependent nature of the 
implementation process and the influence that the targets of regulation can have not only on 
regulatory structures and styles but also on the practical outcomes of the regulatory process. It is 
also significant because, when compared to a related study by Gouldson and Murphy (1998), it 
highlights the relevance of Hutter’s distinction between the perspectives of capture theorists, 
who emphasise the extent to which the targets of regulation are able to exert influence to set the 
direction and the pace of the changes required by regulators, and consensual theorists who 
emphasise the achievements of regulation whilst acknowledging that it could more fully realise 
its objectives.
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The results of the study by Gouldson and Murphy (1998), which also considered the 
implementation of IPC, countered to some degree the central conclusion of Smith (1997) that 
the style of implementation and enforcement has rendered the regulations weak and ineffective. 
Focusing on both the implementation and the impact of environmental regulation, Gouldson and 
Murphy (1998) considered the influence of IPC both on the imperatives and on the capacities 
for environmental improvement in regulated companies. In relation to the former, they also 
found that the demands established by IPC through a co-operative and flexible process of 
interaction and negotiation between the regulator and regulated firms tended to be weak. In this 
respect they supported the findings of Smith (1997) and reflected aspects of the conflict 
theorists’ interpretation of the implementation and enforcement process as described by Hutter 
(1997). Critically, however, Gouldson and Murphy (1998) also found that co-operative 
interactions between the regulator and regulated firms enabled a process of interactive learning 
to take place that increased the capacity of regulated firms to improve their environmental 
performance. They suggest that many companies had subsequently drawn upon these capacities, 
particularly to exploit economically beneficial areas of environmental improvement. 
Consequently, they argue that through co-operation, flexibility and discretion, IPC had 
effectively promoted environmental improvement to some degree but that it had done so by 
raising the capacity of regulated companies to improve their environmental performance rather 
than by imposing demanding imperatives. In this respect, as well as reflecting aspects of the 
conflict theorists’ view, the study also reflects aspects of the consensual theorists’ interpretation 
of the implementation and enforcement process as described by Hutter (1997).
Thus, Gouldson and Murphy (1998) suggest that the major impacts of environmental regulation 
may come about not only as a consequence of the imposition of controls, the stringency of 
which has been the measure against which the performance of many regulatory frameworks has 
been assessed. Instead, they suggest that environmental regulation may exert influence as a 
consequence of co-operative interactions between the regulator and the targets of regulation that 
can build capacities and encourage and enable regulated firms to work towards the regulatory 
objectives. However, Gouldson and Murphy (1998) also recognise that the accountability of 
such a co-operative, flexible and discretionary approach to implementation and enforcement can 
be restricted if opportunities for third party involvement are limited, as is likely to be the case 
where key regulatory decisions are taken on the basis of informal case-by-case negotiations. 
Significantly, they also suggest that the ability of the regulator to encourage or demand 
sustained environmental improvement through such an approach may be fundamentally 
restricted if industry were to withdraw its support for further improvement, as may be the case
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once the economically attractive opportunities for environmental improvement run out (see 
Murphy and Gouldson, 2000).
The two studies by Smith (1997) and Gouldson and Murphy (1998) are significant because the 
comparisons between them serve to highlight the inter-dependence of regulators and the targets 
of regulation and the influence that the process of interaction between them can have on the 
outcomes and the impacts of regulation. The study by Gouldson and Murphy (1998) also 
emphasises the significance of the factors that shape the capacities of the targets of regulation to 
respond to the outputs of regulation. While Smith (1997) argues that the targets of regulation 
already control the pace and the direction of change, Gouldson and Murphy (1998) suggest that 
there is some consensus between regulators and the targets of regulation but that this consensus 
may break down once the capacity of the targets of regulation to respond to the demands of 
regulation in a way that is economically acceptable to them has been exhausted. Thus, following 
Hancher and Moran (1989), both studies suggest that at some point regulatory activity may be 
confined to those 'regulatory spaces’ where there is a coincidence of public and private 
interests.
This review of the existing research on the implementation of environmental regulation has 
highlighted the significance of two main factors. First, it has emphasised the influence of the 
implementation process on the outputs and outcomes of regulation. Second, it has stressed the 
importance of interaction between regulators and the targets of regulation during the 
implementation process and the influence that various inter-dependencies may have on the 
process of interaction. Therefore, it has emphasised the need to understand the origins of 
different approaches to implementation and to analyse the influence of different approaches on 
the outcomes and the impacts and therefore on the performance of environmental regulation.
The Rationale for Further Research on the Implementation Process
Within the context of broader debates on regulation and its reform, the discussion in this chapter 
has recognised that:
the implementation process exerts a defining influence on the practical substance of 
regulation;
the public sector’s capacity for control is often limited and that the relationship between 
the regulators and the regulated is likely to be shaped as much by inter-dependence as 
by hierarchy;
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the activities of regulatory agencies and individuals cannot be fully 'preconditioned’ or
programmed from above; instead regulators have to exercise discretion as they choose
between the different strategies and styles that might be adopted;
the approaches that are adopted by regulators can vary between those flexible and
cooperative approaches to implementation that seek to promote compliance and those
legalistic and adversarial approaches that seek to sanction non-compliance;
the different approaches to implementation have different strengths and weaknesses;
cooperative approaches have the potential to increase the administrative viability,
efficacy and efficiency of regulation but only at the expense of the equitability,
accountability and the political acceptability that can be secured though legalistic
approaches;
trade-offs may need to be made between different measures of policy performance and 
that the value that is placed on the different criteria varies according to perspective; 
consensual theorists emphasise the benefits of cooperation while conflict theorists focus 
on the potential for regulatory capture.
While this conceptual discussion and empirical review provides a useful foundation for a study 
of the factors that shape the nature and influence of the implementation process, the existing 
research in this area has yet to offer a detailed explanation of:
the nature and extent of any inter-dependencies that exist between regulators and 
regulated actors in the implementation process;
the extent to which these inter-dependencies establish incentives for cooperation in the 
implementation process;
the factors that shape the ways in which the actors respond to these incentives; 
the ways in which cooperation affects the outputs and outcomes of regulation.
Before the thesis establishes the different hypotheses to be tested and the methodologies to be 
applied within an empirical assessment of these issues, the next chapter will examine the 
conceptual basis for co-operation in the implementation process in more detail.
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CHAPTER 2
Co-operation and Implementation 
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> Introduction
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> Co-operation and the Implementation of Environmental Regulation
> The Research Thesis
Introduction
Following the preceding discussion on regulation and implementation, this chapter seeks to 
build a fuller understanding of the origins and influence of co-operation in the implementation 
process. Whilst recognising that a wide range of theories on cooperation exist in both the natural 
and the social sciences, this thesis focuses on the extent to which resource inter-dependencies 
generate incentives for cooperation. As a result, the discussion focuses on those economic 
theories that examine the potential for inter-dependent actors to exchange their resources in 
order to realise their collective objectives. Despite this focus, the discussion also touches upon 
some of the sociological and behavioural issues relating to co-operation as these are seen to 
constitute an important part of the institutional context for co-operation.
The discussion starts by examining the central tenets of different economic theories of co­
operation and collective action. Rather than addressing these theories chronologically, the 
discussion divides the different theories into two separate but related groups: those that adopt a 
rational choice perspective that reflects the principles of neo-classical economics, and those that 
adopt an institutional perspective that is more closely aligned with the principles of new 
institutional economics. The differences between these theoretical perspectives are significant 
because the neo-classical perspective suggests that the actors that interact within the 
implementation process are likely to be economically responsive and thus susceptible to change 
while the institutional perspective suggests that their behaviour tends to be socially embedded
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and therefore more resistant to change. Consequently, each perspective has a different view not 
only of the origins of cooperation in the implementation process but also of the extent to which 
it can be promoted where it is seen to enable collective action or prevented where it is seen to 
engender regulatory capture.
The discussion then moves on to consider the extent to which an analysis of the influence of co­
operation in the implementation process can be informed by an examination of the policy 
networks and economic networks concepts. Like the theories of co-operation and collective 
action, these concepts focus on the influence of inter-relations between inter-dependent actors. 
However, the networks concept adds to the explanatory value of the theories of cooperation and 
collective action as it focuses on the influence of different forms of interaction and exchange as 
institutionalised within different forms of network.
Once the discussion has considered the relevance of these theories to the implementation of 
environmental regulations, the chapter concludes by proposing a range of hypotheses that are to 
be tested within the empirical study that follows.
Theories of Co-operation and Collective Action
In an attempt to develop and test an evolutionary theory of co-operation, Axelrod (1984) 
examines the basis for co-operation by analysing the results of different computer simulations 
based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In common with the starting point for the wider literature on 
game theory, these simulations assume that two isolated but inter-dependent actors have a 
choice between cooperating with each other or defecting and pursuing their individual interests. 
Thus, Axelrod (1984) suggests that the pay-offs for the various combinations of decision are 
structured as follows:
Actor A
Cooperate Defect
Actor B Cooperate 3;3 5;0
Defect 0;5 i;i
(Benefits A; Benefits B)
Given these incentive structures, in a one-off interaction the best outcome that either actor can 
achieve is that they defect while the other actor cooperates. Even if this outcome is realised 
once, however, it is unlikely to be a sustainable outcome as the other actor is likely to withdraw 
their co-operation if the interaction is repeated. While this has often been taken to imply that the 
dominant strategy will be one of mutual defection, through his simulations Axelrod (1984)
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found that under some conditions co-operation between self-interested actors could emerge and 
become stable even in the absence of a central authority such as a coercive government. On the 
basis that co-operation between actors is seen to be desirable in many instances, particularly 
when compared to mutual defection or sustained adversarialism, Axelrod’s (1984) theory of co­
operation is often held to be highly optimistic.
To qualify his optimism about the prospects for co-operation, Axelrod (1984, pl73) identifies 
two particular preconditions; firstly that co-operation between actors is based on reciprocity, 
and secondly that what he terms 'the shadow of the future’ is important enough to make this 
reciprocity stable. Thus, when faced with the incentive structures outlined above, the theory 
indicates that co-operation is most likely to emerge when actors adopt a reciprocal strategy 
based on 'tit-for-tat’ so that an actor cooperates when the other actor cooperates and that they 
defect when the other actor defects. When the interactions between the actors are repeated, and 
where the outcome of future interactions is seen to be important, the theory suggests that actors 
will tend towards co-operation. This is the case because with some experimentation and 
learning, and with ready access to information, it will become apparent that co-operation is in 
their longer-term mutual interest despite the possibilities for individuals to realise short-term 
benefits through defection. Once established, the theory also suggests that co-operation can 
become stable and self-policing, particularly where each actor is reluctant to be the first to 
defect and where each shows a degree of forgiveness towards the defections of the other as in 
such instances any conflicts that do break out tend to diminish rather than escalate.
The theory proposed by Axelrod (1984) therefore emphasises the significance of the incentive 
structures that face each individual actor and of the need for repeated interactions that allow 
strategic behaviour to emerge. In common with neo-classical theories of exchange, it does not 
argue that the actors need necessarily interact directly or forge close working relationships with 
each other, only that each individual actor is aware of their interests and of the behaviour of the 
other and that they recognise and respond strategically to any incentives for cooperation. In 
essence then it suggests that individual actors are flexible and responsive and that their 
behaviour can be easily changed by altering the incentive structures that they encounter.
Axelrod’s (1984) theory of cooperation is highly relevant to studies of the policy process 
because it highlights the potential influence of the various incentive structures whilst 
emphasising the ability of the individual actors to respond to these incentives in ways that may 
serve either the public or their private interests. In essence then Axelrod’s (1984) theory 
suggests that under some conditions 'co-operative regulatory spaces’ are likely to emerge 
because it is in the self-interest of inter-dependent actors to cooperate and that these spaces can
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either be enlarged through incentive-based measures designed to promote co-operation (i.e. to 
realise public interest objectives) or reduced through measures designed to discourage it (i.e. to 
protect against capture).
Although Axelrod’s (1984) theory relates primarily to interactions between two actors and to 
the way that these strategies may spread amongst a larger community, the theory reflects aspects 
of an analysis of the prospects for collective action amongst groups as developed by Olson 
(1965). Within this theory, Olson (1965) also argues that co-operation or collective action may 
emerge where it is in the interests of the associated actors. He argues that there is potential for 
collective action where the benefits of such action can be appropriated by the actors who choose 
to pay the associated costs. However, particularly amongst larger groups, Olson (1965, p21) 
argues that while 'all of the members of the group... have a common interest in obtaining the 
collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective 
benefit’. Thus, largely because of the potential for free-riding, Olson (1965) suggests that 
individually rational strategies may lead to collectively irrational outcomes (see also Ostrom, 
1990).
While in some instances these issues of distribution and appropriability may be enough to 
preclude collective action, Olson (1965) suggests that co-operation or collective action might 
still emerge in large groups if there is one large actor who values co-operation so much that they 
are willing to bear most of the associated costs. As the other smaller actors with less of an 
interest in cooperating can still benefit from the co-operation even though they might not pay 
the associated costs, Olson (1965, p34-5) argues that 'there is a surprising tendency for the 
exploitation of the great by the small’, hi essence then Olson’s (1965) analysis suggests that any 
'co-operative regulatory spaces’ are likely to be less extensive where there are large groups of 
actors and that where they exist co-operation may be driven by one actor and exploited by 
others. In a regulatory setting where the regulatory agency has to cooperate with a large number 
of regulated actors to realise its objectives, such exploitation may be akin to regulatory capture.
The focus of these essentially neo-classical theories on the incentives for co-operation that are 
encountered by individual actors and on the ability of rational actors to respond to these 
incentives is undoubtedly important. However, these theories have been criticised for not 
placing enough emphasis on the influence that actors can have on the incentives structures that 
they encounter or on the institutions that shape these incentives. These issues are seen by many 
to be significant, not least because they raise the critical issue of transaction costs. North (1990, 
p i5), for example, argues that 'although game theory demonstrates the gains from cooperating 
and defecting in various contexts, it does not provide us with a theory of the underlying costs of
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transacting and how these costs are altered by different institutional structures’. A related 
criticism is made by Rydin and Pennington (2000, p i60) who suggest that by under­
emphasising institutional issues such approaches have 'neglected the ability of individuals, who 
have overcome one set of collective action problems, to build on these arrangements in order to 
solve further and as yet intractable problems’. In an attempt to respond to these criticisms, 
various approaches have sought to consider the role that institutions as well as incentives can 
play in furthering co-operation or collective action.
North (1990, p3) suggests that institutions are 'the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. However, Ostrom, 
Schroeder and Wynne (1993, p6) suggest that the institutions that shape the potential for 
collective action are constituted by the 'people and the patterns of regular, repetitive interactions 
among them that transform inputs into outputs’. Despite these differences in definition, both 
North (1990) and Ostrom et al (1993) recognise that institutions can both constrain and enable 
different forms of social and economic activity and that they play a central role in structuring 
the incentives for co-operation and collective action. As such Ostrom et al (1993, pl91) argue 
that institutions represent a form of 'social infrastructure’ that can have a significant impact on 
the potential for collective action. Indeed, they suggest that because of its value this 
infrastructure represents a form of 'social capital’ that relates to the 'body of shared knowledge 
about how to organise people in a productive manner’.
Within these institutionalist approaches, notions of social capital are seen to be particularly 
significant because they suggest that interactions between individuals are no longer based upon 
isolated acts of exchange. Rather, interactions between individuals and within groups are likely 
to be influenced by the shared experiences of the various actors and by the networks of inter­
relationships and inter-dependencies that bind them together and that evolve over time. 
Consequently, Rydin and Pennington (2000, p i61) suggest that social capital encompasses such 
things as the extent of networks between individuals and groups, the density of relationships and 
knowledge of these relationships within networks and the existence of obligations and 
expectations regarding these relationships. They also argue that social capital relates to the level 
of trust between individuals and groups, to the existence of norms of routine behaviour and to 
the existence and use of effective sanctions to punish free-riding.
Critically, Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993) and Rydin and Pennington (2000) argue that 
the presence of social capital, particularly in the form of networks of inter-relations organised 
around a shared interest, can change the incentive structures associated with co-operation. 
Furthermore, because the co-operative relations that generate social capital can increase the
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potential for further co-operation, co-operative behaviour can become self-reinforcing. In this 
way, trajectories or path-dependencies can emerge that both shape and are shaped by the 
interactions between actors. In other words, the institutionalist approach suggests that 'co­
operative regulatory spaces’ may not simply exist but rather that they can be created and shaped 
by the co-evolution of the institutions and incentives that provide the basis for such co­
operation.
In some settings the evolution of co-operation and the generation of social capital can allow 
problems to be solved that would have seemed to be intractable at the outset. However, as 
discussed above, in some settings co-operation may not be desirable, and institutions can evolve 
to constrain as well as to enable particular forms of behaviour. As a result, institutionalised 
modes of behaviour, including any cultures, traditions, habits and routines that shape the 
implementation process, can become embedded to such an extent that change is restricted even 
where there are incentives for change (see Granovetter, 1985; Grabher, 1993). Consequently, 
these new institutionalist theories suggest that change may not be frictionless and that actors 
may not be as free to respond to the incentives that encourage or discourage co-operation as the 
theories proposed by Axelrod (1984) and Olson (1965) suggest. Although these barriers to 
change can be expressed economically and incorporated into neo-classical models by 
representing them as transaction costs, new institutional economics argues that there is a much 
wider range of sociological or behavioural issues that influence the rationality of economic 
behaviour that are harder to capture accurately or meaningfully within a neo-classical analysis 
(see Hodgson, 1988 or North, 1990).
In essence then there appear to be two related sets of theories that might help us to explain the 
emergence of co-operation in the implementation process. On the one hand, the theories of co­
operation and collective action proposed by Axelrod (1984) and Olson (1965) suggest that co­
operation is likely to emerge where individual actors respond rationally and strategically to any 
associated incentives for co-operation. This implies that actors are free to change their 
behaviour to respond to different incentive structures and that co-operation can take place even 
in the absence of close working relationships between actors. This focus on individual actors 
and their ability to respond to economic incentives aligns these theories with broader rational 
choice theories and with neo-classical forms of economics. On the other hand, the theories of 
collective action proposed by authors such as Ostrom et al (1993) and Rydin and Pennington 
(2000) argue that co-operation is likely to emerge not only where there are appropriate 
incentives but also where supporting institutions have emerged over time to enable the various 
actors both to shape and to respond these incentives. This implies that different forms of 
behaviour can become institutionalised or embedded and that co-operation may depend upon the
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presence of much closer working relationships between actors. This focus aligns these theories 
with broader institutional rational choice theories and with new institutional forms of economics 
as discussed by authors such as Hodgson (1988) or North (1990).
Cooperation within Networks
Like the theories of cooperation and collective action, the networks concept is based upon an 
acknowledgement of the significance of interaction and exchange between interdependent 
actors. Indeed, the concept reflects aspects of the institutional perspective discussed above as 
networks can be seen as the 'social infrastructure’ within which cooperation and the exchange 
of resources takes place. Furthermore, the quality of the relationships and the body of 
knowledge and trust that exists within these networks is the 'social capital’ that enables 
collective action to take place. Despite these similarities, however, the networks concept adds to 
the explanatory value of the theories of cooperation and collective action as it focuses on the 
influence of different forms of interaction and exchange as institutionalised within different 
forms of network. In seeking to examine the explanatory value of the networks concept further, 
the discussion that follows examines the relevance of both the policy networks concept as it 
focuses on the nature of the interactions that shape the implementation process and the 
economic networks concept as it considers the ways in which regulated firms engage with and 
respond to the implementation process.
Policy Networks
As Rhodes (1981) suggests, policy networks are likely to emerge where actors within an area of 
common policy interest have to exchange resources in order to realise their goals. Indeed, Hanf 
and O’Toole (1992, p i69) state that:
The concept of the network draws attention to the interaction of many separate but 
interdependent organisations which act in a self-interested manner but nevertheless co­
ordinate their actions through inter-dependencies of interests and resources... the term 
'network’ merely denotes the fact that policy making and implementation involves a 
large number and wide variety of public and private actors from different levels and 
functional areas of government and society. By stressing the 'inter-relationships’ and 
'inter-dependencies’ of these actors, the term also draws attention to the pattern or 
linkages and interactions among them and to the ways in which these affect the 
behaviour of the individual organisations.
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Despite its similarities with the theories of cooperation and collective action as examined above, 
the policy networks concept develops a clearer view of the range of resources that can be 
exchanged within the policy process. Rhodes and Marsh (1992a) for example suggest the 
resources that are held by different actors within a policy network may be legal, organisational, 
financial, political or informational. Similarly, Mol (1995) argues that particular attention 
should be paid to the distribution and use of legal resources or authority, economic and financial 
resources and informational resources.
As power, whether political, legal or economic, can be an important resource, authors such as 
Smith (1997) suggest that networks may depend either on the potential for mutual benefit or on 
the power of one or more actors to force others to participate in a process of exchange. Indeed, 
according to Dowding (1995), the outcomes of the process of exchange may 'emerge through 
power struggles of different interests, both within zero-sum and variable sum contexts, and 
within battles of what Marin (1990) has described as 'antagonistic co-operation” . This suggests 
that interactions between inter-dependent actors in the implementation process may take place 
'in the shadow of hierarchy1 as regulators draw upon, or threaten to draw upon, their legal 
authority to coerce change from the top-down. It also suggests that power can also influence the 
implementation process from the bottom-up as well as from the top-down as the targets of 
regulation draw upon their wider power and influence to influence the behaviour of regulators 
and to shape the nature of the implementation process.
While this emphasis on the range of resources that can be mobilised by particular actors 
suggests that networks are likely to emerge where there are incentives for interaction based on 
resource and power inter-dependencies, the policy networks concept also recognises that the 
ways in which actors interact and resources are exchanged can become institutionalised over 
time. More particularly, the concept suggests that as resources are likely to be unevenly 
distributed between actors, a process of bargaining is likely to emerge within the policy network 
that will be influenced by the relative resources of each actor, by the strategies that they employ 
and by the institutionalised 'rules of the game’ that evolve within the network to govern the 
process of exchange (Rhodes, 1981). Thus, different forms of interaction, as institutionalised 
within different forms of policy network, are likely to emerge over time.
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest that different forms of policy network can be categorised 
with reference to a range of characteristics. Indeed, they propose a typology that ranges from 
'policy community’ at one extreme to 'issue network’ at the other (see Table 2.1). These 
distinctions between different forms of policy network are important analytically because, as
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Marsh and Rhodes (1992) recognise, different network forms are likely to be associated with 
different policy outputs. They argue that in some instances policy networks can enable both the 
inter-organisational and the inter-personal interactions that are necessary if the objectives of a 
particular policy are to be realised whilst in others the existence of a policy network can act as a 
major constraint on policy change. Thus, again reflecting the importance of the institutional 
dimension, they argue that different forms of policy network can emerge and evolve, for 
example in response to changes in knowledge, ideology, institutional form or economic and 
market conditions, to both enable and constrain the ability of different communities to realise 
policy objectives. If these different forms of network can be categorised with the help of 
variables such as those outlined in Table 2.1, the influence of different forms of interaction can 
become easier to analyse. However, it is important to recognise that given their potential for 
change any characterisations of different network forms maybe specific to a particular time and 
place.
Table 2.1: Forms of Policy Network
Dimension Policy Community Issue Network
Membership
a) Number of participants
b) Types of interest
Very limited number, some groups 
consciously excluded 
Economic or professional interests 
dominate
Large
Encompasses range of affected 
interests.
Integration
a) Frequency o f interaction
b) Continuity
c) Consensus
Frequent, high quality interaction of 
all groups on all matters related to 
policy issue
Membership, values and outcomes 
persistent over time 
All participants share basic values 
and accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome
Contacts fluctuate in frequency and 
intensity
Access fluctuates significantly.
A measure of agreement exists but 
conflict is ever present.
Resources
a) Distribution within 
network
b) Distribution within 
participating 
organisations
All participants have resources, 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship
Hierarchical, leaders can deliver 
members
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are limited and 
basic relationship is consultative. 
Varied and variable distribution and 
capacity to regulate members.
Power There is a balance of power 
between members. Although one 
group may dominate, it must be a 
positive sum game if the 
community is to persist.
Unequal powers, reflects unequal 
resources and unequal access. It is a 
zero sum game.
Source: Marsh and Rhodes (1992).
While this focus on the nature of a particular policy network adds to the explanatory value of 
the theories of cooperation and collective action as it suggests that networks are the embodiment 
of different forms of interaction, it is also important to acknowledge that networks can be 
analysed at different levels. Rhodes (1990) for example suggests that the concept of the policy 
network can be used to consider inter-personal relations at the micro-level, relations between
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interest groups and government at the meso-level and relationships between the state and civil 
society at the macro-level. Similarly, Hanf and O’Toole (1992) suggest that the policy networks 
concept has been developed and can be applied in an attempt to analyse the interactions between 
individuals, institutions and organisations at various levels of the policy process. However, 
Dowding (1995) suggests that analysis that emphasises the character of the network rather than 
its constituent parts can only be descriptive, as by adopting such an emphasis it cannot analyse 
the reasons why networks exist or evolve. Consequently, he argues that for explanatory 
purposes empirical analysis should focus on the character, resources and strategies of the actors 
that interact within the network. However, as the facets of the different actors are likely both to 
shape and to be shaped by the nature of the network within which they interact, it is apparent 
that any empirical analysis needs to consider both the network and its constituent parts if it is to 
have explanatory value.
The insights provided by this examination of the policy networks concept therefore relate 
closely to the theories of cooperation and collective action in that both focus on the incentives 
and institutional structures that shape the interactions between inter-dependent actors. However, 
the policy networks concept adds to the analysis by suggesting that an empirical analysis of the 
interactions that shape the implementation process needs to consider the character, resources 
and strategies of the actors as well as the nature of the network itself and its underlying 
incentives and institutions. By helping to characterise and categorise different network forms, 
the concept increases the ability of an empirical analysis to illuminate the influence that 
different forms of interaction can have on the outputs of the implementation process. However, 
while the policy networks concept can inform and help to structure an analysis of the 
implementation process, it does not offer any insight into the factors that might shape the ways 
in which the targets of regulation respond to the outputs of the implementation process. With 
this in mind, the discussion will now consider the relevance of the economic networks concept.
- Economic Networks
The economic networks concept argues that the response of economic actors to the various 
competing and sometimes conflicting demands that they encounter is shaped not only by their 
own character, resources and strategies but also by the nature of the socio-economic context 
within which they operate. More particularly, it emphasises the significance of interaction 
between interdependent economic actors within an area of common economic interest 
(Axelsson and Easton, 1992; Grabher, 1993). Again therefore it is closely related to the theories 
of cooperation and collective action discussed above and to the policy networks concept.
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In recognising the importance of socio-economic context and inter-relations in economic life, 
the economic networks concept argues that interdependent actors within an economy may 
derive mutual benefit from reciprocal relationships that extend beyond what Grabher (1993, p5) 
terms 'isolated acts of exchange’. The concept therefore suggests that, particularly through 
sustained interaction that fosters trust, mutual understanding and open communication, or in 
other words social capital, economic actors can build upon the resources that are available 
internally to realise various benefits through external interaction. These benefits may be derived 
for instance by transferring information and understanding between actors, by reducing 
uncertainty, by gaining access to new resources and exploiting the potential of new 
combinations of resources and by realising external economies of scale whilst retaining a degree 
of flexibility and avoiding the diseconomies of scale that may be associated with formal 
integration.
While participation in economic networks is commonly motivated by the need to gain access to 
complementary resources, Morgan (1995, p55) argues that access to information and 
understanding may be a particularly important benefit from interaction:
When firms are faced with a whole series of new challenges -  like accelerating 
technological change, more globalised markets, high quality competition and exacting 
environmental regulations -  it is hardly surprising that certain theorists are beginning to 
argue that knowledge is the most important resource and that learning is the most 
important process.
Indeed, referring particularly to the arguments of evolutionary economics, Morgan (1995, p55) 
goes on to suggest that 'neo-classical theory takes as resolved some of the largest and most 
pressing questions in economic development, like how firms come to know what they know, i.e. 
how firms learn’. He suggests that within such an evolutionary approach, learning can be seen 
as an interactive social process and that while interactive learning between firms is particularly 
important, there is also a role for a wide range of other actors from government, finance houses, 
education and training institutions, technology transfer agencies and trade associations 
particularly at the local and regional levels. This emphasises the possibility that different 
networks will coexist and that they will interact at different levels. However, while authors such 
as Morgan (1995) have highlighted the importance of interactive learning within diverse 
networks at the local and regional levels, other authors have questioned the extent to which 
firms actually exist and operate within local and regional networks, emphasising instead the 
significance of networks that are not so spatially contained (Amin, 1993; Curran and Blackburn, 
1994).
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Although there is some debate about the spatial distribution of economic networks, the 
arguments of Morgan (1995) that are outlined above are reflected in the wider literature on 
innovation and technical change (see for example Dosi, 1988; Freeman, 1992; Rothwell, 1992; 
OECD, 1992; Soete and Arundel, 1995). This is significant because the capacity to respond to 
regulation is commonly synonymous with the capacity to develop or adopt new technologies 
and techniques. While it is often assumed that this capacity is shaped by the character, resources 
or strategies of an individual actor, as has been stated, the economic networks concept argues 
that an actor’s capacity to respond to regulation by innovating depends on the resources that are 
available within the wider economic network within which that actor exists and operates. 
Indeed, the concept suggests that as there is potential for positive feedback between the various 
actors in the innovation process, the capacity of the network as a whole to innovate may be 
greater than the potential of its individual constituent parts.
Thus, the economic networks concept suggests that sustained interaction between actors within 
economic networks can enable actors to learn and to develop a response to new threats and 
opportunities such as those represented by regulation. However, Grabher (1993, p24) argues 
that as well as enabling change these networks can 'be petrified and perverted into coalitions 
against economic, political and cultural innovation’. Therefore, as well as enabling and 
supporting innovative responses to regulation, Grabher (1993) suggests that economic networks 
can create inertia and foster path-dependencies which restrict the potential for change. 
Institutionalised economic networks may therefore both enable and constrain the response of 
economic actors to the various demands that they face. However, while the concept suggests 
that economic actions are shaped by institutional structures, it does not stray to the other 
extreme by suggesting that the economic actions are determined solely by the nature of the 
socio-economic structures within which economic activity takes place. Instead, the concept 
reflects Granovetter’s (1985) argument that while economic action is not free from the influence 
of social relations, neither is it so constrained by ongoing social relations that actors loose all 
independence. Thus, again reflecting some of the institutionalist perspective on the theories of 
cooperation and collective action discussed above, the concept suggests that actors retain some 
influence over the structures, including the incentive structures, that both shape and are shaped 
by their behaviour.
Like the policy networks concept therefore, the economic networks concept appears to have 
some analytical value. Based particularly on the results of a long history of research on the 
influence of inter-organisational relationships in industrial and technological development (see 
for example Freeman, 1991), there is now some consensus that the economic networks concept
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can be used to inform such an analysis at a number of levels. Easton (1992) for example 
suggests that studies related to the economic networks concept have focused on single 
organisations and the extent to which they gained access to resources through a multiplicity of 
relationships, on the influence of the dyadic relationships between buyers and sellers in supply 
chains and on the influence of direct and indirect relationships and the consequent inter­
connectedness of organisations. Various studies have also focused on the nature of the 
economic network as a whole and on the influence that different network forms can have on the 
behaviour and performance of particular firms or groups of firms (see Hakansson, 1989; 
Axelsson and Easton, 1992; Grabher, 1993). At a higher level of aggregation, other studies have 
focused on the significance of networks in local and regional development and on the 
relationship between economic networks and national innovation systems (see Morgan, 1992; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Curran and Blackburn, 1994).
Despite the diversity of approaches that have been adopted in studies related to the economic 
networks concept, Easton (1992, p3) argues that the economic networks concept provides a 
distinct approach to research in its own right:
It shares with other approaches a belief that the existence of relationships... among 
firms engaged in economic exchange provides a compelling reason for using inter- 
organisational relationships as a research perspective. It differs from other approaches 
mainly in terms of its scope... The focus of research is, ultimately, the network itself 
and not the firm or the individual relationship, although firms and relationships must be 
studied if networks are to be understood.
This reflects the observation made in the discussion on the policy networks concept, namely that 
an analysis should consider both the nature of the network and the character, resources and 
strategies of the actors that interact within it. Indeed, to explore the characteristics and the 
implications of different network forms, Hakannson (1987) suggests that research on economic 
networks should consider the activities, resources and perspectives of the different actors within 
a particular network. He also argues that research attempting to examine the origins and 
influence of different network forms should consider the functional inter-dependencies and the 
structures of knowledge and power that bind different networks together over time. Relatedly, 
Grabher (1993) suggests that different networks can be characterised according to the degree of 
reciprocity and inter-dependence that exists between actors, to the nature of the ties that bind 
actors together and to the distribution of power within the network.
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This analysis of the economic networks concept has suggested that the concept is highly 
relevant to studies that seek to build an understanding of the ways in which the targets of 
regulation engage with and respond to the implementation process. Like the policy networks 
concept, many of its insights are closely associated with the theories of cooperation and 
collective action as discussed above as it also focuses on the incentives and institutional 
structures that shape the interactions between inter-dependent actors. However, the economic 
networks concept highlights a range of issues and variables that have not been considered 
previously. In particular, it highlights the potential significance of interactive learning between 
actors operating in different networks. Again reflecting aspects of the debate on the insights 
provided by the policy networks concept, the economic networks concept suggests that analysis 
should consider the nature of individual firms, the relationships between firms and the nature 
and influence of different forms of economic network. Finally, like the policy networks concept, 
the economic networks concept suggests that different network forms can be categorised 
according to a range of criteria so that the influence that different forms of interaction have on 
the ways in which actors engage with and respond to the implementation process can be better 
understood.
Co-operation and the Implementation of Environmental Regulation
The theories of cooperation and collective action, and related analysis on the ways in which 
inter-dependent actors can come together within different forms of network, are directly 
relevant to an analysis of the origins and influence of cooperation in the implementation of 
environmental regulation. Axelrod (1984) for example applies his broader theory on the 
evolution of co-operation specifically to issues relating to the implementation of environmental 
regulation. He argues (1984, p i54) that there is a basis for co-operation in the implementation 
process because '...even the most effective governments cannot take the compliance of its 
citizens for granted. Instead it has strategic interactions with the governed, and these 
interactions often take the form of an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’. Depending on the nature of 
the incentive structures, this may be taken to suggest that governments lack the power and the 
resources to impose their will from above and therefore that co-operation emerges by default. 
However, Axelrod (1984, p i56) suggests that co-operative approaches to implementation might 
also emerge by design as they have some inherent advantages for regulators, for firms and for 
society at large:
The company’s choices at any point are to comply voluntarily with the rules or to evade
them. The agency’s choices are to adopt an enforcement mode in dealing with that
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particular company which is either flexible or coercive. If the agency enforces with 
flexibility and the firm complies with the rules, then both the agency and the firm 
benefit from mutual co-operation. The agency benefits from the company’s compliance, 
the company benefits from the agency’s flexibility. Both sides avoid expensive 
enforcement and litigation procedures. Society also gains the benefits of full compliance 
at low cost to the economy. But if the firm evades and the agency uses coercive 
enforcement, both suffer from the punishing costs of the resultant legalistic relationship. 
The firm also faces a temptation to evade if the agency is using a flexible enforcement 
policy that is unlikely to penalise evasion. And the agency faces a temptation to use the 
strict enforcement mode with a complying company in order to get the benefits of 
enforcing even unreasonably expensive rules.
According to this analysis, the pay-offs or incentive structures that are encountered, and the 
associated categorisation of the nature of the implementation process, can be depicted in the 
structure of the following Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Regulatory Agency
Co-operative Non-co-operative
Regulated
Firms
Co-operative Co-operative relations 
(3,3)
Top-down control 
(5,0)
Non-co-operative Bottom-up capture 
(0,5)
Adversarial relations
(i.i)
(benefits for regulators; benefits for firms)
Thus, Axelrod (1984) suggests that co-operation in the implementation process can be 
incentivised, or in other words 'cooperative regulatory spaces’ can be created, where regulators 
offer some flexibility in return for some commitment to compliance from regulated firms. 
Reflecting much of the wider theory on the policy process, this suggests that the implementation 
process is likely to be based on a degree of negotiation between actors rather than on the top- 
down imposition of controls. By its very nature, this negotiation means that the outcomes of the 
co-operative approach, expressed in terms of the presumed regulatory objective of 
environmental improvement, are likely to be lower than those that might be achieved if the 
regulator were able to adopt and maintain a hierarchical, non-co-operative approach. Indeed, 
Axelrod (1984, p i57) acknowledges that in the short-term at least standards are likely to be 
reduced because of the need to secure the co-operation of regulated firms:
To set a tough pollution standard... would make the temptation to evade very great. On 
the other hand, to set a very lenient standard would mean more allowable pollution, 
thereby lessening the payoff from mutual co-operation which the agency would attain
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from voluntary compliance. The trick is to set the stringency of the standard high 
enough to get most of the social benefits of regulation, and not so high as to prevent the 
evolution of a stable pattern of voluntary compliance from almost all of the companies.
This process of negotiation, and the implicit acknowledgement that regulated firms have power 
and influence and therefore can play a role in the standard setting process, is central to the 
accusation that co-operation within the implementation process is synonymous with regulatory 
capture. However, adding a critically important temporal dimension that is often overlooked, 
Axelrod’s (1984) analysis indicates that regulatory agencies can only secure the benefits o f a 
top-down hierarchical approach to implementation in the short term as in the medium term 
regulated firms are likely to respond by adopting a non-co-operative approach, thereby 
triggering the emergence of adversarialism within the implementation process. In order to 
secure medium-term benefits that exceed those that are associated with adversarialism, the 
analysis suggests that regulatory agencies have to compromise in some way in order to tempt 
regulated firms into the 'co-operative regulatory space’. Thus, the analysis indicates that the 
short-term optimum for the regulator simply isn’t available in the medium term. Instead, the co­
operative approach represents the second best option in a world where both parties cannot 
secure their individual first best option because of their interdependencies. This is a critically 
important observation as it challenges the central assumptions of those that assume that 
regulations can be and should be implemented hierarchically and that any departure from such 
an approach approximates capture.
Scholz (1984, 1991) develops Axelrod’s theory further, again focusing particularly on the 
implementation of environmental regulation. Like authors such as Hutter (1997), he suggests 
that two distinctive implementation or enforcement strategies can be observed or advocated -  
one based on deterrence, the other based on co-operation. According to Scholz (1984) the 
deterrence strategy suggests that firms will comply if the benefits of non-compliance are less 
than the prospective costs as defined by the chances of cases of non-compliance being detected 
multiplied by the likely cost of formal and informal sanctions. Under such a strategy, the basis 
for which clearly reflects the neo-classical tradition, it is assumed that regulators can force 
compliance by adjusting the prospective costs and benefits of non-compliance, for example by 
increasing their monitoring activities, by improving public access to information or by more 
readily resorting to legal action in cases of non-compliance. As an alternative to this essentially 
economistic view of regulation, Scholz (1984, pi 80) suggests that a co-operative strategy can be 
adopted which 'assumes a willingness to obey legitimate laws and stresses the need for 
reasonable enforcement and persuasion rather than coercion’. He argues that such a co-operative 
strategy recognises the need for flexible enforcement and the difficulty of applying abstract
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rules to complex situations. Indeed, he suggests (pi 83-184) that, because of their flexibility, co­
operative approaches to implementation and enforcement can have a number of generic 
benefits:
Co-operative enforcement helps overcome the unavoidable problems of under-inclusive 
or over-inclusive regulations by allowing a firm to ignore technical violations in 
situations where compliance would contribute little to reducing harms. In return, 
corrective measures beyond minimal legal requirements are elicited in situations where 
harms can be reduced in a more cost-effective way... To the extent that firms cooperate 
by finding more efficient methods to achieve the ends specified in the standards and 
agencies cooperate by acknowledging tradeoffs and accepting effective, low cost, ad 
hoc methods in lieu of legally required ones, co-operation can achieve better outcomes 
for the agency at less cost for the firm... In addition to the advantage of cost-saving 
trade-offs, co-operative firms and agencies avoid the high legal costs incurred when 
coercive agencies battle evasive firms. And firms are more likely to share information 
on newly discovered problems not covered by regulations if agencies are likely to help 
solve the problem rather than promulgate simple rules and enforce them legalistically. 
Finally agencies can shift scarce monitoring and prosecutorial resources from co­
operative firms to bad firms, thereby increasing, through deterrence, the level of 
compliance among bad firms.
Because of these putative benefits, Scholz (1984, p i81) suggests that co-operation in the 
implementation process should be viewed 'not as an altruistic strategy but... as a strategy which 
helps both individuals and enforcers to achieve a higher utility in the long-run by abstaining 
from temptations to maximise short term gains’. In this sense, like Axelrod (1984), Scholz 
(1984, 1991) also adds a temporal dimension to the analysis by comparing the short-term gains 
that might be available through defection with the longer-term benefits of a more co-operative 
approach.
Whilst recognising that there may be barriers to co-operation, stemming for example from the 
lack of trust or from instability in the relationship between regulators and regulated firms, 
Scholz (1984) also indicates that third parties can exert an influence on the implementation 
process and on the incentive structures associated with it. Significantly, he argues that the 
beneficiaries of health, safety or environmental policies, such as trade unions or environmental 
groups, might oppose the emergence of co-operation in the implementation process even if this 
co-operation leads to more effective implementation and to improved policy outcomes. He 
suggests that this is because regulatory agencies have to be granted long-term discretionary
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powers if co-operation is to emerge. As third parties may lack trust in the regulatory agency, 
Scholz (1991, p i32) suggests that 'the potential gain to beneficiaries from granting necessary 
discretion to the enforcement agency may be offset by a greater risk that the agency will be 
captured by business interests’ and that beneficiaries 'may prefer short-term gains to uncertain 
long-term gains that depend on future agency actions’. As a result, he argues (p i32) that 'if 
beneficiaries always assume that their opponents will soon control the enforcement 
bureaucracy... it appears unlikely that they would ever trust the bureaucracy with the long-term 
discretion required for effective (co-operative) enforcement’. This is an important point as it 
suggests that the potential for cooperation does not only depend upon the relationship between 
regulators and regulated firms but also on the interests and resources of third parties.
These arguments relate closely to Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) view that public interest 
groups should be invited to participate in the implementation process to protect it against 
capture. As long as the position of being an 'empowered public interest group’ is contestable, 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that regulated firms must capture all of the contesting 
public interest groups as well as the regulators if they wish to subvert the co-operative approach 
to policy. However, public choice theory suggests that such an approach depends upon the 
presence of various competing interest groups, all of which must have an incentive to participate 
in the various stages of the implementation process (see for example Dunleavy, 1991). Where 
the implementation process is flexible and iterative, these interactions are likely to be complex 
and sustained. As Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) acknowledge, the incentives and the 
institutional structures that might motivate and enable third-party involvement in the intricacies 
of the implementation process therefore remain a central issue. Thus, authors such as Gouldson 
and Murphy (1998) have suggested that cooperation in the implementation process can be 
protected against capture not necessarily through the participation of public interest groups in 
the implementation process but through the provision of transparency and the publication of 
clear performance measures that can be widely scrutinised.
Many of the issues discussed above are reflected in the literature on the role that networks can 
play in the implementation of environmental regulation. Smith (1997) for example suggests that 
networks emerge in the implementation process as a response to various resource inter­
dependencies. He also suggests that different forms of network can be characterised and 
analysed according to their membership, the pattern of resource distribution and inter­
dependence between members and the extent to which common values and rules of the game 
emerge which mediate the interactions between these members. Using the policy networks 
concept to analyse the implementation of Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) regulations in 
England and Wales, Smith (1997) argues that the interactions between the regulators and the
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regulated firms were based upon a range of resource inter-dependencies: as regulators had the 
authority to allow firms to operate and the organisational resources to enforce standards, firms 
had the information needed to set standards and the financial and organisational resources to 
make improvements. Because of these inter-dependencies, he suggests that a tightly bound and 
highly cooperative network, or more particularly a policy community, emerged in the IPC 
implementation process that was based on the exclusive membership of inspectors and the 
managers of regulated firms.
In relation to the influence of this form of network, Smith (1997) argues that the balance of 
power favoured the regulated firms as the inspectors were unable to exercise their full authority 
without access to the information that was held by the firms. As a result, he suggests that the 
particular form of policy network that emerged in the IPC implementation process generated 
weaker policy outputs (meaning the stringency of the demands made by the regulators). 
Although the interactions and outputs that were associated with this approach to implementation 
were viewed with suspicion by actors within the wider issue network, Smith (1997) argues that 
the extent of resource inter-dependence within the policy community meant that the regulated 
firms were able to restrict the potential for change by drawing the regulators back into the 
cooperative approach. As such, he associates this approach to implementation with regulatory 
capture as he argues that it leads to lower standards and to unaccountable decision-making 
processes that were unresponsive to broader public concerns. Critically, however, Smith (1997) 
does not consider whether this cooperation between the regulators and the regulated generated 
more effective policy outcomes (meaning the ways in which the firms responded to regulatory 
demands) by enabling collective action problems to be resolved. In the case of IPC, this may 
have been the case if cooperation in the implementation process encouraged or enabled the 
wider adoption of the best available technologies and techniques for pollution control.
Reflecting Hutter’s (1997) distinction between the conflict theorists and the consensual theorists 
as presented in Chapter 1, it seems therefore that the different analyses of the influence of 
cooperation and collective action in the implementation of environmental regulation generate 
contrasting findings. On the one hand, authors such as Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and Smith 
(1997) suggest that in the absence of third party involvement cooperation between regulators 
and regulated actors leads to capture through reduced standards and unaccountable and 
unresponsive decision-making processes. On the other, authors such as Axelrod (1984) and 
Scholz (1984, 1991) argue that cooperation is required if the implementation process is to be 
administratively feasible. Whilst acknowledging that cooperation can require negotiation and 
compromise in the short-term, they also argue that it can lead to more effective and more 
efficient outcomes in the medium term as it enables collective action problems to be solved.
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Questions about the balance between cooperation and capture in the implementation process 
that remain largely unanswered in the broader literature will be examined within this thesis 
therefore.
The Research Thesis
On the basis of the conceptual discussion that has been presented within this chapter, a number 
of hypotheses can be put forward that will be tested within the empirical investigation that 
follows. These hypotheses are:
i) that implementation processes will be shaped not only by the ability of public sector 
regulators to resort to the hierarchical application of legal authority but also by the 
extent to which regulated actors derive influence in the implementation process from 
their access to a broader range of resources;
ii) that various resource interdependencies will emerge in the implementation process 
which mean that compliance depends upon co-operation and the exchange of resources 
as regulatory objectives effectively become 'collective action problems’;
iii) that cooperative interactions within the implementation process will be institutionalised 
within different forms of network and that these networks will influence both the 
outputs and outcomes of the implementation process;
iv) that because of these inter-dependencies the implementation process will display some 
of the advantages of co-operation (i.e. enhanced capacity for collective action leading to 
higher standards) and some of the disadvantages of regulatory capture (i.e. reduced 
standards and loss of accountability).
As well as testing the validity of these hypotheses, the thesis also seeks to examine the 
explanatory value of two contrasting perspectives on the basis for cooperation and collective 
action in the implementation process. On the one hand, the rational choice or neo-classical 
perspective contends that resource inter-dependencies generate the incentives that shape the 
strategies that are adopted within the implementation process. On the other, the institutional 
perspective contends that these inter-dependencies, incentives and strategies are shaped by the 
broader institutional context within which the implementation process takes place and by the 
presence of various institutionalised forms of behaviour. These different perspectives are 
significant as they are associated with different views of the implementation process; one with a 
responsive view of the world where behaviour can be altered by changing incentive structures,
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the other with a more socially embedded view of the world where institutionalised modes of 
behaviour emerge which can be very difficult to change.
In order to examine the validity of these hypotheses and the associated theoretical perspectives, 
the discussion has suggested that an empirical analysis should consider the character, resources 
and strategies of the different actors, the origins and influence of interactions at the inter­
personal and inter-organisational levels and the significance of interaction between different 
networks in specific settings. This implies that a contextually specific, multi-level empirical 
analysis is needed. With these issues in mind, the thesis will now consider the nature of the 
empirical cases to be considered and the methodological basis for such an empirical 
investigation.
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The Rationale for the Empirical Study
In order to examine the validity of the hypotheses and the explanatory value of the conceptual 
perspectives that were introduced in the previous chapters, the thesis needs an empirical focus 
that will allow it to examine the nature and influence of those interactions that are at the heart of 
the implementation process. For various reasons, both practical and conceptual, the empirical 
analysis focuses on the implementation of environmental regulation in the UK.
The focus on environmental regulation is adopted because many of the recurrent themes in the 
wider debate on regulation and its reform are reflected in the interactions between government, 
business and the wide range of other stakeholders with an interest in environmental protection. 
The focus on the UK is adopted partly through practical necessity. However, in many areas of 
regulation in the UK, regulatory agencies and the street level bureaucrats within them 
commonly exercise the discretion that is awarded to them by adopting a particularly cooperative 
regulatory style (see Vogel, 1986). Thus, the influence of the implementation process and the 
significance of cooperation within this process are likely to be more pronounced in the UK than 
in many other settings. While this may make the issues that are at the heart of the thesis easier to 
study, it may also mean that the findings of the empirical research are particularly UK oriented. 
However, it is contended that some important aspects of the UK’s experience with cooperative
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approaches to implementation are likely to be reflected in other settings but in a different 
context and possibly in a less exaggerated form.
Within the broader field of environmental regulation in the UK, two distinct but closely related 
regulatory frameworks provide the basis for a comparative study. These frameworks of 
regulation, which were introduced in England and Wales in 1990 under the Environmental 
Protection Act (EPA), are:
i) the framework of Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) regulations which affects larger and 
more environmentally significant industrial processes and is implemented by the 
Environment Agency for England and Wales.
ii) the framework of Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC) regulations which affects smaller 
and less environmentally significant industrial processes and is implemented by a large 
number of local authorities.
At least in terms of their formal design, the IPC and LAPC systems have a range of notable 
similarities. Both systems were adopted at the same time in the same country. They are both 
examples of technology-based command and control regulations, each relying on the 
interpretation of a flexible principle that obliges regulatory agencies to determine whether a 
particular industrial process meets those emissions standards that could be realised through the 
adoption of the 'Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost’ (BATNEEC). 
Although guidance is issued for each regulator on what may constitute BATNEEC for a 
particular industrial sector, the practical demands established by both the IPC and the LAPC 
systems are represented within the operating conditions and emissions limits that are set, to 
some extent on a discretionary basis, following the case-by-case interpretation of this flexible 
principle. The interactions that are at the heart of the implementation process are therefore 
particularly influential in both regulatory frameworks.
Despite their similarities, however, the IPC and LAPC systems are implemented by different 
regulatory agencies that seek to influence the behaviour and performance of different target 
groups. The IPC system, which regulates emissions to air, water and land from larger and more 
environmentally significant industrial processes, is implemented by the national Environment 
Agency for England and Wales. This specialist agency has a statutory responsibility to protect 
the environment and to protect against floods and other natural hazards. By contrast, the LAPC 
system, which regulates the emissions to air only from smaller and less environmentally 
significant industrial processes, is implemented by individual local authorities that have 
responsibility for the protection of various aspects of the local environment and for a wider
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range of functions including the promotion of economic development and the provision of land- 
use planning controls. Thus, despite some notable similarities, there are some significant 
differences in the nature of the implementing agencies, the breadth of the regulations and the 
character of the target actors that are associated with the IPC and LAPC systems.
These similarities and differences provide the basis for a comparative empirical review that will 
analyse the origin and influence of any cooperative interactions that emerge within each of the 
implementation processes. The similarities mean that a wide range of contextual factors and the 
central regulatory principles are common to both regulatory frameworks. The differences mean 
that the analysis can consider the origins and the influence that the interactions between the 
different regulatory agencies and the regulated firms can have on the outputs and outcomes of 
each implementation process. A fuller discussion of the origins and content of the IPC and 
LAPC regulatory frameworks, as well as a brief discussion on the relevance of contemporary 
developments in European Union policy, is presented in Appendix A.
Research Questions
Given the conceptual basis for the thesis, the associated hypotheses and the nature of the two 
regulatory frameworks that are to be assessed empirically, we can begin to identify a range of 
more specific research questions including:
i) What is the broader institutional context within which the implementation process takes 
place?
ii) What are the characteristics of the different actors that operate at the heart of the 
implementation process?
iii) What resources do the different actors have access to and what role do these resources 
play within the implementation process?
iv) What strategies do the different actors adopt within the implementation process?
v) Are the strategies adopted by the different actors shaped by any resource inter­
dependencies and, if so, what form do these take?
vi) What are the incentive structures associated with different forms of inter-dependency?
vii) What institutional factors determine the ability of the central actors to interact in 
different ways and to recognise, shape and respond to these incentive structures?
viii) What influence do third parties have on the interactions between actors or on the 
incentive structures that shape these interactions?
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ix) What influence do these interactions and any associated institutional factors have on the 
practical demands associated with the implementation process and on the ways in which 
regulated actors respond to these demands?
x) What factors shape the responsiveness or embeddedness of particular approaches to 
implementation?
Qualitative Approaches to Policy Analysis
- The basis for qualitative research
In order to answer these questions, a qualitative approach to policy analysis is adopted. 
Qualitative research attempts to view the world from the perspective of those who are being 
studied and to provide a detailed description of the context within which events and processes 
take place that is consistent with the perspectives of the participants in that social setting 
(Bryman, 1988). Because of its focus on the perspectives of those being studied and its 
emphasis on the significance of the context within which social processes take place, qualitative 
research attempts to provide a detailed 'contextual backdrop’ against which events and 
situations can be analysed and explained. Thus, qualitative approaches are of particular 
relevance to the study of social relations when context is important and when individuals need 
to be viewed in their natural setting (Flick, 1998; Creswell, 1998).
Qualitative approaches also have particular value for research that delves in-depth into social 
complexities and processes and for research that attempts to examine the significance of social 
inter-connection (Bryman, 1988; Marshall and Rossman, 1989). They are also well suited to 
research that seeks to explore real as opposed to stated organisational goals and for research that 
seeks to understand where and why policy and practice do or do not work (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1989). Given its focus on the influence of the interactions and interdependencies that 
shape the implementation and impact of regulation, and on the significance of the context within 
which these social processes take place, the qualitative approach is well suited to the focus and 
objectives of this thesis.
Although the qualitative approach is not normally associated with a positivistic search for 
universal theories and objective facts, there are concerns about the reliability and validity of 
qualitative research. These concerns relate particularly to the extent to which qualitative 
research should be informed in advance by existing theories and to the ability of researchers to
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collect, analyse and present data in a way that faithfully reflects the perspectives of those that 
they are investigating.
In relation to the extent to which qualitative research should be informed by existing theories, 
Bryman (1988, p66) argues that in order to perceive, interpret and present the perspective of 
those that they are investigating faithfully, many qualitative researchers reject the imposition of 
'prior and possibly inappropriate frames of reference on the people they study’. This is 
particularly evident in qualitative approaches that adopt the grounded theory approach which 
gives preference to the data and field under study as against a priori theoretical assumptions and 
models (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Flick, 1998). However, in the thesis it is 
argued that the theories of cooperation and collective action and the policy and economic 
networks concepts can inform a study of the extent to which the interactions between the 
interdependent organisations shape the implementation and impact of regulation. Thus, whilst it 
is acknowledged that the selection of these conceptual issues may have narrowed the focus of 
the research and limited its ability to reflect the perspectives of the participants with complete 
freedom, it is also argued that these concepts can provide the basis for a more focused and 
incisive empirical study.
- Data collection techniques and data reliability
In relation to the methods used to generate data, the semi-structured interview is adopted as the 
main technique for primary data collection. Lofland (1971, p76) suggests that semi-structured 
interviews seek 'to elicit rich, detailed materials that can be used... to find out what kinds of 
things are happening rather than to determine the frequency of predetermined kinds of things 
that the researcher already believes can happen’. Flick (1998, p76) argues that the widespread 
adoption of semi-structured interviews as a technique for qualitative data collection is linked to 
'the expectation that the interviewed subjects’ viewpoints are more likely to be expressed in a 
relatively openly designed interview situation than in a standardized interview or questionnaire’. 
Relatedly, Gilbert (1993) suggests that semi-structured interviews are valuable where the 
subject matter is complicated or sensitive, as is likely to be the case where interdependent actors 
are asked to talk openly about their beliefs, strategies and perceptions of each other. Semi­
structured interviews are also useful where some flexibility is required to allow the interviewer 
to clarify responses, to seek more detailed responses and to explore the inter-connectedness of 
particular issues and the complexities of social interaction. Thus, semi-structured interviews 
appear to be an appropriate technique for collecting data on the perceptions of the actors that 
participate in the processes that shape the implementation and impact of regulation.
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However, the reliability and validity of data collected through semi-structured interviews can be 
eroded by the biases of both interviewers and respondents. In relation to the potential effects of 
interviewers on the validity and reliability of the data, Gilbert (1993, pl48) identifies several 
sources of error or bias relating to 'misdirected probing and prompting, ignoring the effects of 
interviewer characteristics and behaviour, neglecting the cultural context within which the 
researcher is located and problems with question wording’. However, following Merton and 
Kendall (1946), Gilbert (1993) argues that these can be minimised, for instance by keeping 
guidance and direction from the interviewer to a minimum, by allowing the subjects definition 
of the situation to find full and specific expression and by bringing out the value-laden 
implications of responses. More fundamentally, Gilbert (1993, pl38-139) argues that the 
attitudes expressed by respondents are not necessarily a useful indicator of what people have 
done or will do. Indeed, he argues that respondents in interviews may rationalise their behaviour 
and may only offer logical rather than emotional reasons for their action, that they may lack 
information or awareness on the issues being discussed, that they may be unused to describing 
their opinions or feelings, that they may fear being shown up or that they may show over­
politeness to the interviewer, particularly by giving those answers that they anticipate the 
interviewer wants to hear.
This thesis adopts a range of practical techniques to respond to the potential influence of 
interviewers and respondents on the reliability of the data collected. Initially, both the interview 
schedule and the interview technique were tested and refined through pilot interviews. Whilst 
the transparency of the research process was restricted to some degree by the need to conduct 
interviews in confidence, this also ensured that respondents could speak openly about their 
perceptions of the regulatory process, about the strategies that guide their interactions within it 
and about the practical influence of regulation on their behaviour. It also allowed every 
interview to be recorded, full transcripts of interviews to be produced and verbatum quotes to be 
used throughout the research.
Opportunities for respondent validation were also built in to the interview schedule and 
opportunities to comment on the contrasting perspectives of other respondents in the same 
group and in other groups were established. Further opportunities for respondent validation 
were also introduced through various follow-up interviews and conference presentations and 
through an interactive workshop with representatives both of the different regulatory agencies 
and of the different target groups. Details of the interactive workshop are included in Appendix 
B.
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-  Top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy analysis
Within the thesis, two approaches to policy analysis are combined in a form of methodological 
triangulation designed to increase the validity and reliability of the research process and its 
outcomes (Denzin, 1989). Thus, although the thesis focuses on the influence of the processes 
that shape the implementation and impact of regulation 'at the bottom’ of the policy process, it 
combines aspects of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy analysis.
Top-down approaches to policy analysis focus on particular policies or regulations and examine 
the extent to which these policies or regulations realise their objectives. Typically, such 
approaches focus initially on a policy decision, and address questions on the extent to which the 
actions of implementing officials were consistent with the procedures set out in the policy 
decision, on the extent to which the impacts of the policy were consistent with the objectives of 
the policy decision and on the nature and influence of the principal factors affecting policy 
outputs, outcomes and impacts (Sabatier, 1986). Thus, analysis based on the top-down approach 
can contribute to an understanding of the extent to which the actions of those 'at the bottom’ are 
shaped in advance by decisions taken 'at the top’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
However, top-down approaches have a tendency to over-emphasise the significance of the 
attempts made by those 'at the top’ to precondition the implementation process. In particular, 
they can under-emphasise the extent to which the actions of those 'at the bottom’ can influence 
the practical outcomes of the implementation process. Top-down approaches can also over­
estimate the beneficial effects of a particular policy or regulation, for example by claiming 
responsibility for benefits that may have been realised in the absence of the policy in question or 
for effects that may have been stimulated by other policies or regulations. Relatedly, top-down 
approaches can ignore or under-estimate both the negative side-effects or unintended 
consequences of a particular policy or regulation and the influence of the multitude of other 
market and regulatory pressures that also affect the behaviour of the target group (Sabatier, 
1986).
By contrast, bottom-up approaches focus initially on a particular issue before identifying the 
range of actors and initiatives that influence that issue at the local level (Hjem and Porter, 1981; 
Sabatier, 1986). Bottom-up approaches then focus on the range of actors associated with a 
particular issue at the local level, examining their perceptions and their various objectives, the 
range of strategies that they employ to realise their objectives and the actors with whom they 
interact as they attempt to realise their objectives. In this way, bottom-up approaches attempt to 
build an overview of the perceptions, actions and interactions of different actors and to analyse
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the relative influence of the different policies and of the wider range of social and economic 
pressures that influence their behaviour. Bottom-up approaches therefore emphasize the 
influence of the wider socio-economic and political context that both facilitates and constrains 
the activities of particular actors.
Despite its potential to examine the wide range of factors that are likely to influence behaviour 
at the local level, the bottom-up approach has a number of weaknesses. Bottom-up approaches 
can under-estimate the extent to which the goals, resources and strategies of actors 'at the 
bottom’ can be shaped indirectly by decisions taken 'at the top’ as they influence the 
institutional structure within which individuals operate, for example by introducing 'rules of the 
game’ to govern their activities (Sabatier, 1986). Futhermore, as the bottom-up approach bases 
its analysis on the perceptions and activities of actors at the local level, Sabatier (1986) argues 
that it 'is unlikely to analyse the factors indirectly affecting their behaviour or even the factors 
directly affecting their behaviour that they do not recognise’.
Given the different strengths and weaknesses of each approach, this thesis draws upon aspects 
of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy analysis. It is argued that the top- 
down approach can contribute to the analysis of the influence that the different approaches to 
implementation that are adopted by implementing agencies and officials can have on the 
outcomes of the regulatory process. However, while the top-down approach focuses on those 
factors that influence the effectiveness of different policies and of particular approaches to 
implementation, the impacts of policy are also determined by the local conditions that shape the 
behaviour of target groups. In this respect, it is argued that the bottom-up approach can 
contribute to an analysis of the wide range of factors that affect behaviour at the local level. 
Thus, the policy process is examined from two different perspectives. Where the results of the 
two different approaches to policy analysis coincide, the reliability and validity of the 
qualitative data are reinforced. Where the two approaches yield different results, the differences 
can be identified and the reasons for them illuminated and explored.
- Data analysis, analytical induction and generalizability
In relation to the analysis of the qualitative data collected through the semi-structured 
interviews, a process of analytic induction is employed to draw theoretical observations and 
explanations from the empirical data. Analytic induction is a process that attempts to build and 
to test theories by analysing and reanalysing data (Flick, 1998). Bryman (1988, p83) argues that 
analytic induction is 'a highly stringent approach to the analysis of data in that the occurrence of 
a single negative case is sufficient to send the researcher off to reformulate the problem’.
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However, the reliability and validity of any theories generated through the process of analytic 
induction rests to a large degree on the ability of the researcher to derive generalizable theories 
from the contextually specific findings of case study research. Although it may be the job of 
other researchers or of subsequent research projects to test the relevance of the findings of 
particular cases in other situations, Bryman (1988, p88) argues that:
The concern that findings may be untypical is understandable when a subject is keen to 
develop a modicum of empirical generalization and possibly to make a contribution to 
wider theoretical developments. Further... to have an impact on social policy through 
the use of a case study can be diminished by the belief that the findings may be 
idiosyncractic.
However, Bryman (1998, p90) goes on to argue that any claims about the wider relevance of 
findings from case-based research should relate to theoretical propositions rather than to broader 
populations or universes. Thus, the primary focus of the research is not on the particular 
regulatory frameworks selected as cases for empirical study or on the organisations and 
individuals that were interviewed as part of this study but on the nature of the interactive 
processes within which these actors participate and on the influence that these processes can 
have on the outputs and outcomes of regulation. While this case-based research may have some 
intrinsic interest for those interested in the particular cases, therefore, where it can illustrate an 
issue that is of wider practical interest and theoretical relevance it should also have some 
instrumental value (Cresswell, 1998).
The Research Process
The research process began with a conceptual examination of the nature of regulation and 
implementation. This examination, which was stimulated in part by the findings of the previous 
empirical work conducted by the author (see Gouldson and Murphy, 1998), highlighted the 
potential significance of the day-to-day interactions between regulators and firms within the 
implementation process. In seeking to build a fuller understanding of the factors that might 
shape the nature and influence of these interactions, the discussion identified the existence of 
various inter-dependencies that had the potential to draw the regulators and the managers of the 
regulated firms together within cooperative networks. Consequently, as well as considering the 
value of the policy networks and economic networks concepts, the value of the different 
theories of cooperation and collective action were also examined. In this way, a more focused
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set of research questions and variables to be considered within the empirical analysis was 
established (see above).
Having established its data requirements, the empirical study began by re-examining the body 
of secondary data that was already available in the form of transcripts from previous interviews 
on the implementation and impact of IPC. Finding that much of the required information on the 
factors that shaped the interactions that defined the IPC implementation process was already 
available, a series of follow-up interviews was conducted to up-date and expand the body of 
data on IPC so that it fulfilled broader data requirements. Thus, in the case of IPC, secondary 
data was drawn from the results of seven semi-structured interviews conducted in 1995/6 and 
from two follow up interviews in 1998 with staff from the regulatory agency. Similarly, 
secondary data was drawn from the results of interviews conducted in 1995/6 with the 
environmental managers of sixteen of the processes regulated by IPC and primary data was 
drawn from follow-up interviews with four of these firms that were conducted in 1998. For 
comparative purposes, LAPC was then adopted as a second case. Primary data on LAPC was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with managers and inspectors in seven local 
authority environmental health departments and with the managers of eighteen regulated firms. 
All interviews relating to LAPC were conducted in 1998.
Given limited resources and the need to reduce the regional differences in the socio-economic 
conditions that may have an influence on the implementation process, all interviews were 
conducted in the Yorkshire and the Humber region. This region was selected for primarily 
practical reasons as the author had developed numerous links with regulators and industry in the 
area. These links eased access to some of the actors with whom interviews were sought, most 
notably the managers of the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that were regulated by 
LAPC. This was significant as securing SME participation in environment related initiatives had 
been highly problematic in the past. Rather than seeking to interview all of the regulated process 
within the region or to select a random or a representative sample, a number of industrial sectors 
were selected for further investigation. The selection of the industrial sectors for further 
investigation was influenced initially by the desire to collect data from similar sectors in each of 
the regulatory frameworks adopted as cases for investigation. However, it was also partially 
influenced by the range of regulated processes within the Yorkshire and the Humber region and 
by the range of regulated processes that agreed to participate in the research.
The number of interviews conducted in each of the regulatory frameworks adopted as cases for 
investigation was influenced initially by the need to gather data from a range of actors to gain an 
insight into the diversity of the perspectives that may influence the processes that shape the
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implementation and impact of the regulations in question. However, following Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), no particular decisions were taken in advance about the number of companies to 
be interviewed. Instead, interviews were conducted up to the point where a substantial degree of 
'theoretical saturation’ had been achieved so that each new interview failed to establish the need 
for new categories of responses to be established.
Each interview lasted approximately 90 minutes, although interviews with the managers of 
some regulated firms were somewhat shorter. All interviews were taped and transcribed before 
working hypotheses were generated and tested in accordance with the process of analytic 
induction outlined above. Thereafter, the central hypotheses of the thesis were reformulated 
before the body of qualitative data that had been collected was re-examined to consider validity 
of these revised hypotheses.
Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the empirical focus for the thesis, the research questions that stem 
from the conceptual discussion that link it to the empirical cases and the methodological 
approach to the empirical study that has been selected. On this basis, the discussion now moves 
on to present the empirical results. Chapters 4 and 5 present the different perspectives that the 
main actors have of their role within the IPC implementation process while Chapters 6 and 7 
adopt a similar approach but this time focusing on the perspectives that the actors have of their 
interactions within the LAPC implementation process. These chapters then provide the basis for 
a comparative analysis of the factors that shape the nature and influence of the implementation 
process associated with each regulatory framework that is presented in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 4
The Case of Integrated Pollution Control:
The perspectives of the regulators
Structure
> Introduction
> The nature of the implementation process
Organisational change and the creation o f the Environment Agency
Pre-conditioning, guidance and the need for flexibility
Instigating change within regulated firms
Beyond the expedient regulatory response
Regulators as educators and persuaders
Arms-length and hands-on approaches to implementation
The resource intensity o f hands-on approaches
The influence o f stakeholders on the implementation process
> The influence of the implementation process 
On technological and organisational change 
On economic networks
On environmental performance 
On costs and benefits
> Relating the empirical discussion to the analytical variables 
Introduction
This chapter is interested in the perspectives that the inspectors within the regulatory agency 
responsible for IPC have of the factors that shape the nature and influence of the 
implementation process. More particularly, it is interested in the perspectives that the inspectors 
have of the influence of a range of analytical variables:
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i) The character and resources of the various actors with an interest in the implementation 
process;
ii) The extent to which any resource inter-dependencies provide incentives for different
forms of interaction within the implementation process;
iii) The strategies that the different actors adopt in response to any such incentives;
iv) The extent to which different institutional structures shape and are shaped by these
incentives, and constrain or enable these strategies; and
v) The influence that different forms of interaction have on regulatory outputs (meaning
the practical demands made by regulators) and on regulatory outcomes (meaning the 
ways in which firms respond to these demands).
The influence of these analytical variables, which arose from the conceptual discussion that was 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2, was examined within a research process based on the 
methodological approach discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, the discussion that follows draws 
upon the results of interviews with managers and inspectors within one region of the 
Environment Agency, conducted between 1995 and 1997. Follow-up interviews and an 
interactive workshop were organised to examine the validity of the interview findings. Although 
they each came from the same regional office, some of the characteristics of the inspectors that 
were interviewed for the study are presented in Table 4.1, with the number (i.e. [5]) at the end of 
each quotation relating to the corresponding row in this table.
Table 4.1: Characteristics of IPC Inspectors
Inspector Position Experience Predom inant role
1 Area Manager Extensive industrial 
and regulatory
National policy/ guidance formulation, 
area manager for inspections team
2 Pollution Inspector and 
Operations Support
Extensive industrial, 
medium regulatory
Guidance formulation, coordination of 
approaches in different areas, site inspections
3 Pollution Inspector Medium industrial, 
extensive regulatory
Site inspections
4 Pollution Inspector Medium industrial, 
extensive regulatory
Site inspections
5 Pollution Inspector Extensive industrial, 
medium regulatory
Site inspections
6 Pollution Inspector Extensive industrial, 
medium regulatory
Site inspections
7 Assistant Pollution Inspector Extensive regulatory Site inspections
In order to present the results of the research process in a logical way, the discussion that 
follows is structured to reflect the different stages of the implementation process. Thus, after 
examining the character and resources of the implementing agency and the inspectors within it, 
the discussion considers the processes associated with the interpretation of legislative principles, 
the setting of standards, the monitoring of performance, the enforcement of standards and the
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imposition of sanctions. The chapter then considers the perspectives that the inspectors have of 
the influence that the implementation process has exerted on the practical demands that they 
make and on the ways in which the regulated firms respond to these demands.
The influence of the analytical variables can be felt recurrently during the implementation 
process, and therefore related issues arise throughout the discussion here. The chapter will 
conclude by drawing these issues together to give an overview of the impact that these variables 
have on the nature and influence of the IPC implementation process, as seen from the 
perspective of the implementing inspectors. To complete the examination of the analytical 
variables that shape the IPC implementation process, Chapter 5 will then examine the same 
issues, but this time from the perspective of the managers of the regulated firms. Chapters 6 and 
7 will take a similar approach when analysing the implementation process associated with 
LAPC regulations. This will then allow the interactions that are at the heart of the two processes 
to be assessed ‘in the round’ within the comparative analysis that is presented in Chapter 8.
The Nature of the Implementation Process
Organisational change and the creation o f the Environment Agency
The creation of the Environment Agency in 1996 brought together the personnel and regulatory 
functions of the various Waste Regulatory Authorities (WRAs), the National Rivers Authority 
(NRA) and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), with its responsibilities for the 
implementation of IPC. Of the three groups of regulators, the NRA was generally seen to be the 
dominant partner. This was the case both because it was much larger in terms of staff numbers, 
and because it controlled a significantly greater proportion of the budget as, aside from its 
regulatory duties, it had a range of responsibilities relating to water management and flood 
defence.
In relation to regulatory styles, the NRA was staffed by inspectors with expertise relating to the 
natural environment rather than the industrial processes which might impact on that 
environment who had a history of implementing emissions-oriented, ecologically focused 
regulations in a relatively arms-length and sanctions-based way. HMIP, on the other hand, was 
largely staffed by inspectors with a background in science or engineering, who had often 
worked in the industries that they subsequently came to regulate. It had a history of applying 
technology-based regulations such as IPC in a relatively hands-on, co-operative and 
compliance-based way.
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The merger of these previously separate regulatory bodies therefore brought different 
approaches to implementation together, within one new organisation. It also created an 
opportunity for change -  for a re-evaluation of the ways in which different environmental 
regulations might be implemented -  and gave rise to a clash of regulatory styles within the 
Agency. As a result, the flexible, co-operative and hands-on approach to the implementation of 
IPC that had been prevalent within HMIP was subjected to some considerable scrutiny and 
pressure. There were calls for change from a range of stakeholders with long-standing concerns 
about the perceived ‘cosiness’ of the relationship between HMIP and regulated firms, which 
generated suspicions about the potential for and presence of ‘capture’ in the implementation 
process. Despite these pressures, however, the flexible, co-operative and hands-on approach to 
the implementation of IPC remained largely intact (see below).
Pre-conditioning, guidance and the need for flexibility
Within the organisational context associated with the creation of the Environment Agency, the 
day-to-day activities of the IPC inspectors therefore remained largely unchanged. They 
continued to exert a defining influence on the practical substance of IPC as they translated the 
generic principles of the legislation into specific requirements for each of the industrial 
processes that they regulated. Although their sphere of influence was limited by the existence of 
various guidance notes, the inspectors felt obliged to be flexible and to exercise a considerable 
degree of discretion, because the legislation was designed to be interpreted and applied on a 
case-by-base basis. This related particularly to the requirement for each site to adopt operating 
conditions and to meet emissions standards that were compatible with BATNEEC, the generic 
and deliberately flexible legislative principle that was at die heart of IPC:
The guidance notes set out the standards that are considered achievable using 
BATNEEC. But they are a fairly broad-brush thing. As the notes make quite clear, 
BATNEEC is a site-specific thing so what applies on the site and how it is achieved is 
an individual assessment [1].
Flexibility had therefore been formally incorporated into the design of the legislation from the 
outset. Indeed, there was a generally held belief that it was not feasible to standardise the 
regulations and that the legislation’s practical demands had to be adapted to reflect the 
characteristics of each regulated process:
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You can’t have a uniform approach. You cannot -  it would not work. You have got to 
address the smaller operator who is probably less forward-looking than the bigger 
company... there is also a big difference [between] authorising something new [and] 
something that has been operating for thirty years [4].
Aside from the flexibility that stemmed from the pivotal role awarded to BATNEEC within the 
legislation, the perceived need for flexibility in implementation was further reinforced by the 
requirement that regulated processes ‘prevent, minimise and render harmless’ any releases of 
regulated emissions. As emissions came from a wide range of industrial processes that were 
operated by heterogeneous companies in diverse contexts, it was generally accepted that 
regulatory approaches that sought to prevent rather than respond to emissions needed to take 
these variations into account. Consequently, inspectors were drawn further into a case-by-base 
analysis of the factors that shaped not only emissions levels, but also the performance of the 
regulated processes themselves:
We regulate the production process rather than merely setting limits for what is coming 
out of a pipe. Obviously we do that in our authorisations as well, but it is the process that 
we regulate and the way that process is carried out. The limits are the last thing that is 
important because they are merely that which can be achieved by using the proper 
techniques -  and it is not just technology, it is techniques in its widest sense. So you make 
sure the process is operating to its correct techniques and then the emissions limits just 
automatically follow [3].
Countering this need for flexibility was an awareness that the Agency and the inspectors within 
it had to interpret the requirements of IPC in an equitable and consistent way, not least because 
of the ability of regulated firms to communicate among themselves and to challenge the Agency 
if any inconsistencies were detected. In order to ensure consistency, and to help prevent appeals 
that might be costly and that might damage their reputation, individual inspectors shared 
information with each other both formally and informally:
There is a nationwide computer-based information system which you can search for 
particular processes and in this case I could search for say clinical waste incinerators 
which are authorised. I can get the name of the company, I can get the name of the 
inspector and I can talk to the inspector to say what are they doing and what techniques 
are they using. That is extremely useful because I have then got concrete evidence when 
I go to the company and say look, company X are doing it this way and why are you 
doing it a different way? [1].
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Such transfers of information within the Agency also served to reduce die inspectors’ 
dependence on the information supplied by the regulated firms. Indeed, a lot of information was 
publicly available thanks to legislation relating to freedom of access to environmental 
information. However, inspectors were constrained in their ability to put other types of 
information on the public register or to transfer it from site to site because of concerns within 
the regulated firms about commercial confidentiality. In these cases, information flows were 
restricted and as a result some options for environmental improvement remained unexploited:
Companies have perfected their own techniques to produce particular products and 
environmentally they might be a lot better than other traditional ways of doing it, but 
they want to keep that to themselves because it is in their commercial advantage. That 
puts me in a very difficult situation because I know how they make it and the 
environmental performance of their competitors would improve if they knew it too... 
[2].
Thus, the day-to-day activities of the inspectors were shaped by the resources that were awarded 
to them through the legislation which gave them access to legal authority, discretionary powers 
and to some extent access to information. However, institutional factors, relating for example to 
the presence of guidance and the need to respect commercial confidentiality, to promote 
consistency and to avoid challenges and appeals that might be costly and damage their 
reputation, all shaped the ways in which the inspectors used their resources in the IPC 
implementation process.
Instigating change within regulatedfirms
The inspectors generally believed that it was their job, through their interactions with the 
managers of regulated processes, to encourage, enable or force them to explore the potential of 
new technologies and techniques and thereby to keep up with what was being demanded under 
BATNEEC. This approach was commonly based on the belief that many companies were 
‘locked into’ existing ways of operating, and that as a result they had yet fully to explore the 
potential of various technologies and techniques. In the eyes of the inspectors, managers’ 
perceived reluctance to change related not only to those expensive and difficult improvement 
options, but also to those reasonably inexpensive and straightforward opportunities associated 
with waste minimisation and improved resource efficiency:
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The people in production who are running the plants have a simple objective... to get X 
tonnes out per week, so I don’t think that companies take waste minimisation 
particularly seriously. They all say they will do, but only so far as it is easy and 
convenient for them to do so, and no further. The whole thing you get back from the 
managers is that this plant is already BATNEEC and we aren’t going to do any more. If 
we weren’t here it simply wouldn’t get done [7].
It was felt that despite the presence of various other environmental management initiatives, 
change simply would not happen to the desired extent without enforcement:
Regulation is the main stimulus for industry investing in environmental issues. The 
other initiatives are all window dressing. Voluntary efforts are either to avoid regulation 
or where public opinion won’t let them get away with anything else... If you actually 
deal with these companies on a professional basis you get very cynical about their 
public relations statements and about their devotion to the environment... Some 
companies now are producing these nice glossy environmental reports, annual things, 
such as Company X. I don’t suppose you will see anywhere in there that Company X 
got an enforcement notice from us last year for non-compliance with the regulations [3].
These experiences led the inspectors to believe that they had to find ways of changing 
companies’ behaviour, and of ensuring that they afforded the environment the commitment 
necessary to overcome the inertia and barriers to change which were preventing them from 
exploring the potential of technologies and techniques which would allow them to reach 
compliance with IPC.
Beyond the expedient regulatory response
Regulated companies’ apathy or ignorance with regard to environmental issues was further 
reflected by their preference for expedient, short-term solutions to regulatory compliance. The 
inspectors felt that in the absence of their influence, regulated firms would tend towards those 
technologies and techniques that could be easily and immediately adopted, rather than those that 
would offer a more effective and efficient response in the longer term:
End-of-pipe is still the standard response from the companies... I think it is a cultural 
thing -  it is the difficulty of going back down the line and rethinking things that have 
often been done in a particular way for years [3].
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Reflecting the preventative dimensions of IPC, the inspectors generally saw such ‘bolt-on’ 
investments as being appropriate only after the more proactive measures to prevent or reduce 
the emission stream had been exploited. Indeed, they felt that industry tended to underestimate 
the economic benefits of some of the more preventative approaches to environmental 
improvement:
One reasonably simple way they can improve their environmental performance and 
save money is through waste minimisation. But this just isn’t treated seriously by many 
companies. That’s not just me saying that... Lots of studies have proven that waste 
minimisation saves money but people just aren’t bothered, it is not a priority item so it 
never gets done [6].
By changing regulated companies’ priorities -  encouraging them to take environmental 
improvements seriously -  the inspectors helped them to exploit environmentally and sometimes 
also economically beneficial options. However, inertia and ignorance were not the only 
problems: uncertainty and risk averseness were also barriers to change. To invest in a new or 
unfamiliar technology or process technique, with the associated disruptions and with no 
guaranteed results, was a big commitment for a regulated company. Indeed, this was seen to be 
the case even where practical, reliable information on the performance of different technologies 
and techniques was available, for example from other companies or from consultants. This 
information was often seen to be spurious or too generic, so that managers of regulated 
processes dismissed its relevance to them:
It is always easy when you come out and say Company A have saved X million pounds 
on this project because they have looked at this. But you then go to another company 
and they have got to start from scratch and it is very difficult for them to start thinking 
laterally and moving away from what they do. So it’s part of our job to get the cultural 
change you need if they are going to rethink aspects of what they do for environmental 
reasons [6].
The regulators therefore sought to increase awareness, to reduce uncertainty and risk averseness 
and to change priorities and cultures within regulated firms. They also sought to create a basis 
for co-operation by arguing that the environmental improvements that they were calling for 
could often be achieved in ways that were economically acceptable to the regulated firms. 
Although these promised economic returns were sometimes perceived to be lower or more risky 
than those that could have been achieved had the firm invested its time and resources in other 
areas, they nevertheless represented a useful rhetorical resource and tool of persuasion for the
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inspectors. Indeed, the environmental managers of the regulated processes were themselves able 
to draw upon this rhetoric, to argue within the firm for more resources to be invested in 
environmental improvement.
Regulators as educators and persuaders
The ability of the inspectors to educate, persuade and empower was therefore a critical 
component in the implementation process. Their ability to adopt such an approach was of course 
backed up by the fact that they could resort to the application of legal authority if it did not 
work. However, there was a general feeling that it did work, which enabled them to instigate the 
desired changes without having to take legal action:
The way this bit of the Agency has always worked, and continues to work, is to try and 
persuade industry to do the right thing knowing that we have the big stick behind our back 
if necessary... In the past, other regulators [with emissions-based approaches] had no 
options. If a consent was breached they couldn’t require a company to take any remedial 
action or anything, their only option if they wanted to take enforcement action was to 
prosecute. But because we actually regulate the production process and we are aware of it 
on a much more intimate basis we are able to identify in advance where there are 
problems and get things done. We don’t have to serve enforcement notices or 
prosecutions to get that done, there are lots of ways of doing it that the public just aren’t 
aware of [1].
The Agency itself did not always benefit from this ‘invisible tool’ (“This is why we get the bad 
publicity, because we don’t prosecute many people. But we don’t need to prosecute many 
people” [2]). However, approaches to implementation that were based on education and 
persuasion were seen to be a much more effective way of changing corporate cultures and of 
mobilising a commitment to compliance among regulated companies, than those that relied 
upon the application of legal authority alone. Improving the operator’s understanding of the 
goals of regulation and the ways of achieving compliance would, they believed, lead to 
improved regulatory outcomes:
It is much better that way because they then own the ‘environment’ within their 
organisation rather than having it imposed on them. That offers better control and 
eventually they will start to understand the processes better and the environmental 
effects and over time that will result in improved performance [5].
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By focusing on the operators, rather than the process, this style of regulation was more likely to 
achieve the preventative goals of the legislation and build a commitment to environmental 
improvement:
I actually see regulation much closer to management of man than I do to management 
of technology. The best technology in the world doesn’t actually stop an accident [2].
But this style of regulation was demanding and time-consuming. In addition, it depended upon 
the presence of inspectors with a considerable amount of relevant experience and expertise. This 
did not necessarily mean that the inspectors should know more about each of the processes they 
regulated than the managers of those processes, merely that they should be able to look at an 
industrial process from a well-informed perspective and ask incisive questions:
The operator should be a deep expert in his process and certainly when I was in industry 
I always took the view that if I didn’t know more about my job and my plants than an 
inspector did, who was visiting a few times a year, then I was in the wrong job... On the 
other hand I think that an extra pair of eyes looking at things from a different angle can 
be useful... [As an inspector] you can come along and ask embarrassing questions... 
Shall we say that sometimes companies aren’t always fully aware of what’s going on [1].
Under the legislation, regulated firms were obliged to investigate different compliance options 
and provide a case as to why their chosen approach represented BATNEEC. Inspectors’ ability 
to ask searching questions came in particularly useful when evaluating this choice:
Companies have to demonstrate to us that they understand the technology and the 
process and their obligations under legislation. We have to have enough nouse and 
expertise to judge what they are telling us. That is the skill of an inspector. It’s not just 
technical, it’s personal. You can look into their eyes and recognise when they are 
starting to stand on shaky ground... And then you can ask them to look into it further 
and present a better case as to why it’s the best way forward [2].
It is apparent therefore that the Agency adopted a strategy of education and persuasion, backed 
up by their ability to resort to legal action when faced with companies that refused to co­
operate. These strategies were adopted by experienced inspectors who often had a considerable 
amount of expertise in the processes they were regulating, enabling them to ask for answers to 
difficult questions and to supply useful information to the regulated companies. It was widely
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felt that such a strategy enabled the inspectors to implement the regulations in a more effective 
way, and to reduce the costs of compliance for industry.
Arms-length and hands-on approaches to implementation
Aside from the powers of education and persuasion, the inspectors interviewed suggested that at 
times they needed to adopt a supportive and hands-on approach with the companies that they 
were regulating. Indeed, in the early stages of the regulations such a hands-on approach was 
needed just to enable widespread compliance with the regulations:
I came into the inspectorate just at about the time when the arms-length approach was 
being shown to be not very appropriate... it was really being taken a little bit too far and 
industry through no fault of its own was getting into an awful mess, as regards for 
example putting applications together. So the decision was taken that if we were going 
to move forward that industry would need additional support. I am not saying all 
industry needed this but it seemed to be a fairly general picture - at the end of the day 
there isn’t any value in seeing somebody getting into trouble basically because they 
haven’t got the expertise... So I think that the decision to give that assistance and to 
move to a closer relationship was both positive and encouraging [4].
Thus, a hands-on approach was adopted because the regulator had a responsibility for ensuring 
that regulated companies collectively worked towards compliance. Where widespread non- 
compliance was a possibility, the regulator felt obliged to offer assistance as its own reputation 
depended upon its ability to operationalise the regulations successfully. However, the inspectors 
were also obliged to adopt an interactive and hands-on approach because of their need to get 
access to information:
To me the arms length approach is not a very satisfactory approach... when we tried it 
we weren’t getting the dialogue that we need to progress things. So we moved away 
from the arms length approach to one based more on discussion to find out basically 
what have they got, what problems they have, what are they going to put forward in 
terms of meeting requirements... Then we put to them what we considered to be 
sensible as well and then they submitted that in terms of the authorisation... [6].
Although the inspectors felt that there were reasons why they had to adopt such an approach, 
they also felt that such an approach engendered commitment rather than resistance amongst the 
regulated companies:
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The change from the arms length approach was a positive move... from an industry 
point of view it has actually got them on our side. I think that the difficulty with EPA90 
was that companies actually had to write their applications and apply to operate their 
own processes and to pay for the privilege of doing that. Everything is negative. After 
some effort and assistance though companies are looking around and saying 'hang on a 
minute - we can get some benefit from this, we can understand what we are doing a lot 
more and we can probably actually save some money doing things' [5].
Furthermore, the alternative approach, which was seen to entail the adoption of an arms-length 
and legalistic relationship with regulated companies, was widely deemed to be unfeasible 
because the regulatory agency did not have the resources to engage in a large number of 
prosecutions:
I was taught as a manager to walk softly and carry a big stick... There isn’t any point in 
going along and prosecuting anything in sight and the reason for that is very simple - if 
you went on to most sites in this country with a totally critical eye you’d find something 
wrong... there has to be a degree of practicality as regards our approach because we 
simply couldn’t prosecute everybody... But we do look at situations and we make an 
assessment as to whether a prosecution should follow or not - so we don’t prosecute 
everybody in sight but we do prosecute when we feel it is necessary and appropriate [1].
A co-operative and hands-on approach was adopted as the preferred approach therefore because 
the regulator was responsible for promoting compliance, because they needed access to 
information to do this and because they didn’t have the resources needed to prosecute everyone. 
They also commonly expressed the view that by quickly resorting to legal action the inspectors 
could undermine the basis for the co-operative and open working relationship that they had 
worked hard to establish with regulated firms. Consequently, a number of stages existed 
between open co-operation and formal legal action:
We are not in the business of prosecuting people for the sake of it. The whole object is 
to get environmental improvement. When we find a firm that isn't doing what it is 
supposed to, it is much more likely that we will take some sort of action such as issuing 
an enforcement notice requiring them to come up with proposals... There is also the 
option of serving a notice telling them what they need do to improve. So prosecution is 
not always the first response [4].
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Thus, the inspectors tended to adopt something resembling a 'responsive’ approach to 
regulation. This enabled them to reserve the right to pursue legal action for the most serious 
breaches of compliance. However, again reflecting the influence of information asymmetries, 
their ability to detect cases of non-compliance was far from perfect:
If you were industry and you wanted to hide something you probably could. There is no 
question of that. There would probably be a gasp if they heard that comment but it is a 
matter of fact. If you wanted to keep something a secret I would have to look very, very 
hard to try and find out if you were up to something. But again you can use your 
initiative and your instinct to work your way through. If you go in hard handed on day 
one you are going to get everyone’s backs up and you will not get the cooperation or the 
openness that you want. But if you go in with an open approach and then when you 
have to be hard, be hard, make an example on some issue, then you get the message 
across [3].
However, because of recent advances in monitoring technologies, the ability of the inspectors to 
detect cases of non-compliance was rapidly increasing, and therefore their dependence on the 
information supplied by regulated companies was decreasing:
We have now got a lot of computer-controlled data logging systems. It logs every alarm 
and what actions were taken so I could go in if I wanted to I can go through the alarm 
log... From time to time, I’ll pick up the log and take them down an audit route for a 
particular incident. If they know that that is going to happen, if they know they are 
going to be audited, they make sure that it is right [3].
Although the inspectors still felt that there would be benefits from co-operating, where they 
were available it was apparent that these technological advances had undoubtedly increased 
their capacity for control.
The resource intensity o f hands-on approaches
Although the inspectors thought that a hands-on and co-operative approach to implementation 
was a comparatively effective way of promoting compliance, they also recognised that it was 
often seen to be a particularly resource intensive approach to implementation. As a result, they 
were very aware of the resource pressures associated with their activities and often expressed 
concern that resource cuts would undermine their ability to deliver the regulations effectively:
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Well everybody will say that they are over stretched and have too many processes to 
regulate and too much work to do and I think that is probably true. But it is like every 
job you have got to try wherever possible to manage the resources that you have... we 
have got to be given enough time to do that job and to do it properly otherwise the 
whole impetus that we have started to get will be lost [1].
However, while the managers interviewed felt that the regulations could be implemented 
effectively with the current allocation of resources, the inspectors responsible for the day-to-day 
delivery of the regulations generally felt that the resources available were insufficient:
It is understaffed, the resources aren’t available. We fundamentally are all under 
pressure to provide a service. The professionalism of the people employed in doing that, 
both administrative and technical, is good. I think that everyone pulls together to try and 
achieve a standard of professionalism but the staffing is not adequate [4],
The inspectors recognised that the cooperative and hands-on approach to implementation that 
they adopted demanded significant inputs of resources from the Agency in die short term, 
stemming particularly from the need to recruit and retain expert inspectors and from the need 
for each inspector to regulate a relatively small number of process. However, while they felt that 
this approach generated more effective and efficient regulatory outcomes in the medium term, 
they recognised that the efficiency gains tended to be realised not by the Agency that had 
invested its resources but by the regulated firms that had secured environmental improvements 
at lower costs. Thus, they argued that it was right that this approach to implementation was 
funded by the authorisation fees that were paid by the regulated companies. Such a view was 
reinforced by the perception that such a charging system reflected aspects of the polluter pays 
principle. On this basis, the inspectors argued strongly that the cooperative and hands-on 
approach to implementation should be maintained despite its resource intensity. However, they 
were also aware that this view was not always shared and that this approach to implementation 
was being questioned within the Agency at large. At the time of the interviews, at least, the 
inspectors had managed to maintain access to the resources needed to fund their preferred 
approach to implementation.
The influence o f stakeholders on the implementation process
While the interactions between inspectors and the manager of regulated firms promoted 
compliance in a variety of ways, throughout the implementation process the inspectors noted 
that public opinion tended to reinforce their influence and to increase the pressure to comply.
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This was particularly the case as information relating to the implementation process was made 
publicly available:
Regulation is the main stimulus for companies investing in environmental techniques... 
it has pushed them a long way forward... but it’s also the fact that it was going public as 
their actions, their results and their application will be documented, the authorisation 
and any monitoring returns would be on the public register. I think that that was another 
key feature that pushed firms along [6].
Thus, because of their ability to exercise discretion when deciding when to classify a firm as 
formally non-compliant, the regulators had some ability to mobilise stakeholder pressure. It also 
gave them the power to legitimise or to de-legitimise the industrial processes that they 
regulated:
I think industry doesn’t mind being regulated... It allows them to answer some of their 
critics by saying 'well we are regulated and we are regulated by a body which has its 
terms and conditions set down by the government and therefore ultimately by yourself 
as a voter. We are doing everything we can with that regulator and therefore no matter 
how much you complain we are obeying the law’... But if we decide that they are not 
obeying the law, then community groups and pressure groups and so on will eventually 
find out through the registers and they could loose a lot of face and standing [7].
While the publication of information on environmental performance gave the regulators extra 
power and influence, it also put the inspectors in a difficult position as they had to mediate 
between the competing interests of the public and those of industry. However, while the 
inspectors were aware of the need to maintain public confidence in their activities, their day-to- 
day interactions with the regulated firms were very rarely if ever scrutinised by third parties. 
Even so, the potential for scrutiny that was provided by the presence of public registers was still 
very influential because of the value that regulated companies appeared to place on stakeholder 
relations and on the ability of the regulators to undermine their reputation and their perceived 
legitimacy.
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The Influence of the Implementation Process
On technological and organisational change
As has been stated, the inspectors interviewed felt that their approach to implementation had 
encouraged, enabled and occasionally forced regulated firms to overcome some of the barriers 
to change that had prevented them from exploring the potential of different technologies and 
techniques. However, in general they did not think that the regulations had necessarily 
stimulated the development or adoption of particularly innovative or leading edge technologies:
We are not about developing new techniques for the sake of it, what we are about is 
getting individual companies to use the best techniques which are available readily. It is 
about 'best available techniques’ and what I would say is that companies can benefit 
from using techniques which are readily available at present without having to go to the 
extra effort of getting innovative techniques. I am not sure that most companies are 
even at a standard that is up to available techniques at present. So it is better to use 
proven techniques and get those implemented first, rather than looking for innovative, 
magic answers [6].
Instead of focusing on the options for technological change, the inspectors focused on the 
improvements that could be made through organisational change and the adoption of new 
process management techniques. As this focus enabled the regulated firms to reduce their 
emissions at source, it also allowed them to avoid the need to buy new equipment. 
Consequently, it had both environmental and economic benefits:
A lot of the changes we call for are developed in-house, within the company using its 
expertise of its own particular process to see what they can do - how they source raw 
materials, how they operate the process and so on. We wouldn’t ask whether they'd 
bought the latest piece of pollution control equipment - we press them a bit further back 
and say have a look at the process first before you go out and spend a hundred thousand 
on new equipment lets try and minimise and prevent the actual release [7].
The scope for the environmental improvement of existing technologies to be improved by fine- 
tuning was closely related to the claims that the inspectors made about the availability of 
economically acceptable or even beneficial improvement options. However, the inspectors also 
recognised that the scope for environmental improvement to be made through the incremental 
improvement of existing technologies was not endless (see below).
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-  On economic networks
In seeking to shape the capacities for compliance, the inspectors felt that the regulations had 
influenced the extent to which firms engaged in various economic networks. Indeed, in relation 
to intra-firm networks, at times the regulators deliberately sought to empower the environmental 
managers of the regulated firms to increase their ability to attract wider support for 
environmental initiatives:
At the local level it may be recognised that they need to do something but they still need 
to persuade the accountants in the centre. I think that is where the regulation comes in -  
it forces their hand... You can actually help the local management along, especially if it 
is a multi-national company, by taking a stance where it is obviously justified and 
making sure they get the attention and the resources they need to comply with the 
regulations [5].
More broadly, the inspectors suggested that the pressure to comply with the regulations had 
encouraged the regulated firms to engage with a range of inter-firm economic networks. Despite 
their concerns about the inspectors passing on commercially confidential information, the 
inspectors thought that managers of the regulated firms were often quite ready to exchange 
information with other firms:
One can see increasingly companies agreeing to hold forums between themselves, 
perhaps on matters relating to IPC which a few years ago they wouldn’t, but they 
recognise that that is a way of keeping up to date and keeping abreast with 
developments. They can actually get benefit out of it without jeopardising their 
commercial advantages. One can see those springing up more and more [7].
These inter-firm linkages were seen to be particularly beneficial for smaller companies where 
access to information and other resources was seen to be more limited. Indeed, in an attempt to 
promote compliance, the Agency had consciously sought to instigate the development of such 
networks:
I think the smaller company would find benefits if we locally and nationally got them 
all together more to talk about IPC. I think some of our central departments do this with 
the industry federations so that they can share their own ideas and experiences [6].
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It is apparent then that the implementation process had led to the development of new networks 
as both the inspectors and the companies sought to increase the capacities for compliance and to 
reduce the costs of compliance.
On environmental performance
All of the inspectors felt that IPC had stimulated increases in the extent to which the regulated 
firms were aware of their emissions and of the various ways in which these emissions could be 
prevented, minimised or rendered harmless. As such, the inspectors felt that the implementation 
process had led to some significant improvements in the capacity of regulated firms to manage 
their environmental risks and impacts. They also felt that they had engendered a greater 
commitment to environmental improvement in the regulated firms and that the firms had drawn 
upon their newly developed commitments and capacities by adopting the technologies and 
techniques that would lead to improvements in their environmental performance. Indeed, as 
BATNEEC was seen to be a dynamic concept, both formally as the guidance notes were 
periodically up-dated and informally as the inspectors continued to apply pressure for further 
improvements, they expected further improvements in environmental performance to be realised 
over time.
While the inspectors felt that organisational change and the adoption of new management 
techniques had helped to ensure that the emissions associated with most existing process 
technologies were minimised, they also accepted that IPC had not generally stimulated major 
process change. Li the absence of such radical changes, they felt that the opportunities to 
generate further improvements by fine-tuning the management of existing process technologies 
would gradually diminish and therefore that the costs of further change would escalate. 
Nonetheless, because the inspectors argued that their approach to implementation had helped 
firms to develop their capacities for change, a dynamic setting there was an interplay between 
diminishing marginal returns on the one hand and increasing capacities for change on the other. 
The emphasis that the inspectors placed on capacity building and on educating, persuading and 
enabling change can therefore be seen as an attempt to reduce the costs of compliance and to 
delay the point at which these costs would increase.
On costs and benefits
As has been stated, the inspectors felt that the changes that IPC had induced were often 
associated with some economic return. This was particularly the case where companies had 
been able to respond to the demands of the regulations by preventing or minimising their
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emissions by developing new techniques rather than rendering emissions harmless by investing 
in end-of-pipe abatement technologies:
Those companies which look at it in the right spirit tend to see an overall benefit... 
There are some exceptions, there are bound to be... If we can’t alter the process to 
prevent and there are some releases, then yes, it is pretty expensive to abate and so you 
have got to look at that and look at the overall benefits and costs of that matter. But I 
think at the moment the majority of the operators should see an overall financial benefit 
[1].
However, as the costs tended to be condensed in the short term while the benefits were often 
spread over the longer term, temporal issues were an issue. Indeed, as one inspector noted, 
companies often focused on the short-term costs rather than the longer term benefits, whilst also 
attributing some costs that would have been incurred anyway to compliance with IPC:
Expenses probably appear to be condensed in the early stages. Some of the costs one 
hears about one questions because what would those people be doing anyway? 
Reviewing the process should lead to some reductions in losses and some of the pay­
backs are shorter than they think. So I am not convinced that it costs as much as they 
say... [3].
Nonetheless, as has been stated, there was a feeling amongst the inspectors that low cost 
responses to regulation would not always be available and that as the costs of compliance 
increased so the feasibility of their current approach to implementation might be reduced.
Relating the Empirical Discussion to the Analytical Variables
Within the discussion presented thus far, it is possible to identify the influence of the analytical 
variables that were identified in the preceding conceptual and methodological chapters. These 
variables relate to the character and resources of the different actors, to the nature of any 
resource inter-dependencies in the relations between the different actors, to the extent to which 
these generate incentives for particular forms of behaviour and to the ways in which the actors 
respond to these incentives by adopting different strategies within the implementation process. 
They also relate to the extent to the influence of the broader institutional context within which 
the implementation process takes place and to the ways in which these factors combine to 
influence the outputs and outcomes of the implementation process. In order to present a
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coherent picture of the influence that each of these analytical variables exerts throughout the 
implementation process, the conclusion to this chapter will examine the significance of each 
variable as seen from the perspective of the inspectors that are charged with the implementation 
of IPC.
The character and resources o f the implementing agency
The division of the specialist, national agency with responsibility for implementing IPC has 
long been associated with the application of a flexible, cooperative and compliance-based 
approach to implementation. Upon the inception of IPC, this approach was maintained despite 
challenges from other sections of the agency and brief experiments with alternative approaches. 
In putting this approach to implementation into practice, the expert inspectors within the agency 
commonly drew upon a range of resources. These related to their ability to:
Understand and interpret the legislation in order to establish site-specific standards and to 
use discretionary powers as they did so.
Ask questions that regulated firms were obliged to answer.
Raise capacities for compliance and influence the costs of compliance by:
Collecting, analysing and transferring information on improvement options
Educating, enabling, persuading and empowering the environmental managers within
firms.
Demand that economically beneficial improvement options were exploited and apply win- 
win rhetoric in their interactions with the regulated firms.
Grant or withhold flexibility relating to the times at which compliance should be achieved. 
Monitor and recognise breaches of compliance.
Apply a 'responsive’ range of informal and formal sanctions in response to non-compliance. 
Legitimise or de-legitimise sites in the eyes of stakeholders.
The nature o f any resource inter-dependencies within the implementation process
Although the inspectors had access to a wide range of resources that they could draw upon in 
the implementation process, they also depended upon a range of resources that were held by the 
managers of the regulated firms. These included the managers’ ability to choose whether or not 
to:
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Collectively ignore or resist the regulations, thereby forcing the regulator to take the 
initiative and to re-engage in cooperative relations in the implementation process in order to 
operationalise the regulations.
Grant the regulatory agency ready access to the site-specific information that they needed to 
put the regulations into practice.
Work willingly towards the compliance that the regulatory agency was obliged to promote. 
Raise the costs of implementation or threaten the reputation of the agency or its inspectors 
by launching appeals or by adopting strategies of non-cooperation.
The extent to which any resource inter-dependencies provide
incentives for different forms o f interaction within the implementation process
These resource inter-dependencies commonly generated incentives for the inspectors to 
cooperate with the managers of the regulated firms at various stages of the implementation 
process. These incentives took a number of forms:
Cooperative approaches were perceived to be more effective and efficient, at least in the 
medium term, as they enabled regulators to engage in open dialogue with regulated firms 
and more particularly to:
gain access to the information held by the managers of the regulated firms; 
raise awareness of legislation, build a commitment to compliance, change cultures, 
mobilise resources and raise capacities for compliance amongst regulated firms; 
encourage, enable or oblige regulated firms to explore potential of new technologies and 
techniques, thereby promoting environmental improvement and securing compliance 
amongst regulated firms.
It was also expected that alternative approaches would be less effective and that it would be 
difficult and costly to change.
The strategies that the implementing agency adopted in response to any such incentives
Given these resource inter-dependencies and the associated incentives for cooperation, the 
inspectors sought to promote cooperation in a number of ways. Their strategies in this respect 
included:
Only offering certain resources to cooperative firms, particularly the information, expertise 
and flexibility that would help them to reduce the costs of compliance and raise the 
capacities for compliance.
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Undertaking detailed monitoring and subjecting firms to close scrutiny to enable 
uncooperative and/or non-compliant firms to be identified.
Using a responsive approach to enforcement that informally sanctioned firms for minor 
breaches by withdrawing cooperative relations, whilst simultaneously offering to restore 
cooperative relations should the firms come back into compliance and threatening to impose 
formal sanctions should the firm that refuse to do so.
The extent to which different institutional structures constrain or enable these strategies
Although the inspectors appeared to be responsive to the incentives that they associated with a 
cooperative approach to implementation, these incentives both shaped and were shaped by a 
range of institutional factors. These factors related to the:
Historical precedents that meant that a cooperative approach was well established, that 
change was seen to be difficult and that alternative approaches were portrayed as being 
more risky and less effective and efficient.
Design of the legislation that established the potential for a flexible approach to 
implementation.
Lack of complete preconditioning that obliged and enabled the implementing inspectors to 
exercise discretion in the implementation process.
Presence of resources within the regulatory agency which allowed the implementation 
process to draw upon expert staff in frequent interactions with the managers of regulated 
firms.
Presence of relatively trusting and open relationships between inspectors and the managers 
of regulated firms.
Availability or potential for the creation of economically acceptable improvement options 
within the regulated firms.
Presence of interested and influential stakeholders.
The influence that different forms o f interaction have on regulatory outputs and outcomes
This approach to implementation shaped the practical nature of the demands that the inspectors 
made and the ways in which the firms responded to these demands. In particular, the approach:
Gave regulated firms, particularly those that cooperated with the inspectors, some influence 
in the implementation process.
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Offered some flexibility relating both to the point at which sanctions would be applied as a 
response to cases of non-compliance and to the form that these sanctions would take. 
Encouraged or enabled the wider uptake of the technologies and techniques that enabled the 
regulated firms to comply with the requirements of the regulations.
Commonly focused on those incremental and organisational changes that were expected to 
encounter diminishing returns in the longer term.
In summary then, this chapter has examined the perspectives that implementing inspectors have 
of the factors that shape the nature and influence of the IPC implementation process. Notably, it 
has found that the implementation process was influenced not only by the potential for 
inspectors to resort to the application of legal authority but also by their ability to promote 
compliance by drawing on a much wider range of resources. However, it has also found that the 
regulator did not control all of the resources that could be drawn upon to exert influence within 
the implementation process. As a result, the discussion has found that the implementation 
process was shaped by a range of resource inter-dependencies and that the inspectors adopted 
cooperative strategies in an attempt to overcome these interdependencies. Whilst recognising 
that the nature of the resource interdependencies and of the associated strategies were shaped by 
various institutional factors, the analysis suggested that such cooperation enabled the regulators 
to operationalise the regulations and to promote what they saw to be particularly effective and 
efficient forms of compliance. Before these findings are developed further and related back to 
the broader debate on regulation, the thesis will now consider the perspectives that the managers 
of the firms that are regulated by IPC have of the factors that shape the nature and influence of 
the implementation process.
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CHAPTERS
The Case of Integrated Pollution Control:
The perspectives of the managers of the regulated sites
Structure
> Introduction
> The nature of the implementation process 
Multi-regulation
Awareness and understanding o f IPC 
Interpretation and standard setting 
Interactive learning 
Monitoring and enforcement 
The influence o f stakeholders
> The influence of the implementation process 
On technological and organisational change 
On internal resources
On economic networks 
On environmental performance 
On costs and benefits
> Relating the empirical discussion to the analytical variables 
Introduction
The discussion within this chapter considers the perspectives that the managers of those industrial 
facilities that are regulated by IPC have of the factors that shape the nature and influence of the 
implementation process. As in the previous chapter, this discussion is interested in the perspectives 
that these managers have of the influence of the range of analytical variables that arose from the
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conceptual discussion that was presented in Chapters 1 and 2. To recap, these relate to the character 
and resources of the different actors, the nature of any resource inter-dependencies, the extent to 
which any such inter-dependencies generate incentives for different forms of interaction and the 
ways in which actors respond to these incentives by adopting different strategies within the 
implementation process. They also relate to the influence that different forms of interaction have on 
the demands that are made by regulators, and on the ways in which regulated firms respond to these 
demands.
Based upon the methodological approach that was set out in Chapter 3, the discussion within this 
chapter draws upon the results of interviews conducted in 1996 and 1997, with the managers of 
sixteen regulated facilities in different sectors but within the same region. A summary of the central 
characteristics of the facilities that were included in the study is presented in Table 5.1. Again, the 
number (i.e. [5]) at the end of each quotation relates to the corresponding row in this table.
The discussion that follows is again structured in a way that reflects the different stages of the 
implementation process. After assessing the significance of IPC in the context of the broader range 
of regulations affecting the facilities that are regulated by PC , the discussion considers the 
processes of interaction associated with the interpretation of legislative principles, the setting of 
standards, the monitoring of performance, the enforcement of standards and the imposition of 
sanctions. The chapter then examines the perspectives that the managers of the regulated facilities 
have of the demands that are made by the regulators, and the ways in which the managers respond 
to these demands. Issues relating to the influence of the analytical variables emerge throughout the 
discussion, and are drawn together in the concluding section which presents a comprehensive 
overview of the influence that these variables have on the nature and influence of the PC  
implementation process, as seen from the perspective of the managers of the regulated facilities.
The nature of the implementation process
Multi-regulation
The managers interviewed explained that their industrial processes were the focus of various other 
forms of regulation; however, it was widely reported that P C  was the most significant and the most 
influential piece of regulation with which they had to comply. This was for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as P C  was designed to regulate emissions to air, water and land simultaneously, it
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of IPC Regulated Sites
Site N ature of 
regulated 
process
Size of 
site
Ownership 
of site
Management
responsibility
Strength of 
culture of 
compliance
N ature of 
engagement 
with regulators
Access 
to internal 
financical 
resources
Access to 
internal 
m anagerial 
resources
Access to
external
resources
Predom inant form of response
1 Speciality
chemicals
Large Group Env High Positive Med High Low Integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
2 Bulk
chemicals
Large Group Env High Positive High High High Integrated technologies 
and techniques
3 Materials
processing
Large Indep Technical High Positive High High Med Integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
4 Energy
generation
Large Group Env High Neutral Med High Low S-chain, integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
5 Materials
processing
Large Group Env Med Neutral Low Low Low Integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
6 Materials
processing
Med. Group Env High Positive High High High Integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
1 Textiles Med Group HSE High Positive Med High Med S-chain and integrated 
technoloqies and techniques
8 Speciality
chemicals
Med Group Compliance High Positive Med High Med Integrated technologies 
and techniques
9 Agro-chemicals Med Indep Env High Positive Med Med High S-chain, integrated tecniques 
and end-of-pipe
10 Energy
generation
Med Group General High Positive Low Med High Integrated technologies 
and techniques
11 Dyes/colourings
manufacturing
Med Group Technical Med Neutral Med Med Low S-chain and integrated 
technologies and techniques
12 Speciality
chemicals
Med Group HSE Med Neutral Med Med Low Integrated technologies 
and techniques
13 Metal
casting
Med Group Plant Med Neutral Low Low High S-chain and 
end-of-pipe
14 Textiles Med Indep General Low Negative Low Low Low End-of-pipe
15 Agro-chemicals Med Indep Compliance Low Negative Low Med Low Integrated technologies 
and end-of-pipe
16 Dyes/colourings
manufacturing
Small Indep Site Med Neutral Med Med Med Integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
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introduced a unified regulatory framework that was eventually delivered by a single regulatory 
agency. This unified approach raised the profile and the importance of EPC and made the 
relationship that the managers had with the regulatory agency much more significant. Secondly, the 
preventative emphasis of IPC meant that it encouraged the managers of regulated processes to focus 
on the factors affecting the environmental performance of the production process as a whole. In 
other words, IPC impacted on all of the management functions within the regulated sites. Again, 
this raised the profile and the influence of IPC:
IPC has been the first legislation where a regulator has come into the heart of the process 
and made attempts to understand it and to probe and ask questions... Also, IPC has 
impacted on all of the divisional managers for all of the process and so has had a far greater 
impact [7].
In addition, the managers suggested that the influence of IPC was exaggerated because many of its 
demands coincided with those established by other regulatory frameworks. This was particularly the 
case where the emphasis that IPC placed on reducing emissions at source better enabled regulated 
sites to comply with regulations relating to health and safety, or to the control of major accidents 
and hazards. In short, compliance with the requirements of IPC increased the capacity for 
compliance with other forms of regulation. Consequently, IPC was commonly seen as a significant 
regulatory framework and compliance with the demands of IPC was consistently awarded a high 
priority.
Awareness and understanding o f IPC
All of the managers of the regulated sites that were interviewed confirmed that they and their 
company had been highly aware of the presence, principles and possible implications of IPC since 
its inception in 1990. They also felt familiar with some of its central aspects, as it was based upon 
similar regulatory principles to the preceding regulations, and in its early stages it was implemented 
by the same regulatory agency. This continuity meant that the managers of the regulated sites were 
more familiar with the general principles and procedures of IPC than might have been the case had 
the regulations demanded a radical departure from existing regulatory structures or from established 
ways of thinking and acting.
Nonetheless, in the period between the adoption of IPC in 1990 and the dates by which particular 
sites had to reach compliance, considerable discussion and debate took place as regulated firms
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sought to clarify the general principles and the likely implications of the new legislation. All of the 
managers acknowledged that the lead-in time associated with this schedule for implementation gave 
them the time to familiarise themselves with the regulations, and to begin to think through the 
implications for their particular process. However, the managers of the regulated sites only began to 
be aware of the specific implications of IPC when the process guidance notes were published. This 
guidance was seen to be very significant therefore:
Once the guidance came out we quickly realised that the EPA would be the most significant 
bit of legislation for us. And we were right -  it has been the one thing that virtually all of 
our sites have had to take seriously.... There is a much greater awareness of environmental 
matters now [1].
From the early stages of the legislation, then, the managers interviewed began to recognise that IPC 
might eventually place significant demands on the nature and the performance of their industrial 
processes. However, most of the managers stressed that even with the publication of sector-specific 
guidance notes, they continued to be very uncertain about the specific demands that IPC would 
place on their particular site.
Interpretation and standard setting
Uncertainty about the specific implications of IPC stemmed from the realisation that these 
depended upon the way that the two qualitative principles that are at the heart of the regulations 
(BATNEEC and BPEO) were interpreted and applied. In this regard, it was generally felt that the 
guidance that had been issued to assist in the managers’ interpretation of these generic principles 
was not particularly helpful, not least because many processes were so specialist that they required 
tailor-made rather than off-the-peg solutions.
Aside from being too generic, some of the managers interviewed felt that the guidance was also too 
static, and failed to reflect the rapidly evolving nature of the technologies and techniques that might 
be adopted within the different sectors. Indeed, industry was not alone in thinking this:
In discussions that I have had with the regulator they think that the technology has moved 
on since the guidance notes were written. They always say that the guidance notes are 
already out of date... [8].
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Given the perceived lack of specifically relevant and suitably up-to-date guidance, the managers 
were dependent for assistance upon their interactions with the regulator. However, in the early 
stages of IPC, the managers recognised that the regulator had attempted to adopt a rather formal and 
‘arms-length’ approach to implementation. As a result, in many instances the managers were left to 
build their own understanding of the specific requirements of the regulations, without any 
meaningful guidance from central government or any substantial help from the regulator. This 
approach introduced a considerable amount of frustration, which in turn led to some resistance to 
the regulations and to a widespread inability to comply with them. However, just as the sites 
required information and advice from the regulator, so the regulator required information and 
acceptance, or at least an absence of collective resistance, from the regulated sites. Consequently, a 
cooperative relationship quickly re-emerged between the managers of the regulated sites and the 
inspectors in the regulatory agency. This was welcomed by the managers of the regulated firms:
Our inspector, when he first came here, he was rather 'I am the regulator and you are a 
regulated company and you have got to abide by the rules’. When he did that, I thought 
well, yes I can see that you should police industry to some extent but I also think that 
you’ve got to work with industry to prove the usefulness of the regulations... He’s changed 
now - he comes in now and we are all on first name terms and it is quite a good 
relationship. I think things have changed for the better -  we’re willing to work with him 
now and we accept what we’ve got to do [2].
By engaging with the cooperative approach to implementation that eventually emerged, the 
managers were able to work with the inspectors to interpret the regulations and to enhance their 
understanding of the specific requirements that IPC would have for their particular process. To this 
extent, cooperation in the implementation process reduced the initial uncertainty that was associated 
with IPC. However, within these cooperative interactions, it was generally felt that the central 
principles of IPC were interpreted on the basis of subjective and informal judgements made by the 
inspectors:
It would be good to know how the pollution inspectors have determined BATNEEC. I think 
the answer would probably be that they didn’t do it formally. They just had opinions with 
no particularly structured approach... I think that is the problem with BATNEEC -  it gets 
very subjective... you have to weigh things up and come up with an opinion and see if the 
inspectors agree [12].
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While there were some concerns about the consistency of the approach to implementation and the 
predictability of the outcome, somewhat paradoxically the perception that the standard setting 
process was reasonably flexible was generally welcomed:
Our inspector always comes up with a number of innovative technologies which he would 
expect you to have researched and looked into... Obviously with the regulator’s legendary 
inconsistency other inspectors may have a different approach. But we’re quite happy with 
ours, he’s understood and accepted our position and has steered us towards some very 
useful areas without being too rigid [16].
Aside from allowing inspectors to encourage managers to investigate the strengths and weaknesses 
of different technologies and techniques, flexibility in the implementation process also enabled the 
managers of some sites to gain some leverage in the interpretation and standard setting process. In 
essence, the need to cooperate ensured that the regulators had to listen to the views of the managers 
of the regulated sites and to take these views into account in the interpretation and standard setting 
process. Some of the managers of the smaller and more independent sites felt that this was 
particularly the case if there was a perception that the demands imposed by the regulator would 
threaten the economic viability of the regulated process:
Two or three years ago the inspectors for this area came to see us and were a bit heavy 
handed. Both myself and my colleague sat there and said well look if that is the 
recommendation, then this process becomes non-viable and we would have to stop making 
the product for the customer and rationalise our work force and business completely... They 
said well hang on, we are not in the business of putting people out of business... They 
definitely seemed to back off at that point, as though there was scope in their brief to do 
that [8].
Thus, particularly where the sites claimed that they were operating at the margins of economic 
viability, the flexibility of the implementation process ensured that standards could be adjusted by 
the regulator to accommodate some of the concerns of the regulated actors.
The flexibility that was offered by the regulator was seen to relate to the timing rather than the level 
of the demands established by the implementation process as when granted it gave the regulated 
sites more time to explore the potential of the various ways in which they might work towards 
compliance. Furthermore, by awarding a degree of flexibility, the regulators allowed the sites to
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synchronise their response to IPC with any other investment programmes. The managers 
interviewed suggested that this significantly increased the influence of the regulations as it allowed 
concerns about environmental performance to be incorporated into the mainstream of business 
decision-making. Thus, although such flexibility may have reduced the imperatives for immediate 
action, for example by relaxing the deadlines for changes to be made or standards to be achieved, 
according to the managers interviewed flexibility in the implementation process enhanced the 
efficacy of the regulations in the medium term. It was also seen to have enhanced the efficiency of 
the regulations as it enabled the regulated sites to explore the potential of cleaner technologies and 
techniques, thereby reducing the need for significant investments in end-of-pipe technologies. 
Amongst the managers interviewed, this overlap between the environmental and economic concerns 
commonly formed the basis of their cooperation with the regulators and their commitment to 
compliance with the demands of IPC.
Interactive learning
Many of the managers interviewed stated that initially they had been reluctant to engage with IPC 
too fully because of concerns about the costs of compliance. However, they also suggested that 
these concerns had decreased over time as they had accepted the regulations and established 
positive working relationships with the regulator. These relationships were based not only on the 
need to interpret and apply the requirements of the legislation; they were also centrally concerned 
with the search for and adoption of those forms of compliance that were both effective, in that they 
realised improvements in environmental performance or reductions in environmental risk, and 
efficient, in that they minimised the costs of compliance. While it would be too simplistic to suggest 
that regulators were solely concerned with the efficacy of regulation and the regulated sites with the 
costs of compliance, the search for responses to IPC that satisfied their mutual concerns about the 
efficacy and efficiency of the response to IPC helped to ensure that a cooperative relationship 
between inspectors and the managers of regulated processes emerged and was maintained.
Within these generally cooperative relationships, the managers of the sites interviewed suggested 
that they had often benefited from the information and expertise of the regulatory inspector. Indeed, 
some of the managers interviewed suggested that they were prepared to do more to improve their 
environmental performance if they were given more assistance:
Our relationship with the environmental regulators is a bureaucratic burden but it also
stimulates us to think about the way we do things... We welcome the help they give us but
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sometimes there could be more feedback from them to guide companies like ourselves... 
we are quite prepared to go further along those paths if helped a little bit more [9],
One of the main reasons that the managers of the regulated sites valued their relationship with the 
regulator was because it gave them indirect access to information on the technologies being adopted 
by other firms and on the levels of performance that they were achieving. In this sense, the 
managers commonly suggested that their inspector acted as an agent of exchange by transferring 
information on best (or at least good) practice between regulated firms:
They have gone to another company that operates a similar technology and have said 'how 
did you get on’ and then they benchmark and use the information elsewhere... That is a 
major benefit of the regulators with IPC - they distribute best practice between the regulated 
sites [6].
However, despite the benefits that were potentially available, the managers interviewed consistently 
suggested that a range of factors had to be present if their relationships with the regulator were to be 
productive. First among these was the issue of the expertise that was available to the regulatory 
agency. Every manager interviewed argued that they could only have meaningful exchanges with 
inspectors if those inspectors had the experience and expertise that was needed to enable them to 
understand and talk about the complexity of the process that they were regulating and the technical 
feasibility of the various improvement options. Coupled with the issue of access to appropriate 
forms and levels of expertise were concerns relating to the frequency and the continuity of 
interaction between regulatory inspectors and the managers of the regulated sites. By having a close 
and cooperative day-to-day relationship with a relatively expert inspector, the managers interviewed 
felt that they were more able to build a common understanding, maintain a mutual orientation and 
to regularly exchange information and understanding on their process and on the nature of the 
changes that they were making in response to IPC:
We’ve known him for a while now. He visits on average probably once a month and I may 
speak to him two or three times a week on the telephone to talk through various things. I 
think there have been a lot of benefits from having a close relationship with site inspectors 
who understand the processes... If that style of regulation is maintained that will be fine 
and it will bring continued improvements. But if you get a regulator that comes in that isn’t 
going to understand the heart of the process and has a tick box of questions and standards 
that will be met I think we are going to be in a lot more trouble [2].
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The importance of frequent contact with the regulator was seen to be particularly important when 
cleaner technologies and techniques were being adopted. As these involved detailed investigations 
followed by a series of relatively small, incremental changes to existing processes, regular transfers 
of information and understanding were seen by the managers interviewed to be very important. 
They also enabled the regulator to influence the entire decision-making process and to shape the 
detailed nature of the changes that were being made.
As stated above, the presence of such a close, cooperative working relationship allowed a common 
understanding and a mutual orientation to develop between the regulators and the managers of 
regulated processes. Over time it also allowed a degree of trust to emerge that reassured the 
managers and made them more willing to supply information to the regulator and to be open to 
suggestions about options for further improvements in their environmental performance:
With IPC and BATNEEC you have to make a judgement on what it means and the 
judgement comes down to trust. If you have got trust then it can be a mutual judgment, if 
there is no trust then the regulator has to rely on the big stick. To get the best out of it is 
relatively complex but it needs open communication and a trusting relationship but I can 
see that the regulator does need to be able to fall back on the big stick sometimes [3].
Although all of the managers interviewed had at times appreciated the influence of the expertise, 
time and trust that underpinned their cooperative relationship with the regulator, they were also very 
aware that such an approach was under threat because it placed great demands on the scarce 
resources of the regulatory agency. As most of the managers interviewed had the perception that 
individual inspectors shared their view that such an intensive approach to implementation was 
beneficial to both parties, they tended to sympathise with the inspectors about the resource 
pressures that were placed upon the regulatory agency. However, they also realised that resource 
shortages increased the extent to which the regulatory agency depended upon their cooperation.
Monitoring and enforcement
While cooperation clearly played an important role in the implementation process, the managers 
interviewed suggested that the monitoring requirements associated with IPC established the 
potential for cases of non-compliance to be detected and for sanctions to be imposed. Indeed, most 
of the managers interviewed suggested that in the early stages of IPC they had been required to
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invest quite heavily in monitoring technologies. Thereafter they were required to establish 
monitoring programmes and to submit reports at regular intervals to the regulator. The scope and 
the content of these reports were subjected to close scrutiny by the regulator and that the integrity of 
the data that was included within them was assessed in the compliance audits that were regularly 
conducted by the inspectors. Thus, when coupled with the frequent contact that they had with well- 
informed inspectors, the managers recognised that any breaches of compliance could be readily 
detected.
Although the monitoring requirements that were associated with IPC were quite demanding, the 
subsequent enforcement activities were seen to be much more flexible. Other than for serious 
incidents with significant environmental consequences, the inspectors were generally seen to be 
flexible and accommodating in the first instance, as long as they were convinced that the managers 
of the site had both the commitment and the capacity to work towards compliance. Thus, the 
common perception was that, as long as the inspectors trusted the managers, occasional breaches of 
compliance that did not have serious consequences would not lead to the imposition of either 
informal or formal sanctions. Where there were more regular cases of non-compliance however the 
managers felt that the regulator would begin to impose informal sanctions by adopting a less 
cooperative regulatory style. In serious or sustained cases of non-compliance, they fully expected 
formal sanctions to be applied. As the managers valued their cooperative and trusting relationship 
with the inspectors, compliance was driven as much by the desire to maintain good relations with 
the regulator as it was by the fear of sanctions.
The influence o f stakeholders on the implementation process
While compliance was enabled by the cooperative approach adopted by the regulator and ensured 
by the regulators ability to detect and respond to cases of non-compliance, it was also driven by the 
pressure placed on the regulated sites by their stakeholders. This was a particular pressure because 
the processes that were regulated by IPC tended to be major industrial operations that were often 
highly visible and that were generally subjected to pressure from a wide range of stakeholders. The 
pressure on these sites from stakeholders had been growing in recent years as access to information 
on their environmental performance had become both more readily available through developments 
such as the introduction of public registers and the publication of corporate environmental reports 
and more widely publicised in the media. However, the regulations themselves were still seen to be 
more significant:
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Because of the location, we are in the middle of a residential area, we have quite a close 
relationship with a lot of the local people. We run a community liaison group which meets 
regularly, we have a community news letter, we have open days that type of thing. They are 
quite vocal and we take them seriously, we have to really, but I think you would still have 
to say the regulators are more influential [3].
Significantly, the stakeholders that exerted pressure were not only external to the regulated firm. 
Indeed, in many instances the boundaries between the firm and its external stakeholders were not at 
all clear:
One of the major pressures on our directors is their own children asking them questions 
about the environment. Also, when we actually decided to stop fighting the greens and 
accept the precautionary approach there was no question about it that everybody who 
worked here felt much more comfortable because of the fact that they no longer had to 
make excuses to either their mates in the pub or their kids or whatever... Another side of it 
is that effectively we have convinced the local press, although that sounds over the top. 
They realise that we are genuine about what we do and in fact we are no longer the evil 
people we were then [5].
Because of the influence of these external and internal stakeholders, many of the managers 
interviewed felt that they had to be seen to be complying with all of the relevant health, safety and 
environmental regulations if the legitimacy of their operations was not to be challenged and if their 
reputation was to remain intact. In essence then it appeared that the broader mode of social 
regulation underpinned and reinforced the demands of government regulation and strengthened the 
role of the regulator in the implementation process as they had the power to legitimise or to de- 
legitimise the operations of industrial sites.
The Influence of the Implementation Process
Technological and organisational changes
In the early stages of IPC, most of the managers interviewed suggested that, in the absence of 
external influences, they would have responded to IPC in the most expedient way by adopting end- 
of-pipe technologies. For some facilities, these end-of-pipe responses were seen to be the only way
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in which their environmental performance could be improved. However, the inspectors delivering 
the regulations had emphasised the need to explore the potential of more integrated and anticipatory 
approaches. At the same time, the managers of the regulated sites had taken part in, or had at least 
been exposed to, wider debates about the potential benefits of initiatives which sought to improve 
process efficiency and to promote waste minimisation. Collectively, their interactions with 
regulators and their exposure to these debates had raised their awareness of, and their confidence in, 
more integrated approaches to emissions reduction. As a result, they had become more willing to 
accept that where possible it might be better to anticipate and avoid emissions at source than to 
capture and treat them reactively by investing in end-of-pipe technologies.
However, the managers of the regulated sites also recognised that such approaches would demand 
significant and sustained inputs of management time and that they would generate delayed and 
uncertain improvements in environmental performance. Flexibility and support from the regulator, 
as well as access to managerial resources, were therefore seen to be critical if more integrated 
approaches were to be adopted:
We have deliberately moved away from end-of-pipe whenever we can... We very 
deliberately and very publicly took the approach that that wasn’t the answer and instead we 
would go back to the source of the problem and do waste minimisation and we got full 
backing for that from the inspector. It means unfortunately that you do not have overnight 
successes... Whereas for an end-of-pipe you might have sunk you money into one project, 
when you are talking about waste reduction and waste elimination at source you may have 
30 or 40 different projects which all require thinking through or require technical problems 
to be sorted out and require money to some extent or another. So it takes more time and 
effort to sort those out, and obviously during that time you are not getting the apparently 
spectacular results that an end-of-pipe treatment unit would have. But it is something that 
we feel we can do, especially with the help of the regulator [3].
Where the regulated sites had adopted such integrated approaches, they tended to be of an 
organisational or a low-tech nature. Consequently, the managers interviewed felt that the changes 
that they had made as a response to IPC were not particularly innovative. However, the large- 
number of small changes that they made as a response to IPC commonly required a considerable 
degree of experimentation that improved the performance of existing technologies, sometimes quite 
dramatically. Their response to IPC therefore depended upon a process of organisational learning 
which, over time, incrementally improved the performance of existing technologies.
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Because they tended to depend upon changes in the way that existing processes were organised, 
responses to IPC could not easily be bought 'off-the-shelf from external suppliers. Instead, they 
had to be developed on a site-by-site basis, often over extended periods of time. Such approaches 
placed significant demands on the managerial resources of the regulated sites. For some, these 
demands represented a considerable barrier to improvement. However, the pressure for compliance, 
coupled with the influence that the interactions between the regulator and the managers of the 
regulated sites had on their capacity to change and the flexibility that was offered by the regulator, 
both encouraged and enabled the sites to overcome these short-term barriers. Where they had been 
overcome, many of the managers claimed that they had led to significant economic returns. These 
stemmed both from the improvements in the efficiency of the regulated process itself and from the 
development of techniques which could be used to improve the performance of other non-regulated 
processes:
After talking a lot with the inspector, we soon realised that we weren’t doing things 
correctly... there were better ways of doing it. So we changed the working practice to come 
in line with the requirements of the environmental legislation and we made significant 
savings. And then we realised that if we looked at other processes and other methods we 
may be able to come up with similar sorts of savings. We have gone a long way down that 
path -  and we’ve some distance still to go before it stops being worth it [11].
Some of the managers interviewed claimed that the benefits of such incremental improvements had 
become harder to secure over time. However, they also claimed that their capacity to explore further 
opportunities had increased over time. The costs and benefits of approaches to compliance which 
were based on incremental change therefore depended both on the presence of opportunities for 
change that were both technically and economically viable and on the availability of managerial 
capacities to exploit such opportunities.
While incremental improvements to existing process technologies represented the most common 
form of response to IPC, in some instances IPC had been associated with more radical forms of 
technological change. This was particularly the case either where the regulations required operators 
to undertake more major changes to their existing process, as was the case where old processes 
were required to work towards new plant standards, or where the operators themselves sought 
authorisations for new or significantly altered processes. Although such changes were relatively 
unusual, the managers interviewed suggested that where they did take place the regulator had
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increasingly sought to influence the search process as it related to the identification and evaluation 
of the alternative technologies that might be adopted. While no particular technologies were 
prescribed, managers were required to investigate various technological options and to justify their 
selection on environmental as well as economic grounds. In this way, IPC extended its influence 
dramatically as during periods of significant change it helped to shape the fundamental nature of the 
technologies that were adopted in the regulated processes as well as the ways in which these 
technologies were organised and applied. Thus, the sustained periods during which relatively stable 
technologies were incrementally improved through organisational learning were occasionally 
punctuated by moments of more fundamental technological change.
Demands on internal resources
In seeking to respond to the combination of imperatives, incentives and stakeholder pressures that 
they typically encountered, the regulated sites commonly drew upon a range of internal and external 
resources. Internally, all of the managers suggested that the resources that were available to 
facilitate a response to IPC were limited. However, factors restricting access to human resources 
were generally seen to be more significant than those which limited access to financial capital. This 
was particularly the case in those sites that saw the environment in general, and compliance in 
particular, not as a purely competitive issue but more as a precondition for doing business. In such 
sites, it was often relatively easy for environmental initiatives to secure investment resources:
Generally capital expenditure has a necessary return on the capital employed so it is ones 
with the shortest returns on capital that get approved. However, if there is a health and 
safety or environmental aspect to any project which is being put up for consideration, it will 
be resourced, even with a longer return on capital, simply because we recognise the 
importance of these issues. If it is a regulatory requirement we will invest in it - there is no 
question about it [6].
Although this was the perception of the majority of the managers interviewed, in some of the 
smaller and more independent sites limited access to investment resources was seen to be a more 
pressing concern. However, rather than failing to respond to the demands of IPC, these sites had 
been forced to become more innovative in the way that they sought to secure compliance:
If we had the resources it would be done straight away. But as we don’t, we really have to 
think about it. It’s got to actually pay us to do it really. But we have found that we can find
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ways of doing things that actually pay dividends... The relative shortage of investment 
resources forces you to be more innovative... [15].
While ease of access to financial resources varied from site to site, all of the managers interviewed 
suggested that they had reduced the need for such resources by exploiting the potential of 
organisational and low-tech changes. While such changes still required an investment of time, the 
cost of responding to IPC in this way could often be accommodated within the existing staffing 
budgets of the firm. Although it was commonly the responsibility of the environmental manager to 
interact with the regulator and to coordinate the site’s response to IPC, responsibility for working 
towards compliance tended to be spread more broadly within the site:
Everyone here is encouraged to take responsibility for their bit. We have regular briefing 
sessions, once a month, when all the staff get together in their groups. All the business 
heads and team leaders encourage people to develop their role within the company. It 
doesn’t matter whether they are a floor sweeper or an engineer... With this approach there 
is absolutely no barrier apart from finance... but even here if it is an environmental issue 
which is vital to the operation of this site then we will find cash for it [4].
Given the need to coordinate and control activities at different levels and in different departments, 
all of the larger sites and most of the medium-sized and smaller sites had adopted a formalised 
environmental management system (EMS). These EMSs were seen to be a central factor enabling 
an integrated response to IPC that depended upon change taking place throughout the regulated site. 
As such, although they had taken a lot of time and effort to develop, EMSs were seen both to have 
enabled compliance and to have reduced the costs of compliance:
EMSs are one of those things that IPC doesn’t make absolutely necessary but ours certainly 
helps us to comply. Where the procedures of four or five years ago weren’t laid down, 
things were made, things got out through the door just the same but if you had a problem 
you were guessing. Now we have a carefully laid down procedure for everything we do and 
it is easy to see where you went wrong. Until IPC, the legislation wasn’t there to do the 
things that they now require so obviously sometimes they were over looked. I’m sure that 
was the case with most companies. But now as a positive step, but also through necessity 
guided by the regulator, we have had to register processes that come under the IPC 
umbrella. Because of that we have to register every process in the place, every piece of 
equipment, and then address all the environmental problems as a result. This has been so
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much easier with an EMS. It has lots of benefits which become self perpetuating. We can 
now say well we’ve looked at that, we’ve done that, we’ve achieved that and we’ve saved 
money on that so why can’t we go on to do something else or even to do the same things 
somewhere else... [3].
In contrast, the managers interviewed from the smaller sites suggested that they were reluctant to 
adopt such systems. They argued that the adoption of formalised and fully documented management 
systems would introduce a bureaucratic burden that might restrict their ability to maintain flexibility 
and responsiveness. They also argued that formalised management systems were not necessary 
given the opportunities for closer cooperation and more regular interaction between the smaller 
number of actors that existed on the site.
Thus, the response of the regulated sites to IPC was influenced by a range of internal factors. These 
related to the ease of access to financial capital, the availability of managerial resources, the 
presence of formal management systems that enabled monitoring, coordination and control and the 
occurrence of informal interactions which enabled information and understanding to be developed 
and diffused. However, while these internal factors and interactions were clearly influential, the 
managers interviewed suggested that their response to IPC had also been affected by the nature of 
their relationships with other actors outside of the site.
- Impacts on economic networks
To complement the information and understanding that was available within the regulated sites, 
many of the managers interviewed suggested that they had sought to gain access to the information 
held by a range of other actors. Although a considerable amount of generic and information was 
widely available as it was publicised by technology suppliers and discussed in the trade press, the 
managers needed access to forms of information and understanding that were more reliable and 
more relevant to their particular process.
In seeking to gain access to such information, the managers of those regulated sites that were part of 
a larger group initially sought to draw upon the information and expertise that was present in the 
other sites within the same group. Such intra-firm linkages were particularly influential where they 
enabled information and understanding to come directly from the managers of similar sites that had 
already learnt to comply with similar regulatory demands. Information of this nature was often 
perceived to be reliable, relevant and readily applicable in the particular process:
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One of our sites has been going through the mill with the regulations recently while another 
has already done the work... Because they’ve already done it, they are now giving 
presentations to representatives of all of the other sites in the hope that we can pass on some 
of their knowledge. Although some people are sceptical about whether it is really 
worthwhile expending so much time on it, everyone that has actually done these projects 
has said that it’s worth the resource and that it’s worth spending a bit of money because it 
does pay back. That helps me because I want to get that message across to all the divisions. 
Some of them say we are good enough as it is but because I know what the other sites are 
achieving I am sure that they are not [5].
In the absence of such extensive intra-firm linkages, the managers of the independent sites 
depended more upon any information that they were able to access through external or inter-firm 
linkages. These included links with technology suppliers, where at times there were mutual benefits 
from cooperation:
We were very fortunate in that the company that built the machine originally offered to get 
involved free of charge and so gave us two chaps that helped us. One was an engineer, one 
a chemist and both were more qualified that I am to put an authorisation together and to 
demonstrate compliance. So they basically did it for us. Without them it would have 
probably cost us a great deal of money and time. They put a great amount of effort in - 1 
think it took them about 18 months to do it. But it was in their own interest as well because 
they have machines in other countries. It was a good idea for them to get involved and to 
know what we had done so they could apply it to any machine on the continent, because 
their other customers are going to have the same problems with regulation that we have 
[15].
While cooperation between actors with access to complementary resources might be expected, 
cooperation between firms who are normally competitors might seem less likely. However, the 
managers interviewed commonly stated that they did not see the environment as a competitive issue 
and that as a result they had exchanged information on the performance of different ways of 
securing compliance with their competitors. Again they suggested that these transfers of 
information had been to the mutual benefit of each party:
There has been a lot of co-operation with the supplier of new technologies but also with
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other companies... One of our main competitors has had very similar problems to us and 
we’ve done a lot of benchmarking with them. We’ve also exchanged information with other 
industries with similar processes... We’ve done this because there are people on site, our 
own people, who are sitting down and scratching their heads and wondering what to do 
about the regulations. Because they have been quite ready to go out and talk to these third 
parties we’ve been more able to solve the problems. The same must be true for the other 
firms. I would imagine there are things we would hold as confidential but we are quite open 
generally, especially when it comes to environment as we believe it’s the right thing to do. 
So when we’re thinking about how to comply there’s a mixture of internal, group and 
external communication, as well as our discussions with the regulator of course [1].
These cooperative interactions, which tended to be of a very informal and ad hoc nature, normally 
took place between competitors operating within the same industry. However, they were much 
more common either where links between relevant actors already existed or where fora such as 
trade associations of green business clubs had been established specifically to engender such 
exchanges of information.
Despite these possibilities, the managers of some of the smaller and more independent sites found 
the opportunities for such interactions more limited. In part this was because they were often 
responsible for a wider range of functions and were therefore less able to participate in specialist 
meetings. However, it was also because they tended to be less engaged in the networks that would 
grant them access to the experience that had accumulated in other companies that had faced similar 
problems:
We are going in our own direction trying to do what we can do. Other companies must be 
in the same boat but we don’t seem to get together to work out where we all are, where 
we’re up to and whether we might be able to help each other out as I am sure we should be 
able to do... I don’t see why there should be anything confidential about the techniques 
involved in environmental matters. But we never seem to get together really -  the 
opportunities just don’t arise [12].
Nonetheless, some sites had participated in schemes that had been initiated by central and local 
government, trade associations and business support organisations. In several instances, these 
organisations had sought to create networks to enable cooperation and to provide information, 
understanding and technical assistance to raise the capacity of firms to improve their environmental
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performance in economically efficient ways. This was particularly apparent in the field of waste 
minimisation where a variety of demonstration projects had been organised. The information that 
had been made available as a consequence of these projects also had an impact on non-participating 
sites, particularly by helping to convince them that some forms of environmental improvement 
might be economically beneficial. However, there was a common perception that such initiatives 
could not work without external support and without the sustained focus on improvement that came 
from being a member of a club or network. Thus, it was the regulator that drove the uptake of such 
schemes in many instances.
Impacts on environmental performance
All of the managers interviewed suggested that IPC had exerted a significant influence on the 
factors that shaped their environmental performance. As has been discussed, the regulations obliged 
them to conduct baseline reviews and assessments of their environmental impacts and risks and to 
adopt extensive monitoring programmes. The information generated as a result raised their 
awareness and increased their understanding of both the causes and consequences of their 
environmental impacts. Their interactions with the regulator also raised their awareness of the 
different ways in which their performance might be enhanced. Particularly through the process of 
interactive learning associated with the implementation process, the managers felt that their 
commitment to environmental improvement and their capacity for change increased significantly as 
a consequence of IPC.
By tracing the root causes of their impacts and risks and attempting to address the issues at source, 
the managers suggested that IPC had commonly ensured that, wherever possible, their emissions 
were prevented and minimised rather than being reactively captured. However, in those instances 
where prevention was not possible, IPC had obliged companies to make significant investments in 
end-of-pipe pollution control technologies. Furthermore, where emissions streams could not be 
avoided entirely, IPC obliged the companies to channel any remaining emissions towards the Best 
Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO - i.e. air, water or land). Thus, rather than using the 
cheapest or most convenient disposal option, the regulated companies were obliged to examine the 
alternatives and to select the disposal route with the lowest environmental burden. Thus, as well as 
associating IPC with reductions in the quantity of emissions, the managers also felt that the impact 
of their residual emissions had been reduced.
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On costs and benefits
As has been stated, at the time of the interviews, there was a clear feeling amongst the managers of 
the regulated firms that compliance could often be secured through incremental improvements in 
process efficiency. Consequently, moves towards compliance were often associated with economic 
benefits, except in those instances where regulated sites were obliged to invest in costly end-of-pipe 
technologies. Consequently, the managers interviewed commonly suggested that compliance had 
been incorporated into the core values of many of the regulated sites both because of internal and 
external pressures and because of the belief that compliance made good business sense:
Regulation was the kick-start for our environmental management programmes really... To 
be fair when we started out the whole object was to comply with the legislation but as it 
turned out that has almost become secondary because we gained so much from it... We 
have saved a lot of money from environmental measures. In fact very few of the 
environmental measures we have put in, apart from our big investment in [end-of-pipe 
technology] have cost us money. The pay back period has been remarkable with things we 
have done paying back in way under a year, some have cost us nothing and we have saved 
thousands of pounds. The staff have got little projects going all over the site now... All 
these little things have suddenly mushroomed. Also, if we don’t comply there is potentially 
a big financial penalty and we will have the locals as well as Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth bearing down on us very heavily. We are going to going to get bad press and the 
share price will drop. So there is no doubt that there is a big financial incentive to comply 
both in terms of the potential gains and the risk of lost value of company [4].
Thus, at the time of the interviews, all of the managers interviewed suggested that there was a 
commitment to compliance and in many instances a desire to move beyond compliance. However, 
over half of the managers interviewed also suggested that their commitment to compliance would 
be undermined if they were continually asked to meet higher and higher standards. This view was 
based on the expectation that their attempts to secure improvements in environmental performance 
through incremental change would eventually encounter diminishing marginal returns and therefore 
that the costs of compliance would escalate. Consequently, the managers suggested that the 
cooperative relationship that had emerged between themselves and the inspectors in the 
implementation process would at some point be threatened. In anticipation of this, the managers 
interviewed suggested that they would adopt less cooperative approaches if the costs of compliance 
became unacceptable:
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At the moment it isn’t too much of a problem for us but if we start being regulated too 
closely and we feel that isn’t being done in the same way for everyone we will say we 
aren’t going to cooperate and they can try and take us to court [12].
Thus, it appears that the strong cultures of compliance that were commonly reported by the 
managers interviewed were based upon a coincidence between a range of different factors including 
external and internal stakeholder pressure, the desire to maintain cooperative relations with the 
regulator and the presence of economically acceptable opportunities for compliance. While such a 
coincidence was common at the time of the interviews, many of the managers interviewed 
suggested that it may only be a temporary phenomena as they expected the costs of compliance to 
escalate as the opportunities for further environmental improvement to become less readily 
available. At such a time, the managers interviewed suggested that cooperation and consensus in the 
implementation process may be replaced with contestation and conflict.
Relating the Empirical Discussion to the Analytical Variables
To complement the analysis presented in the previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter 
has examined the perspectives that the managers of the regulated facilities have of the factors 
that shape the nature and influence of the IPC implementation process. Within the discussion, 
recurrent reference has been made to the influence of the central analytical variables. To 
facilitate a fuller conceptual and comparative analysis, this chapter will conclude by examining 
the influence of each variable in turn.
The character and resources o f the regulated firms
IPC affects a diverse range of complex industrial facilities with potentially significant 
environmental impacts. Despite some variations in the character of the regulated facilities, 
there was a considerable degree of consistency relating to the ways in which the managers 
engaged with and responded to the implementation process. Because of its integrated nature 
and its preventative orientation, the managers of the regulated facilities consistently saw it as a 
significant piece of legislation with which they would have to comply. Despite some early 
resistance to the regulations because of the legalistic and arms-length approach adopted by the 
regulator, when a more cooperative approach was restored the managers generally engaged
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with the implementation process positively. In seeking to gain influence within this approach to 
implementation, the managers of the regulated facilities commonly drew upon a wide range of 
resources. These related to their ability to choose whether or not to:
Grant the regulatory agency ready access to the site-specific information that it needed to put 
the regulations into practice.
Invest managerial and financial resources and develop the commitment, capacities and 
cultures needed to work towards compliance.
Explore the potential of the new technologies and techniques that would enable them to 
secure the compliance that the regulatory agency sought to promote.
Raise the costs or threaten the reputation of the agency and its inspectors by launching 
appeals, by adopting strategies of non-cooperation or by entering into collective resistance.
The nature o f any resource inter-dependencies within the implementation process
Although the firms could draw upon a variety of resources as they sought to shape the approach to 
implementation adopted by the regulatory agency, they also depended upon the ability of the 
regulators to:
Interpret the regulations and establish site-specific standards and to pply their discretionary 
powers sympathetically as they did so.
Help to raise their capacities for compliance and to reduce the costs of compliance by offering: 
information and understanding on the potential of new technologies and techniques 
the flexibility needed to explore the potential of new technologies and techniques before 
investing in end-of-pipe technologies and to synchronise their responses to regulations with 
other investment programmes 
Maintain their cooperative and flexible approach rather than resorting to a more prescriptive or 
sanctions-based approach.
Legitimise or de-legitimise their facilities in the eyes of the stakeholders.
The extent to which any resource inter-dependencies provide
incentives for different forms o f interaction within the implementation process
As a response to these inter-dependencies, the managers commonly perceived that there was a 
range of incentives associated with cooperative approaches to implementation. In particular,
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they suggested that cooperating with the regulator enabled them to:
Gain access to some useful and reliable forms of information and expertise.
Put their views and concerns to the inspectors in an attempt to influence the ways in which 
they interpreted the regulations and exercised their discretion.
Be awarded an amount of freedom to work towards compliance in ways and at times that 
reduced the costs of compliance.
Gain some degree of flexibility relating to the times at which particular standards had to be 
achieved.
Gain some insulation from the immediate imposition of formal sanctions in some of the 
less serious or sustained breaches of compliance.
The strategies that the regulated firms in response to any such incentives
Given these resource inter-dependencies and the associated incentives for cooperation, the 
managers of the regulated facilities engaged with the implementation process and responded to 
the regulators in a number of ways. Their strategies in this respect included:
Willingly giving the regulator access to information and listening to the advice or 
responding to the requests made by the inspectors.
Showing a commitment to compliance by investing in environmental improvement. 
Developing their capacities for compliance and seeking to overcome the barriers to change. 
Exploring the potential of new technologies and techniques which delivered the 
improvements in environmental performance that the regulations sought to promote. 
Supporting the approach adopted by the agency and being sympathetic to their resource 
constraints.
Promising to do more if given more assistance
Threatening to resist the regulations if the regulator adopted an uncooperative approach or 
if the costs of compliance ever became unacceptable.
The extent to which different institutional structures shape and are shaped by these 
incentives and constrain or enable these strategies
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Although the managers appeared to be responsive to the incentives that they associated with a 
cooperative approach to implementation, these incentives both shaped and were shaped by a range 
of institutional factors. These factors related to the:
Historical precedents that meant that a cooperative approach was well established, that change 
was difficult and that alternative approaches were portrayed as being more risky and less 
effective and efficient.
Design of the legislation that established the potential for a flexible approach to 
implementation.
Lack of complete preconditioning that obliged and enabled the implementing inspectors to 
exercise discretion in the implementation process.
Presence of resources within the regulatory agency which allowed the implementation process 
to draw upon expert staff in frequent interactions with managers of regulated firms.
Presence of relatively trusting and open relationships between inspectors and the managers of 
regulated firms.
Ability of the firms to gain access to resources through intra-firm and inter-firm networks. 
Availability or potential for the creation of economically acceptable improvement options 
within the regulated firms.
Presence of interested and influential stakeholders.
The influence that different forms o f interaction 
have on regulatory outputs and on regulatory outcomes
This approach to implementation shaped the practical nature of the demands that the inspectors 
made and the ways in which the managers of the regulated firms responded to these demands.
In particular, the approach:
Gave regulated firms, particularly those that cooperated with the inspectors, some influence in 
the implementation process.
Enabled the managers to gain some flexibility relating to the point at which sanctions would be 
applied as a response to cases of non-compliance and to the form that these sanctions would 
take.
Secured investments of financial and managerial resources and built some commitments to and 
capacities for compliance.
109
Enabled a shift away from end-of-pipe responses and encouraged the wider uptake of the 
integrated technologies and techniques that were associated with improvements in 
environmental performance and with reductions in the costs of compliance.
Commonly focused on those incremental and organisational changes that were productive in the 
short to medium term but that were expected to encounter diminishing returns in the longer 
term.
By examining the perspectives of both the regulators and the regulated firms, the discussion that has 
been presented in the previous two chapters has established the basis for a comprehensive analysis 
of the factors that shape the interactions that are at the heart of the IPC implementation process. 
Before such an analysis takes place, the thesis will first conduct a similar assessment of the 
implementation process associated with the framework of LAPC regulations. The results of this 
assessment are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Thereafter, Chapter 8 presents a comparative analysis 
that draws upon the collected findings to consider the validity of the hypotheses that form the basis 
for this thesis.
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CHAPTER 6
The Case of Local Air Pollution Control; 
The perspectives of the regulators 
Structure
> Introduction
> The Nature of the Implementation Process
The external context for implementation
The internal context for implementation
Competition for resources
The availability o f specialist expertise
Identifying sites to be regulated
Reducing resistance through education
Preconditioning, guidance and the need for flexibility
Negotiating standards, securing agreement, building consensus
The absence o f monitoring
Complaints driven enforcement processes
The influence o f stakeholders on the implementation process
> The Influence of the Implementation Process
On technological and organisational change 
On economic networks 
On environmental performance 
On costs and benefits
> Relating the Empirical Discussion to the Analytical Variables 
Introduction
The previous two chapters examined the perspectives that the inspectors within the regulatory 
agency and the managers within the regulated firms have of the factors that shape the nature 
and influence of the IPC implementation process. The following two chapters now seek to
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consider a similar range of issues, but this time in relation to the implementation process 
associated with the Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC) regulations. This chapter will therefore 
present a naturalistic account of the perspectives that the inspectors responsible for delivering 
the LAPC regulations have of the factors that shape the different stages of the implementation 
process, and the influence of that process on the behaviour and performance of the regulated 
firms. The chapter concludes by reviewing the discussion, in order to focus on the influence of 
the range of analytical variables that the thesis is most interested in, as perceived by the LAPC 
inspectors. In this way, the chapter examines the resources available to the inspectors, the 
nature of any inter-dependencies and incentives for cooperation that emerge in the 
implementation process and the strategies that the inspectors adopt in response to these. It also 
considers the institutional factors that shape the implementation process and the ways in which 
these factors combine to influence the outputs and outcomes of the LAPC framework.
Again reflecting the methodological approach and the research process that was introduced in 
Chapter 3, the discussion that follows draws upon the results of interviews with inspectors in 
eight local authorities within the same region, conducted between 1996 and 1997. Details of the 
interviews, including the row numbers used to attribute quotes in the text, are presented in 
Table 6.1. Where quotations are included in the text, they are followed by an attribution (i.e.
[1]) that corresponds to the associated row number in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Characteristics of LAPC Inspectors
Inspector Position Experience Predom inant role
1 Head of Environmental 
Protection
Extensive experience in all areas of 
environmental health
Head of department, local authority 
policy formulation, liaison with other 
local authorities
2 Principal Environmental 
Health Officer
Extensive experience in all areas of 
environmental health
Head of pollution control office, local 
authority policy formulation
3 Senior Environmental 
Health Officer
Some experience in all areas of 
environmental health, specialist in 
pollution control
Local authority policy formulation, site 
inspections, complaints management
4 Senior Environmental 
Health Officer
Some experience in all areas of 
environmental health, specialist in 
pollution control
Site inspections, some monitoring, 
complaints management
5 Environmental Health 
Officer
Experience in all areas of 
environmental health
Site inspections, some monitoring, 
complaints management
6 Environmental Health 
Officer
Experience in pollution control Site inspections, some monitoring, 
complaints management
7 Environmental Health 
Officer
Experience in pollution control Site inspections, some monitoring, 
complaints management
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The Nature of the Implementation Process
The external context for implementation
Upon the inception of the 1990 Environmental Protection Act (EPA), responsibility for the 
implementation of the Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC) system was delegated to a large 
number of district and borough councils in England and to county and county borough councils 
in Wales1. Although these local authorities are governed by the statutes and funding decisions 
of central government, they also have some autonomy, as they are run by democratically elected 
councils that have some tax-raising powers and that are able to develop and introduce their own 
policies in a variety of areas. They are also commonly given a degree of flexibility in the way 
that they enact and respond to the requirements of the regulations that are issued by central 
government. Local authorities therefore exist and operate in what Rydin (1993, p i90) describes 
as an ‘uneasy partnership’ with central government, with ‘both claiming authority because of 
their elected nature but with central government clearly in a position of greater power through 
various financial and administrative controls’.
Aspects of this relationship between central and government are reflected in the LAPC 
implementation process. Under the conditions of the 1990 EPA, local authorities must enact the 
legislation, whilst giving regard to the guidance issued by central government. This guidance 
relates particularly to the ways in which the flexible principles within the LAPC system -  
notably the requirement for regulated firms to meet standards that are compatible with 
BATNEEC (‘Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost’) -  should be 
interpreted and applied. The guidance issued by central government is therefore designed to 
‘precondition’ the implementation process at the local level.
Despite the presence of this guidance, local authorities retain an amount of discretion in the 
interpretation and application of the LAPC regulations, as the generic principles that are at the 
heart of the regulations must be interpreted and applied to establish and enforce standards on a 
case-by-case basis. However, their discretionary powers are curtailed not only by the guidance 
but also by the potential for regulated firms to complain to the locally elected councillors (see 
below), and to appeal to the Secretary of State, who has the power to over-rule any decisions 
made at the local level. Although appeals are relatively unusual, the ability of firms to compare 
the ways in which the large number of local authorities interpret the regulations, and thus to
1 Various port health  authorities throughout England and W ales are also responsible for the 
im plem entation o f  LAPC for industrial processes located in ports and airports.
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recognise and appeal against any inconsistencies, increased the extent to which the 
implementing inspectors included in this study relied on the published guidance.
The potential for inconsistencies to be detected, and for appeals to be made, also increased the 
extent to which the inspectors in the different local authorities interacted with their counterparts 
in other authorities. In order to gain access to information and expertise and to improve the 
consistency of the ways in which the requirements of LAPC were interpreted and applied by 
different authorities, the inspectors had shared information and expertise through direct 
relationships with inspectors in other local authorities, through regional advisory committees 
and through a ‘link authority’ scheme, which published a list of local authorities with expertise 
relating to particular industrial processes, so that they could be contacted by any other 
authorities that needed to regulate similar processes. The inspectors interviewed suggested that 
these links had been very useful, particularly in the early existence of the LAPC system where 
capacities for implementation had yet to be built:
This area was dropped on me a couple of years ago. I have to hold my hand up and say 
that my knowledge of the processes was very, very limited. We’re reasonably familiar 
with the types of abatement equipment that are available. But we do use other expertise 
in other authorities -  and we’re the most expert in some processes which there are a lot 
of in this area and so other authorities come to us when they need info on those [5].
Although these inter-relations were seen to be important, most of the inspectors interviewed 
suggested that once the LAPC system had become established, their links with other inspectors 
in different local authorities had diminished and that any remaining relationships tended to be 
informal and of an ad hoc nature. Concerns about the capacity for implementation and about 
the consistency of the implementation process had therefore re-emerged to some degree.
The internal context for implementation
The local authorities with responsibility for implementing the LAPC regulations are also 
responsible for enacting a number of other environmental policies and for pursuing a wide 
range of other objectives. The priority awarded to the implementation of LAPC therefore 
depended both upon the political climate within particular local authorities, and on the 
relationship between environmental protection and other related functions such as planning or 
economic development.
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In relation to the political context for the implementation of LAPC, most of the inspectors 
interviewed suggested that they had never had any direct pressure from elected members to 
change the way that they implemented or enforced LAPC regulations, and indeed that attempts 
to exert influence in such ways would be highly unusual and even improper. However, such 
pressure was not completely unheard of:
The elected members do try to, err, shall we say, influence us somewhat whether it be 
to give them a hard kick or not to give them a hard kick depending on their relationship 
with that particular industry... Sometimes our relationships with operators which have 
taken months or years to establish can be ruined by one telephone call from a councillor 
that has stopped negotiations dead in their tracks [2].
Although most inspectors were keen to stress that, as a technical process that was 
preconditioned from above, the implementation process could not be influenced by political 
pressures or by conflicts of interest within local authorities. This was particularly the case in 
relation to the inter-relations between environmental protection and economic development:
Although economic development officers do everything they can to retain businesses, 
they wouldn’t be able to convince me of the need to not apply regulations as stringently 
as we might do. Having discussed a lot of issues with various economic development 
officers over the years I’ve never been asked to relax standards. The authorisations are 
issued on the basis of technical guidance notes and they are to be dealt with by a 
competent technical officer... we cannot be allowed via other officers or members to be 
persuaded to relax any conditions relevant to any of those processes [1].
Nonetheless, the implementing inspectors were commonly conscious of the impacts that their 
activities might have on economic development. Indeed, they acknowledged that this 
consciousness had the potential to influence the ways in which they exercised any discretionary 
powers that they were awarded in the implementation process. This related particularly to the 
deadlines that they set for compliance to be secured, and to the point at which they might take 
enforcement activities when faced with cases of non-compliance:
At times we’ve all been aware that we would be cited as the villains that cause that 
company to close. It’s a difficult dilemma, we are the local authority and we are local 
people, do you shut them down and make them redundant or do you negotiate with 
them to get the best you can? The standards are set down by the process guidance notes
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which we normally apply but they are just guidance and we do vary them sometimes by 
giving them leeway or extensions for example [3].
Thus, the implementation of LAPC took place within a context where there was potential for 
environmental objectives to clash with the local authorities’ desire to promote economic 
development and where there could be tensions between elected members and officers with 
responsibilities in different areas. However, the inspectors’ awareness of the economic 
implications of their activities appeared to exert only an intangible influence on the 
implementation of LAPC.
Competition for resources
In other respects, though, the competition between the different objectives that local authorities 
sought to pursue exerted a tangible influence on the LAPC implementation process. This was 
the case because the various departments that existed within each authority commonly had to 
compete with each other for funding. As funds were short and because environmental 
protection in general and LAPC in particular were rarely awarded a high priority, the funds that 
were available for the implementation process were rarely seen to be sufficient. This was 
despite the fact that the 1990 EPA includes provisions for local authorities to recover the costs 
of implementing the LAPC system by collecting authorisation from the companies that they 
regulate. However, these fees rarely if ever found their way back to those responsible for the 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement of LAPC:
Our charges were originally intended to cater for the costs that we incurred in 
implementing and monitoring and looking after the [LAPC] processes. But like most 
councils it just disappears into the abyss and that’s it [2].
The effects of these financial shortages were seen to be significant in all of the authorities 
included in the study. Indeed, the implementation process was commonly defined more by the 
funds that were made available than by the objectives that were to be realised:
There’s a big difference between what we actually do and what we might like to do. 
That’s probably going to get worse not better. It’s resource led... if the authorisation 
fees and charges that are supposed to go to these guys to allow them to regulate 
[LAPC] processes had come into this department we would have had no problems 
whatsoever in delivering LAPC to a high standard... [3].
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Within such a context, the inspectors interviewed consistently suggested that while they 
attempted to meet their statutory obligations to the best of their ability, their capacity to go 
beyond a basic fulfilment of statutory objectives was limited. Even when it came to fulfilling 
their statutory duties, however, some of the inspectors suggested that other similar duties were 
seen to be more important. This was the case because the implications of many of the other 
activities that the environmental protection or environmental health departments had to fulfil 
were much more visible:
Other functions get staff to meet statutory obligations more easily than we do. If people 
get killed because of an industrial accident or if they get food poising and die... it’s a 
more direct effect than emissions from an industrial process isn’t it. So occupational 
health and safety and food safety get a higher priority than we do, even though we’ve 
got statutory duties as well [5].
On a day-to-day basis, this meant that LAPC was overlooked or neglected as specialist staff 
were either not recruited at all, or they were drawn away from their responsibilities associated 
with the implementation of LAPC to respond to what were seen to be more pressing concerns.
The availability o f specialist expertise
Some of the inspectors interviewed suggested that the personnel involved in the implementation 
process were often reluctant to give up their involvement in the other functions in order to 
become specialists in the implementation of LAPC. This reflects the fact that the LAPC system 
is implemented by inspectors who are trained as Environmental Health Officers (EHOs). While 
the training and experience of many EHOs enables them to draw upon a broad range of 
technical skills relating to environmental health (“it encompasses the whole lot -  housing, 
health and safety, food, waste management, public health, pollution and business management 
to an extent”), most inspectors have a limited amount of specialist experience with process 
management or regulation. This limited experience raises an issue of competence, which has 
encouraged many EHOs to avoid becoming involved in LAPC implementation:
It’s a big issue about competency and it’s something that most EHOs are very sensitive 
about... Some EHOs are frightened to death of authorisations and will hide in housing 
or food safety for years because they don’t want to come into environmental control 
because it’s seen to be too specialist, too technical [4],
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While some of the more proactive local authorities had adopted training programmes to build 
the technical capabilities of their inspectors, most of the inspectors interviewed suggested that 
they lacked the resources needed to acquire or to develop such specialist expertise. The 
consequent lack of such expertise increased both the emphasis that inspectors placed on the 
central guidance notes and the need for them to engage cooperatively with the companies that 
they regulate in an attempt to gain access to information. This was particularly the case where 
an authority or an inspector were unfamiliar with a particular process:
Any senior EHO that says to you all my staff are technically competent with dealing 
with any of the guidance notes is misleading you... Before we deal with an application, 
we visit the process as many times as it needs for us to become au fait with that 
process. Then we provide the operator with a draft authorisation for their consideration. 
We discuss the draft with them in its entirety with them to get agreement, that’s a much 
more positive way to making progress. You can’t regulate it unless you do this, that’s 
why it costs as much as it does [2].
As this quotation suggests, particularly in the absence of specialist expertise, interpreting the 
requirements of the LAPC system for a particular process can demand intensive interaction 
between regulators and regulated companies, where the regulated companies hold the 
information that the inspectors need in order to operationalise the regulations. However, as has 
been discussed above, competition for resources within departments with responsibility for 
LAPC meant that such an intensive approach was rarely adopted. Instead, the local authorities 
developed a range of less specialist and resource intensive strategies in an attempt to fulfil the 
statutory duties associated with the LAPC system.
Identifying sites to be regulated
Using what resources were available, the first stage of the implementation process was to 
identify the companies that were operating processes that were subject to LAPC control. Given 
the range of industrial processes that can be regulated by LAPC, and the fact that many of these 
processes are run by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), this was not always a 
straightforward task. Often, the initiative had to be taken by the local authorities themselves 
rather than the companies that were the targets of the regulations:
Legally speaking, the onus is on the operators of the process to come to you. But if all 
local authorities adopted that approach then we’d not see much of an achievement in 
environmental standards. So really the local authorities have to go out there. We’ve got
118
no choice. We have to search for authorised processes because they’re not going to 
knock on our door and say can you regulate me and can I give you all of these big fees
[3].
While the local authorities interviewed were confident that they had identified and were 
regulating the vast majority of the companies that were operating processes falling under 
LAPC, there was a feeling that some processes were not being regulated either because the 
companies were not aware that they needed to be authorised or because they were deliberately 
evading the regulations.
The response to this situation varied, with some of the local authorities interviewed conducting 
surveys of local industry and others relying upon information sources such as the telephone 
directory to identify those processes that may need to be regulated. Even after sites had been 
identified and authorisations had been issued, the inspectors felt that they had to continue to 
take the initiative because of the low levels of awareness and commitment in regulated 
companies:
Most LAPC processes that are authorised have a very low understanding of what the 
authorisation means... Their technical understanding is very low, they’re under­
resourced and under pressure and environment comes 99 out of their top 100 list of 
priorities [6].
Despite the impact that the need to take the initiative had on their scarce resources, many of the 
inspectors interviewed had some sympathy for the position that many regulated companies were 
in. They appeared to accept that LAPC had to compete for the limited time and resources of 
many of the regulated companies, and that when compared to the other pressures that the 
regulated companies may face, LAPC was unlikely to be a priority for action, particularly in the 
SMEs that were often the focus of the regulations. These sympathies were common amongst 
the inspectors interviewed, and reflect the extent to which the inspectors were conscious of the 
potential for conflict between environmental protection and economic development.
Reducing resistance through education
Against this backdrop, all of the inspectors interviewed had adopted broadly similar strategies 
with which to implement the LAPC system. A common feature in all of the strategies adopted 
was the desire to build open and cooperative relationships with regulated companies and to be 
seen as a source of information and advice before they were seen as an enforcer:
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They’re so afraid of the regulators it’s incredible... [but] we aren’t there to hit them 
with a big stick. The only time we’ll do that is if they do things wrong and consistently 
wrong and ignore the best advice that’s given to them. We’re here to help, to advise and 
then to regulate [5].
The emphasis that was commonly placed on helping and advising, rather than controlling and 
punishing, reflected a general feeling that the companies that were regulated by LAPC lacked 
access to information on the specific requirements of the regulations. To overcome these 
problems, most of the inspectors interviewed had proactively attempted to raise awareness of 
the requirements of LAPC in the early stages of the implementation process, through relatively 
close interactions with the companies that they were regulating.
This approach was very resource-intensive (and at times was felt to be “a bit like taking a horse 
to water”), and was difficult given the scarcity of resources, but it was generally felt that over 
time they had been an effective way of ensuring that the local authorities fulfilled their basic 
statutory responsibilities by issuing authorisations to LAPC regulated companies. They had also 
had an impact on the working relationship between local authorities and regulated companies, 
encouraging operators to come to the local authority for advice, indicating that the latter had 
come to be seen as “players in the game of environmental improvement”.
In essence, then, the inspectors felt that they had to promote the regulations by offering 
information and assistance to companies that were unaware of the legislation or were unsure 
about the specific implications that the regulations would have for their particular site. This 
culture commonly encouraged inspectors to see the companies that they were regulating as their 
customers:
We’ve targeted them as customers so when we’ve issued authorisations we’ve given a 
lot of explanatory information with it which goes through the various concepts and 
what they mean to try and raise the level of understanding. We give contact numbers 
during the day and out of hours to encourage them to discuss issues within us. And 
more companies have now started to come and talk to us [1].
While most inspectors accepted that it was desirable for them to adopt a customer orientation in 
their relationships with regulated companies, it was recognised that such an orientation could 
change the dynamics of the implementation process as the inspectors were providing a service
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for which the regulated companies paid a fee. While this had some advantages, some inspectors 
felt that it reduced their ability to act as impose standards or enforce sanctions:
In some ways we may err too far the other way. It would be useful on occasion to be a 
bit more up-front and say no, what you’re doing is patently wrong and if you carry on 
I’m going to nick you. But there is a very different reaction as we work very much more 
with cooperation and then coercion. And frankly we get appealed against a lot more 
because people don’t see local authorities as being so difficult to fight [3].
The client orientation that many of the local authorities had adopted therefore helped to create a 
perception that regulators were service providers and that they should either listen to the views 
and secure the agreement of their customers or be prepared to be the subject of appeals.
Preconditioning, guidance and the need for flexibility
Once the operators of the LAPC processes had been identified and their awareness of the 
requirements of the regulations had been raised, the next step in the implementation process 
was to interpret the specific requirements of LAPC for the particular process. As an initial 
reference point, all of the local authorities interviewed referred to the guidance notes for each 
industrial sector. While the guidance notes were perceived to be very useful, not least in 
promoting consistency and protecting the local authorities against appeals, there was a common 
feeling that they were too general and that they had to be adapted to reflect the specific 
circumstances in each regulated company. To do this, it was generally acknowledged that the 
inspectors depended at first upon the information supplied to them by the regulated companies. 
As their experience with process management had accumulated and as they had increased their 
familiarity with the various abatement technologies, however, their reliance on regulated 
companies had declined. The inspectors also developed good relations with equipment 
suppliers so that they had a better idea of the costs of compliance. Thus, all of the local 
authorities interviewed suggested that their capacity to interpret the requirements of LAPC for 
particular sectors had increased over time. This was particularly the case where individual 
inspectors had remained in post long enough to accumulate experience through their 
interactions with regulated companies.
Negotiating standards, securing agreement
Given the need to tailor the general requirements of the regulations to the particular 
characteristics of each regulated site, the standards that were to be required were generally
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established through negotiations with the managers of those sites. Thus, the implementation 
process had become more interactive as, despite their legal authority, inspectors still depended 
upon regulated companies for information and ultimately even for acceptance and approval:
During negotiations there’s give and take, we always ask the highest standard knowing 
that we may have to trade off, it’s like buying a car, you eventually come to a price that 
you both agree which is acceptable to all of the parties concerned. It’s no different 
when you negotiate standards with industry [7].
Within this negotiated process some of the experienced and better resourced inspectors were 
sometimes able to transfer information and understanding to regulated companies, which raised 
their awareness of the various ways in which they might improve their environmental 
performance. This was particularly the case where companies might be able to improve their 
economic and environmental performance simultaneously, for example by improving resource 
use and process efficiency (see below). However, these opportunities for education and 
awareness raising were not consistently present:
I would like to think that during negotiations we educate operators and teach them 
about new opportunities to improve their performance. But we often can’t educate 
companies because they already know about the options or because they’re simply not 
interested [7].
The inspectors’ attempts to educate and persuade within the implementation process therefore 
related more to the practical demands associated with the regulations than to the ways in which 
compliance with these demands might be achieved. In this sense, while the approach to 
standard setting was cooperative and flexible, the inspectors played only a very limited role in 
building capacities for compliance or shaping the forms of compliance.
The absence o f monitoring
Once authorisations had been issued which contained the operating conditions and emissions 
limits for a particular process, in many instances the inspectors interviewed suggested that they 
heard nothing more from the company. In some cases companies were supposed to undertake 
annual monitoring and sampling and to send in their records. This requirement was frequently 
disregarded, but the inspectors’ heavy workload meant that unless they received a complaint 
about the process, they did not interfere:
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We don’t have a visit schedule for any of the 90 scheduled processes. We used to have 
a schedule but the pressure of general complaint work that we have to take care of now 
is such that it just over-loads the system. There is no statutory duty to inspect LAPC 
processes, just to respond, so you take your statutory duties first and look at the rest 
afterwards. If you get complaints then the guys go in [6].
Although some of the local authorities included in the study were attempting to move beyond 
this essentially reactive approach by adopting programmes for routine and non-routine 
inspection of regulated processes, particularly for those processes that were seen to be a higher 
risk, most of the inspectors suggested that their inspection programmes were generally driven 
by complaints. This relative lack of proactivity related both stemmed particularly from the 
scarcity of resources and the fact that proactive inspections were not seen to be a statutory duty. 
However, it also related to the absence of a rigorous monitoring programme to assess the 
performance of regulated companies and the extent to which they complied with the 
requirements of LAPC. Without such a monitoring programme, local authorities often only 
found out about breaches of compliance when there were complaints or major incidents.
There was a variety of reasons for the general lack of reliable monitoring data. According to the 
legislation, the requirements for monitoring should be set out in the authorisation and 
conducted by regulated companies; however, in practice, all of the local authorities interviewed 
had problems with this. In part, these problems stemmed from the nature of the guidance notes, 
which at times were too vague:
I find the monitoring requirements incredible on the process guidance notes, they can 
make the measurement at whatever time suits them, even during shut down, it’s a very 
difficult area [7],
Such concerns, which were common amongst the inspectors interviewed, served to reinforce 
the reactive approach adopted by many local authorities, particularly when combined with 
resource shortages and a comparative lack of relevant expertise. Again, this reflected the extent 
to which inspectors depended upon the regulated companies for information:
If we find that the monitoring data is in consistent breach we would go to see them. 
But, depending on the process, they can monitor at the time when they know their 
emissions are going to be beneath the threshold. We don’t have any chance of checking 
that because of our resources. On some of the processes they do notify us when they’re 
going to have their stacks tested and on a couple of occasions the guys have been down
123
to watch them doing the test, more for their own information as to how it’s done 
because they’ve never seen it being done before... [2].
Thus, the monitoring data collected by regulated companies and presented to local authorities 
may not have offered an accurate reflection of their actual performance. Even where accurate 
monitoring data was available, it was widely accepted that the data offered only a ‘snap-shot’ of 
the performance of a regulated company on the day in which samples were taken. Requirements 
for monitoring performance on other days were generally much weaker or even non-existent.
In theory, these issues are catered for by the requirement for monitoring to be undertaken using 
established monitoring protocols and accredited consultants to generate data that can be 
verified by the local authorities. As one inspector observed, there was a feeling that the capacity 
of some of the local authorities to scrutinise the monitoring data provided by the regulated 
companies had increased over time as a result of their interactions with regulated companies:
Within the authorisations we ask to be notified of the days when any consultants will 
come onto the site to do the annual monitoring, that gives the officer the opportunity to 
go to the site to check that the monitoring is being conducted in accordance with the 
British Standard for monitoring and to talk to the consultant to make sure they’re 
accredited to monitor. We do this for about one in four or one in three [1].
Thus, in some local authorities checks were made to verify the claims made by regulated 
companies about their environmental performance. However, this was far from the norm: in 
most of the local authorities interviewed these checks were either not undertaken at all, or if 
they were in general the monitoring data was not rigorously scrutinised or verified. The effect 
of this was that even after local authorities had established operating conditions and set 
emissions limits often there was no effective way of checking whether the regulated companies 
routinely complied. The practical outcomes of the LAPC process, reflected in the extent to 
which they imposed meaningful imperatives on regulated companies, were significantly 
weakened by the fact that the local authorities were unlikely to detect any cases of non- 
compliance unless there was a major incident or someone complained.
Complaints-driven enforcement processes
In relation to the enforcement of the requirements of LAPC, the lack of monitoring data meant 
that the local authorities included in the study tended to resort to legal action only when 
complaints were made and when regulated companies were ‘caught in the act’ of exceeding
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their emissions limits. Even at this stage, however, most of the local authorities interviewed 
preferred to use negotiations to promote compliance, rather than legal action to sanction non- 
compliance:
Negotiations allow you to get the respect and attention of the industry that you’re 
dealing with -  I’ve always been brought up with the principle that it’s better to talk to 
people, to get their understanding, to get their cooperation that way than it is to put 
their backs up by taking them to court. The moment you bring a solicitor in you 
complicate things beyond all belief [2].
While some inspectors recognised the potential of a more robust and less cooperative approach 
to enforcement, the view of the regulated company as a customer or client to be assisted tended 
to prevail for all but the most persistent offenders. This stemmed also from a feeling that the 
regulated companies were not faceless entities but members of a community, employers who 
paid local wages and taxes -  and, indeed, contributed to the regulators’ own salaries through 
the authorisation fees that they paid. As a result, most councils tended to “use the big stick very 
sparingly, they will try to persuade, cajole, coerce before they will prosecute”. Nonetheless, in 
those cases where there were serious incidents or persistent complaints, when the inspectors 
commonly stated that they would immediately resort to the application of formal sanctions.
It was generally acknowledged by the inspectors interviewed that this complaints-driven 
approach to enforcement led to inconsistencies in the way that the requirements of the LAPC 
system were interpreted, applied and enforced. These inconsistencies related particularly to the 
proximity of neighbours who might detect and complain about breaches of compliance:
Because of the way that the processes are regulated in a reactive way rather than a 
proactive way because of the pressure everyone is under, if you’re lucky enough for 
your process to be away from houses you can get away with murder. A level playing 
field is not likely... those in the middle of the towns get it in the neck while those on 
the outskirts never get troubled [6].
This generated a dilemma amongst some of the inspectors interviewed, whereby they were tom 
between the desire to implement and enforce the requirements of the LAPC system 
consistently, and the need to prioritise and to focus scarce resources on the regulated companies 
that were causing problems:
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If you have a process out in the sticks that’s emitting but it has no harmful effect on the 
environment and it isn’t a nuisance then my view is well so what... That’s the way it’s 
going to have to be until we get the resources to do it consistently [7].
Thus, in the absence of effective monitoring, enforcement activities were driven by the 
demands of other stakeholders. Where there were no stakeholders to complain, or where these 
stakeholders could not detect any breaches of compliance, the practical imperatives established 
by the LAPC system were very weak indeed.
The influence o f stakeholders on the implementation process
Where they did exist, various stakeholders had been able to exert a significant influence on the 
implementation process. Individuals making complaints about regulated companies had a 
particularly significant influence on the implementation and enforcement of the requirements of 
the LAPC system: “Certainly in the case of the tax payer what he wants is someone to turn up 
immediately he complains”. However, the managers of regulated firms, who also had status as 
clients of the local authority as well as being tax-payers and creators of wealth and 
employment, also became stakeholders in the implementation process. For example, the 
managers of some of the businesses that were regulated by LAPC had lobbied local authority 
inspectors to ensure that they imposed similar standards on their competitors. Such lobbying 
activities had sometimes been very influential: in one case, a regulated company which had 
spent £150,000 to bring its process into compliance with the standards set out in the guidance 
note complained that its competitors were not being obliged to do the same. The regulator in 
charge of this case responded by visiting the firm in question:
We went and sorted out the process in the same area that wasn’t complying and he 
ceased operating. I also contacted my equivalent in the neighbouring authority, I 
explained the situation and he went and sorted out the other process. So we can adopt a 
strict line in terms of enforcement if we need to do. It’s got to be a level playing field
[2]-
Thus, although the local authorities adopted a cooperative and hands-on approach as they 
sought to interpret the legislation and issue authorisations, when it came to monitoring and 
enforcement they generally adopted a much more arms-length and reactive approach, that was 
driven by complaints both from the public and from the managers of regulated firms.
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The Influence of the Implementation Process
On technological and organisational change
The inspectors commonly suggested that the typical response to the LAPC regulations was for 
firms to adopt end-of-pipe technologies. This may have reflected the perceived lack of capacity 
for more proactive forms of environmental management within the LAPC regulated firms. 
However, the inspectors also thought that there were fewer opportunities for the environmental 
performance of smaller and simpler processes to be improved through re-organisation or fine- 
tuning than were often available in larger and more complicated industrial processes:
There is more scope within a lot of the IPC processes for changing the method of 
operation within the process... Some LAPC processes are so basic there are no other 
options than end-of-pipe. Also with EPC processes you’re looking at the whole process 
for water, waste and air so you’ve got more scope. When you’re looking at LAPC 
you’re only looking at air [3].
The general perception, then, was that there were fewer opportunities for LAPC processes to 
improve their environmental performance and perhaps their economic efficiency by changing 
the ways in which they organised and managed their production processes. However, the 
inspectors also suggested that the capacity of the firms to recognise and respond to any such 
opportunities was likely to be more limited, since capacity to respond declines as companies 
grow smaller; as a result, it was felt that smaller companies faced particular problems when 
seeking to respond to the requirements of LAPC. While bigger companies had begun to employ 
environmental managers and develop environmental management systems, environment was 
still low on the list of priorities for smaller companies: “Most little companies have had a 
shock, because although it’s not a priority it’s a significant budget requirement so there’s an 
imbalance. They’ve had to suddenly make expenditure decisions about environmental 
improvement when they used to think it wasn’t an issue”. As a result of the perceived lack of 
opportunities and absence of capacities for the types of process change that could enable firms 
to anticipate and avoid their environmental impacts, the inspectors rarely challenged the 
managers’ initial preference for end-of-pipe responses. This was the case even though the 
LAPC regulations required firms to prevent or reduce their emissions wherever possible before 
they resorted to those end-of-pipe approaches that would render harmless any remaining 
emissions. Indeed, some inspectors perceived the regulations to be about emissions rather than 
management or clean technology:
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Most of what we do is to do with abatement -  in this day and age it’s fairly easy to go 
to a manufacturer and buy something off the shelf. That is what we would regard as 
BATNEEC. If it is a question of emissions we would prefer to see the filtration unit put 
on rather than just fine tuning little bits. We see our job as being emissions oriented 
rather than process oriented. We are responsible for seeing that emissions to 
atmosphere are within limits [4].
The job of seeking to ensure that regulated firms had adopted end-of-pipe abatement 
technologies was made easier as a wide range of such technologies were now commonly 
available. Despite the official requirement for BATNEEC, however, most of the inspectors 
interviewed were happy to accept an effective rather than an optimum response: “We find that 
companies will put in what is appropriate, not necessarily the very best but if it is effective 
common sense has to prevail. We will accept something slightly less than ‘best available’ if it 
works...”.
Indeed, some of the companies had been innovative enough to develop their own responses in 
an attempt to avoid the need to buy abatement technologies from external suppliers, since end- 
of-pipe technologies can be very costly. This was generally accepted by the inspectors: “At the 
basic end some of them do come up with their own responses -  they can be a bit Heath 
Robinson but they sometimes do the job”.
More fundamentally, the inspectors recognised that some operators had attempted to redesign 
their processes, for example by moving away from the material inputs that generated regulated 
emissions. This was often less to do with a desire to improve environmental performance than 
to avoid being regulated by LAPC (“they’re fed up with the local authority regulating them”) 
and by implication to avoid having to spend money on abatement technologies.
The influence on economic networks
Although innovative responses to LAPC were deemed to be comparatively rare, the inspectors 
noted that there was one major exception to this broader trend: in various sectors, material 
suppliers had worked with their LAPC-regulated customers to develop new products that would 
either enable them to avoid the regulations entirely or that would enhance their capacity for 
compliance:
Material suppliers are developing products which mean that their customers can 
comply without any abatement. The guidance note for the paint sector for example
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outlines compliant coatings, so if they use a coating that has a low amount of solvent or 
is water based, then it will comply without any abatement. It’s the same thing with 
adhesives or with styrene usage where they’ve set a limit on the amount of styrene that 
can be released per tonne of resin used. Operators using styrene have said that by the 
time the day comes when they have to comply, the manufacturers of resin will have 
produced a product that contains a low amount of styrene. But if they choose not to use 
that product or if it isn’t available then the guidance notes set out the need for 
abatement technologies [3],
This meant that broader economic networks, relating particularly to the emergence of new 
alliances within supply-chains, had dramatically altered the ways in which some of the firms 
that were regulated by LAPC responded to the regulations. Despite this, the inspectors 
suggested that many managers of regulated firms were reluctant to change their material 
supplies because such changes represented a commercial risk. In response to this problem, the 
regulators were often able to offer some short-term flexibility to companies that were prepared 
to take such risks as they felt that in the medium term such initiatives would pay dividends:
If people are doing tests to see if it works or if it doesn’t work we generally give them a 
bit of leeway, providing they’re not causing a nuisance. If we’re getting complaints 
there’s a dilemma, whether we enforce it rigorously or relax it and sit on the complaints 
in the hope that the new products will work and that things will eventually improve [5].
Other than these supply-chain initiatives that had emerged as a consequence of LAPC, the 
inspectors suggested that the managers of the regulated firms did not commonly engage in 
broader economic networks in order to gain access to any resources that they lacked. External 
linkages were seen to be limited, poorly developed and under-utilised:
I’ve no evidence that regulated processes turn to other organisations like the Training 
and Enterprise Councils or the Chambers of Commerce to help them comply. I’m sure 
they do within their own trade organisations and sometimes with one another at the 
local level -  but trade associations are very poor apart from certain sectors in helping 
their members with environmental issues. Half of them are just dining clubs and cricket 
clubs [4],
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On environmental performance
In those instances where the need to buy material inputs that gave rise to harmful emissions had 
been removed or reduced through product and process changes, the inspectors associated LAPC 
with significant improvements in environmental performance. However, in the majority of 
cases the inspectors stated that LAPC had only led to the introduction of new abatement 
technologies. Although it was easy for the inspectors to assess whether or not these abatement 
technologies were in place, the lack of monitoring meant that it was difficult for the inspectors 
to say whether the abatement technologies were regularly used or if they were working 
effectively, unless there were changes in the number of complaints from the public. The ability 
of the inspectors to assess the environmental impacts of the LAPC regulations was more limited 
still for those pollutants that could not be seen or smelt by the public.
Despite the problems with monitoring, the inspectors felt that the wider adoption and use of 
end-of-pipe technologies had led to some improvements in local air quality as they enabled the 
managers of the regulated processes to capture a proportion of their harmful emissions and to 
prevent them from entering the air environment. However, they also acknowledged that the 
broader environmental impacts of LAPC depended on what the managers then did with the 
emissions that they had captured. Although some of the firms had been able to recycle the 
materials that they had captured or to find new markets for them, the inspectors suggested that 
in other instances, the harmful emissions were merely transferred from one medium (air) to 
another (water or waste). As the inspectors did not have a responsibility for ensuring that 
emissions streams were channelled towards the ‘best practicable environmental option’ (BPEO) 
as a whole, the overall impact of the LAPC regulations on the environment was unclear.
On costs and benefits
Although environmental improvements had been associated with cost savings in some larger 
firms, most of the inspectors interviewed claimed that the smaller companies that they regulated 
saw far more limited economic returns on their investments of scarce management time or 
financial resources in improving environmental performance. Furthermore, while the 
Environment Agency was able to demonstrate to the bigger companies that regulation could 
offer them significant savings -  for example by applying Agency expertise to help them 
minimise waste -  the perceived costs of environmental improvement for smaller companies 
affected their willingness to respond to the requirements of LAPC. These differences in the 
perceived economic implications of environmental regulation in larger and smaller processes 
stemmed in part from the fact that there were fewer opportunities for improving the
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organisation or the management and therefore the efficiency of smaller and simpler processes. 
However, as one inspector noted, it was also because the LAPC regulations focused on air 
emissions rather than water or waste emissions:
There are benefits from IPC that aren’t there for LAPC... it costs money to have your 
waste or your effluent taken away and treated so it pays to reduce them -  it’s different 
for emissions to air because these are free [2].
Nonetheless, some inspectors clearly thought that LAPC could sometimes stimulate 
improvements in efficiency and that on occasion it could generate benefits as well as costs. 
Where the inspectors were able to offer advice, savings could sometimes be made: one 
interviewee cited a company which had a problem with kilns that were approaching emissions 
limits. On the regulator’s recommendation, the company paid a consultant to do a stack 
emissions reading, which revealed very high levels of carbon monoxide, suggesting the kilns 
were working inefficiently: “We went in and gave the company advice, they had the process 
serviced, they’re now operating much more efficiently and they’ve saved themselves £70,000 
per year in gas bills. They weren’t aware that they were running inefficient kilns”. 
Opportunities for such integrated process changes were seen to be comparatively rare, however 
and the inspectors generally suggested that LAPC imposed a cost on the regulated companies 
that could not be recouped through improvements in economic performance. As such, while the 
inspectors were concerned about the economic implications of LAPC, they generally felt that 
little could be done to reduce the costs of compliance:
In many cases there has been no impact on the company other than on their bottom-line. 
There’s been no production benefit or improved efficiency at all. It’s just an add-on 
cost that they’ve got to meet [2].
Thus, the inspectors were often unable to counter any resistance to the regulations amongst the 
managers of the regulated sites by arguing that some approaches to compliance could generate 
benefits or by offering advice and assistance that the companies could draw upon to reduce the 
costs of compliance.
Relating the Empirical Discussion to the Analytical Variables
The discussion that has been presented in this chapter reflects the perspectives that inspectors 
within a number of different local authorities have on the various factors that shape the nature
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and influence of the LAPC implementation process. Within this discussion, it is possible to 
identify the influence of the range of the analytical variables that the thesis is interested in, 
namely the resources that are available to the different actors, the extent to which any resource 
inter-dependencies establish incentives for different forms of interaction and the strategies that 
the different actors adopt in response to these incentives. The thesis is also interested in the 
extent to which these variables are shaped by different institutional factors and in the ways in 
which all of the variables combine to influence the outputs and outcomes of the implementation 
process. Based on the discussion presented above, this conclusion will examine the influence of 
each of these variables as seen from the perspective of the inspectors who are engaged in the 
LAPC implementation process.
The character and resources o f the implementing agencies
Within the local authorities with responsibility for implementing LAPC, competition between 
different objectives commonly restricted the resources that were available to the LAPC 
implementation process. In seeking to fulfil their statutory duties whilst operating within these 
resource constraints, the inspectors commonly took the initiative and adopted a cooperative 
approach to standard setting. However, resource shortages restricted their ability to monitor the 
extent to which the firms complied with the standards that were established. As a result, the 
enforcement process was commonly complaints driven.
In adopting this approach to implementation, the inspectors commonly drew upon a range of 
resources. These included their ability to:
Understand and interpret the legislation in order to establish site-specific standards;
Use discretionary powers as they did so, whilst also resisting influence from regulated
companies or third parties by referring to the published guidance;
Draw upon networks between inspectors to:
- transfer information and expertise;
- reduce dependence on the information held by regulated firms; and
- improve consistency and reduce the prospect of appeals;
Grant or withhold flexibility relating to the times at which standards should be achieved;
and
Choose whether or not to apply formal sanctions in response to any cases of non-
compliance that were detected or complaints that were made.
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The nature o f  any resource inter-dependencies within the implementation process
Although the inspectors had access to various resources that they could draw upon in the 
implementation process, they also depended upon a range of resources that were held by the 
managers of the regulated firms. These included the managers’ ability to choose whether or not 
to:
Help local authorities to meet other objectives, relating particularly to economic 
development, which in turn influenced: 
the resources available for implementation;
the status of the regulated firms as they became ‘clients’ of the local authorities; 
the extent to which the inspectors were conscious of the potential conflicts between 
environmental protection and economic development when exercising their discretionary 
powers;
Grant the inspectors ready access to the site-specific information that they needed to put the 
regulations into practice;
Collect and grant the inspectors access to the accurate monitoring data that they needed to 
assess whether compliance had been achieved;
Respond to requests to move back into compliance when breaches were detected and/or 
complaints were made, to enable the inspectors to avoid the need to resort to the application 
of formal sanctions; and
Raise the costs of implementation or threaten the reputation of the local authority or its 
inspectors by launching appeals.
The extent to which any resource inter-dependencies provide
incentives for different forms o f interaction within the implementation process
Within the context of broader resource shortages, these inter-dependencies encouraged the 
inspectors to adopt a cooperative and hands-on approach to the stages of the implementation 
process associated with the interpretation of the legislation, the setting of standards and the 
issuing of authorisations. This approach enabled them to:
Raise awareness of the regulations and to encourage firms to come forward to be regulated; 
Gain access to information needed to interpret legislation and apply standards;
Issue authorisations, thereby fulfilling their statutory obligations; and
Reduce resistance to the regulations and avoid appeals against regulatory decisions.
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During the monitoring and enforcement stages of the implementation process, however, the 
authorities generally adopted a more arms-length and reactive approach. This approach enabled 
them to:
Avoid the need to spend scarce time and resources on monitoring;
Avoid the need to resort to legal action by giving any firms associated the opportunity to 
avoid further complaints by coming back into compliance; and
Resort to legal action only in response to serious incidents or sustained cases of non- 
compliance.
The strategies that the implementing agency adopted in response to any such incentives
Given these resource inter-dependencies, the LAPC inspectors sought to adopt different 
approaches at different stages of the implementation process. Their strategies in this respect 
included:
Taking the initiative by identifying companies to be regulated and raising their awareness 
of the requirements of the regulations;
Cooperating with the managers of regulated firms as they interpreted the regulations, to 
enable them to issue authorisations without antagonising regulated firms;
In the absence of significant monitoring initiatives, relying on: 
the strong culture of compliance that existed within some firms; 
the monitoring information that the regulated firms did provide; and 
a complaints-driven monitoring and enforcement process.
Issue informal warnings in response to any non-serious or temporary breeches of 
compliance; and
Impose formal sanctions in response to any serious or sustained breeches of compliance.
The extent to which different institutional structures shape
and are shaped by these incentives and constrain or enable these strategies
Within the broader context associated with the structures of central and local government, these 
incentives for interaction were shaped by a range of specific institutional factors that 
necessitated the adoption of this approach whilst restricting the ability of the inspectors to 
explore alternative approaches. These included the:
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Presence of different, and sometimes competing, objectives within local authorities and 
within implementing departments;
Presence of client mentality in relationships between local authorities and regulated firms; 
Practical nature of the funding structures within local authorities that limited resources 
available in the implementation process;
Design of the legislation that established the potential for a flexible approach to 
implementation;
Lack of complete preconditioning that obliged and enabled the implementing inspectors to 
exercise some discretion in the implementation process;
Presence of some preconditioning that enabled the implementing inspectors to defend 
themselves against undue influence from regulated firms and some third parties; 
Professional backgrounds/aspirations within EHO career structures that limited the amount 
of technical expertise they could offer on the ways in which companies might comply; 
Perceived absence of many economically beneficial improvement options, particularly in 
smaller firms with simpler processes; and
Presence of interested stakeholders that could detect and complain about any incidents.
The influence that different forms o f interaction have on regulatory outputs and outcomes
This approach to implementation shaped the practical nature of the demands that the inspectors 
made and the ways in which the firms responded to these demands. In particular, the approach:
Relied on guidance and preconditioning but still gave regulated firms that cooperated some 
influence in the implementation process;
Offered some flexibility relating to the point at which sanctions would be applied as a 
response to any cases of non-compliance and to the form that these sanctions would take; 
Generally focused on controlling emissions rather than on the opportunities to avoid these 
through changes to production processes;
Was able to detect whether abatement technologies had been installed but was often unable 
to detect any case of non-compliance unless they were reported by the companies 
themselves or came to light as a result of complaints from the public;
Commonly stimulated investments in end-of-pipe technologies that did not reduce 
generation of polluting substances but restricted their release and established potential for 
their effective management; and
Sometimes stimulated product and process re-design to enable emissions to be avoided at 
source, particularly where alliances emerged in the supply-chain.
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In summary, then, this chapter has examined the perspectives that the implementing inspectors 
had of the factors that shaped the nature and influence of the LAPC implementation process. It 
found that the inspectors had to mobilise what resources they had and to cooperate with the 
managers of the regulated firms in order to interpret the regulations and to issue authorisations. 
In this sense, it found that strategies that the inspectors adopted were shaped by a range of 
resource inter-dependencies, which gave rise to some cooperation. However, it also found that 
the inspectors lacked the resources needed to cooperate with the regulated firms in order to 
promote compliance or to reduce the costs of compliance. These resource shortages also 
precluded the adoption of a rigorous monitoring regime, which in turn restricted the capacity 
for the inspectors to control the activities of the regulated firms. In the absence of such 
capacities for control, the chapter found that the prospects for compliance depended on the 
cultures of compliance in the regulated firms and on the ability of the different stakeholders to 
detect and complain about non-compliant firms.
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The Case of Local Air Pollution Control: 
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Structure
> Introduction
> The Nature of the Implementation Process 
Multi-regulation
Awareness and understanding o f LAPC 
Interpretation and standard setting 
Interactive learning 
Monitoring and enforcement 
The influence o f stakeholders
> The Influence of the Implementation Process 
On technological and organisational responses 
On internal resources
On intra-firm and inter-firm networks 
On environmental performance 
On costs and benefits
> Relating the Empirical Discussion to the Analytical Variables 
Introduction
Chapter 6 considered the perspectives that the LAPC inspectors have of the factors that shape 
the nature and influence of the implementation process. This chapter will complete the 
presentation of the empirical results by considering the perspectives held by the managers of the 
sites that are regulated by LAPC. Following the structure of the preceding empirical chapters, 
the discussion examines the perspectives that the managers of the regulated sites have of the 
various stages of the implementation process, before considering their views on the influence
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that this process has had on the behaviour and performance of the regulated sites. The chapter 
then concludes by drawing out the influence of the various analytical variables that are of most 
interest within this thesis, namely:
The character and resources of the actors that interact within the implementation process; 
The extent to which any resource inter-dependencies generate incentives for cooperation; 
The nature of the strategies that the different actors adopt in response to these incentives;
The degree to which these strategies are enabled or constrained by any associated 
institutional factors;
The influence that different strategies and forms of interaction have on the outputs and 
outcomes of the LAPC implementation process.
Again reflecting the methodological approach and the research process that was introduced in 
Chapter 3, the discussion that follows draws upon the results of interviews with the managers of 
18 regulated sites within the same region, conducted between 1996 and 1997. Details of the 
sites that were included in the study are presented in Table 7.1. Where quotations are included 
in the text, they are followed by an attribution (i.e. [1]) that corresponds to the associated row 
number in Table 7.1.
The Nature of the Implementation Process
Multi-regulation
LAPC was one of several frameworks of regulation that had affected the managers of the 
regulated sites. As a result, the managers explained, they had to familiarise themselves with a 
variety of different regulations and to engage with a range of regulatory agencies and personnel. 
This was particularly the case because, unlike the larger sites that engaged with a single 
regulator under integrated pollution control, the smaller firms faced separate regulations for 
emissions to air, water and land:
Potentially we have visits from five or six regulators. The Environment Agency for 
special waste, the local authority for our air emissions, the Health and Safety Executive 
for hazardous substances, the water company for our effluent... I realise these things 
need to be controlled and they need to know what’s going on but it certainly makes it a 
headache for us here dealing with so many regulations and so many people [14].
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Table 7.1: Characteristics of LAPC Regulated Sites
Site N ature of 
regulated 
process
Size of 
site
Ownership 
of site
Management
responsibility
Strength of 
culture of 
compliance
Nature of 
engagement 
with regulators
Ease of access 
to internal 
financial 
resources
Ease of access 
to internal 
managerial 
resources
Ease of 
access to 
external 
resources
Predom inant 
form of response
1 Materials
Processing
Large/
Med
Group HSE High Positive High High Low Integrated technologies 
and techniques
2 Light
Manufacturing
Large/
Med
Group HSE Med Neutral Med Med Med S-chain and 
integrated techniques
3 Paint
Manufacturing
Med Group HSE High Positive High High Low Integrated technologies 
and technuques
4 Light
Manufacturing
Med Indep E&Q Low Negative Low Med Low End-of-pipe
5 Packaging
Manufacturing
Med Group HSE Low Neutral Med Low Med S-chain and 
end-of-pipe
6 Paints
Manufacturing
Med/
Small
Indep HSE&Q High Positive Med Med Low End-of-pipe
7 Packaging
Manufacturing
Med/
Small
Group HSE&Q High Positive High High High Integrated techniques 
and end-of-pipe
8 Materials
Manufacturing
Small Group E&Q Med Neutral Low Med Low End-of-pipe
9 Materials
Coating
Small Group HSE&Q High Positive Med High High S-chain and 
end-of-pipe
10 Materials
Processing
Small Indep General Low Negative Low Low Low End-of-pipe
11 Packaging
Manufacturing
Small Indep HSE&Q Med Neutral Low Med Med End-of-pipe
12 Printing Small Group General Low Negative Low Low High S-chain and 
end-of-pipe
13 Process
Engineering
Small Indep HSE&Q High Positive Low Med High S-chain
14 Process
Engineering
Small Indep General Low Negative Low Low Low End-of-pipe
15 Materials
Processing
Small/
Micro
Group General Low Negative Med Low Low End-of-pipe
16 Printing Micro Indep General Med Neutral Low Med High S-chain and 
end-of-pipe
17 Process
Engineering
Micro Indep General Low Negative Low Low Low S-chain
18 Materials
Coating
Micro Indep General Low Negative Low Med High S-chain and 
end-of-pipe
Most of the managers agreed that a steady stream of new regulatory initiatives in recent years 
meant that it was possible to prioritise each new piece of regulation only for a limited period, 
before competing regulatory demands drew their attention to a new initiative or a more pressing 
concern. In a setting where the different regulatory frameworks had to compete for the resources 
of the regulated firms, some regulators were clearly better at holding their attention than others. 
Legislation relating to health and safety, and to water and waste management, was generally 
seen to be more stringent than that relating to air pollution control, for example. However, the 
priority that the managers awarded to complying with different regulations depended not only 
on the formal design of the different regulatory frameworks, but also on the regulatory styles 
adopted by the different regulators:
It over-complicates it when you have to deal with different regulators, especially when 
you don’t know what to expect from each one. They’re all pretty friendly to begin with, 
but you really get the feeling that some of them will get legal at the first sign of trouble 
while others are much more reluctant to do that [11].
The fact that some regulators were resorted to legal action more readily than others established a 
‘pecking order’ of regulations within many of the sites interviewed. As will be discussed below, 
the monitoring regime associated with LAPC was generally seen to be unlikely to detect many 
breaches of compliance, and the associated enforcement process was seen to be flexible and 
forgiving. As a result, LAPC was not generally considered to be the highest of priorities, 
particularly when compared with other regulations relating to areas such as health and safety, 
water or waste, where levels of compliance were more carefully monitored and where the 
regulators were quicker to resort to the application of formal sanctions.
Awareness and understanding
For most of the managers interviewed, the realisation that they had to comply with LAPC when 
it came into force in the early 1990s came as something of a surprise. However, the initial shock 
was often followed by an acceptance of the regulations, particularly when they realised that they 
would eventually have to comply and that sanctions could be imposed if they did not. The 
simple prospect of legal authority being imposed to force them to comply was therefore enough 
to encourage most firms to begin to think about how they might meet the requirements of 
LAPC. Many of the managers interviewed, though, found themselves stumbling at the first 
hurdle -  interpreting the generic requirements of LAPC -  a problem which prevented them from 
identifying the specific standards with which they would have to comply:
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The biggest problem that we’ve had is the way the regulations have been written -  you 
just can’t understand them. You’ve got to read them five times and then you might think 
you know what they say -  that was a big problem from the start, not fully understanding 
what they wanted [13].
This initial lack of understanding meant that the majority of managers of the regulated sites left 
it to the regulators to take the initiative, despite the fact that the LAPC system obliged them to 
apply for authorisations to operate. In response to their collective lack of action, the regulators 
had established contact and had offered to help to translate the generic requirements of the 
legislation and the associated guidance into a form that was useful for each particular site.
Interpretation and standard setting
Once there was engagement between the regulator and the operators of regulated sites, specific 
emissions standards were commonly established on the basis of cooperative interactions 
between the two parties. The boundaries of this cooperation were shaped by the legal authority 
of the regulators -  “I know we’ve got to meet the law, they know we’ve got to meet the law” -  
and the threat of legal penalties was seen to be an important resource. However, the managers 
also recognised that while they depended upon the regulators to interpret the regulations (or 
more exactly, to establish standards and to authorise their operation), to enable them do this the 
regulators in turn depended upon the information that became available through their dialogue 
with regulated sites. In other words, the relationship between the regulators and the regulated 
firms within the implementation process was one of interdependence:
With the guidance notes, we agree on what the interpretation is because often I’m 
reading it and he’s reading it and we’re not quite sure what they mean. So first of all we 
sit down and work out what they mean to establish exactly what they say we have to do. 
And then we talk about how we’re going to do it [3].
This was seen to be the case amongst all of the sites included in the study, as the regulator had 
not imposed standards in any instance without a prior dialogue with the operator of a regulated 
site. While this gave regulated sites some leverage in the way that the guidance was interpreted, 
nevertheless there was a general feeling that the guidance was central to establishing standards, 
and that the only flexibility that could be offered by the regulators related to the timescales for 
compliance: “The only room for manoeuvre is where there’s an investment required, where they 
may give you a bit more time to meet the levels that you need to meet.” In the eyes of the 
managers, therefore, the standards that were established by the implementation process were
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heavily preconditioned by the process guidance notes, even though these had to be interpreted 
by the regulator on a case-by-case basis.
Despite this high level of preconditioning, many of the regulated sites interviewed felt that they 
would be given more flexibility if they had established a cooperative and trusting relationship 
with the regulators. Such trust emerged over time between particular inspectors and the 
managers of sites that they regulated if the managers cooperated willingly and if a track record 
of compliance had been established for the site. This flexibility was commonly valued by the 
managers of the regulated sites, as it gave them the freedom to examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various ways in which compliance could be secured. It also reduced the risks 
associated with innovating, as they felt able to explore the potential of different technologies 
and techniques in the knowledge that sanctions would not be immediately imposed should such 
approaches fail. One environmental manager [9] claimed that this flexibility, and the innovative 
activity that it afforded, had enabled them to improve both the efficiency and the efficacy of 
their response to LAPC.
Thus, the trust that grew within the cooperative relationship between regulators and some 
regulated sites over time was associated with financial savings by the sites interviewed. In this 
sense, developing a trusting relationship with their regulator had an economic value for 
regulated sites. This also gave the regulators more power in the implementation process, as such 
flexibility was awarded at their discretion.
Interactive learning
Although they felt that it was useful to cooperate in the standard-setting process, the managers 
claimed that they had received little assistance on how they might best comply with the 
regulations. They all agreed that their ability to learn from the inspectors depended upon the 
inspectors’ accumulated expertise and on the continuity of their relationship with the managers 
of the regulated sites, but the regulators’ lack of resources meant that experienced staff, with the 
time and attention to give to regulated sites, were in short supply.
They’d be the first to say that they could do with more expertise. The people constraint 
is a problem for them. They’ve got a lot of people to regulate and to see and they can’t 
always be everywhere... One very experienced one left and has not been replaced as far 
as we can tell. We don’t feel that’s a good idea. They need more EHO guys and we 
need some continuity... [3].
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Indeed, at times the managers felt that the inspectors learnt more from them than they did from 
the inspectors:
We learnt a lot from him, he told us about companies who’ve tried different things, 
although I have to say we were at the vanguard of things really and he was using us as 
an example to share with his other colleagues who were regulating other companies in 
our industry [1].
Far from the regulatory process being a ‘one-way street’ with information passing from the 
regulator to the regulated sites, then, in some instances the implementation of LAPC involved 
processes of exchange and interactive learning, whereby individual inspectors would collect 
information and understanding from regulated firms, and transfer it both to other regulators and 
to other regulated firms. It appeared, then, that a combination of continuity and expertise 
influenced the nature of the relationship between the inspectors and the managers of the 
regulated sites. This combination allowed trust and mutual understanding to develop, in turn 
enabling the emergence of an interactive learning process that could be to the benefit of each 
actor. However, the managers interviewed repeatedly remarked that the level of expertise that 
the inspectors had to offer within this interactive learning process was often limited.
On the one hand, then, companies felt that such cooperation was useful, as it gave them a 
greater understanding of the regulations and enabled them to be awarded some flexibility 
relating to the times at which they would have to secure compliance. On the other hand, they 
rarely felt that cooperating with the regulator would enable them to gain access to the 
information and understanding that they needed to enhance their capacities for compliance or to 
reduce their costs of compliance.
Monitoring and enforcement
Although many of the managers felt that the standards that had been established were quite 
demanding, the common perception was that the inspectors did not have the resources to 
monitor whether or not companies complied with these standards. Instead, unless there were 
complaints or major incidents, it was left to the regulated companies to take the initiative by 
collecting monitoring data and supplying it to the regulators. But even where they did this, the 
managers generally felt that the inspectors were slow to scrutinise or to verify any monitoring 
data, and quick to forgive any occasional breaches of compliance brought to their attention by 
the public complaints procedures:
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We get the monitoring done and send them the results. We get an independent company 
to come in and they send a copy to the EHO. They never actually arrive on site to have 
a look. The water regulators do -  they just arrive at any time. Air is reactive though and 
complaints-driven. But even then they call and say, ‘Well I had a complaint last 
Thursday, were you doing anything?’ And I’ll say, ‘Yes we were doing this or that’. 
He’s just following it up, but he never comes down and he takes our word for it that 
we’ve rectified the situation [4],
The influence of the perceived weaknesses in the monitoring regime associated with LAPC 
depended on the cultures of compliance amongst the regulated firms (see Table 7.1). In this 
respect, the sites included in the study can be divided into two main groups: those sites with a 
strong culture of compliance that accepted the regulations and that positively engaged with the 
regulators, and those with a weak culture of compliance that would have preferred the 
regulations not to exist and that adopted a defensive stance in their interactions with the 
regulator. Differences in the cultures of compliance appeared to relate particularly to the size, 
ownership and public profile of the site. Medium-sized and/or group-owned sites that were often 
subjected to public pressure tended to have stronger cultures of compliance than their smaller 
and/or more independent counterparts, which were commonly less visible.
Managers that worked in sites with a strong culture of compliance commonly attributed this not 
only to the fact that their sites tended to be subjected to more public scrutiny (either because 
they were larger or because the companies that owned them had a higher public profile), but 
also to the fact that both they and their company had some ethical commitment to the 
environment. As a result, they claimed, they always sought to comply with the requirements of 
LAPC even though their environmental performance was rarely subjected to any scrutiny by the 
regulator:
We do it purely off our own bat because we feel that we ought to. We know that there’s 
legislation... but nobody is bothering us, we’ve nobody on our backs. The nearest we 
get to any bother is from our customers who say, ‘What checks are you doing?’ as part 
of their environmental policies [3].
In stark contrast, the managers of those sites with a weaker culture of compliance stated that a 
lack of contact with the regulator and the lack of public scrutiny had led to the feeling that 
compliance with LAPC should not be seen as a priority -  “Nobody’s bothered about our 
performance so we’re not either”. It was recognised that in the absence of a rigorous monitoring 
regime, incidents of non-compliance were unlikely to be detected. As a result, the managers of
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those sites with a weak culture of compliance tended to be reluctant to spend time or money 
working towards compliance with LAPC. This reluctance was even more acute where they 
suspected that their competitors were not being required to achieve the same standards that they 
had been asked to achieve. Such suspicions about the consistency of the implementation and 
enforcement process were common wherever information on the standards that were being 
demanded by different regulators, and those that were being achieved by similar sites, flowed 
between companies within the same sector:
I know from travelling around that there’s hardly a factory like this that can conform to 
[the standard set out in the guidance] so what are we to do. We’re all struggling against 
the tide -  the sort of business this is and the cost of cleaning up and getting to that level 
is too prohibitive... We’ve tried hard to meet it but I know of quite a lot who haven’t 
done anything [12].
The perceived lack of monitoring, together with the feeling that a firm would be put at a 
competitive disadvantage if it complied with the requirements of LAPC while its competitors 
did not, served to undermine commitment to meeting standards among managers of those sites 
with a weaker culture of compliance.
This commitment was further eroded by the fact that the enforcement regime was not seen to be 
particularly stringent unless there were public complaints or serious incidents. For example, the 
common perception was that the LAPC inspectors were inclined to respond to any non-serious 
cases of non-compliance that they were able to detect by adopting a cooperative, flexible and 
relatively forgiving approach to enforcement, in an attempt to encourage compliance and to 
avoid the need to resort to legal action. Although the managers accepted that this cooperative 
and flexible approach would eventually be withdrawn in serious or sustained cases of non- 
compliance, they also thought that it would be reinstated when the site had moved back into 
compliance. Consequently, while they valued the cooperation of the regulator, they were not 
particularly afraid of this cooperation being temporarily withdrawn as an informal sanction, not 
least because the existence of this informal sanction protected them from the immediate 
imposition of more formal sanctions.
Given the low probability of being ‘caught’, the temporary nature of any informal sanctions and 
sites’ ability to avoid the imposition of formal sanctions, then, consistent compliance was 
expected only in those sites with a very well established culture of compliance, or in those that 
were the subject of complaints from the public and other stakeholders.
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-  The influence o f stakeholders
The various factors outlined above helped to generate a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach 
to compliance with LAPC amongst those companies with a weak culture of compliance. 
However, there were also some counter-veiling forces at work. For example, the complaints- 
driven monitoring and enforcement process gave a considerable amount of power to various 
stakeholders, since members of the public as well as regulated firms were seen to be the 
‘clients’ of the local authority. Consequently, complaints about nuisance were taken seriously 
and inspectors commonly reacted to any serious or sustained incidents by resorting to their legal 
authority. This tended to mean that those sites that were located near to residential areas, or that 
emitted visible or smelly substances, were subjected to significant amounts of pressure from the 
public and subsequently from the inspectors. More isolated sites, or those with less easily 
detectable emissions, generally escaped more lightly.
Furthermore, this complaints-driven approach to enforcement appeared to have a ‘knock-on’ 
effect, whereby some of the more proactive sites with a strong culture of compliance, or those 
sites that had been forced to comply as a response to public complaints, had lobbied the 
regulator to force their competitors to achieve the same standards. This served both to promote 
consistency and to ensure that higher rather than lower standards were adopted and complied 
with across the range of sites. For example, the HSE manager of one particularly proactive site 
provided information to a regulator from another authority, which was taking legal action 
against one of its competitors:
There’s another similar plant like this in Scotland -  and the Scottish local authority 
wanted to come here and get some baseline information because they were taking the 
chap to court... We were very happy to show the inspector around, and we’ll be even 
happier if they take him out of business. It should be a level playing field, we’re 
spending the money to comply, [and] so should our competitors [1].
In another instance, a company that had been forced to make substantial investments in 
abatement technologies, following a series of complaints from the public, had appealed to the 
local authority because one its competitors had not been required to do the same. The company 
alleged that this meant its competitor was able to charge lower prices. In response to the firm’s 
appeal, the inspector notified his counterpart in the neighbouring authority, leading to the 
imposition of a similar standard on the competitor’s site. The competitor was therefore obliged 
to make substantial investments in abatement technology despite the fact that no one had 
complained about its performance. Thus, the implementation process was sometimes driven by
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the demands of industry as well as by those of the public and in some instances this led to an 
upward rather than a downward movement of standards.
The influence of the implementation process
- On technological and organisational change
Differences in all of the factors outlined above had an impact on the ways in which the sites 
included in the study responded to the practical demands established by LAPC. At the most 
basic level, variations in sites’ culture of compliance affected the level and the nature of the 
monitoring they undertook. Those sites with a strong culture of compliance were much more 
willing to invest in monitoring technologies, giving them regular or even continuous data on the 
performance of their process, as well as on the level and the nature of their emissions. These 
data improved their understanding of the factors that affected the environmental performance of 
their process, in turn increasing their capacity for compliance. By contrast, those sites without 
such a strong culture of compliance tended to be reluctant to undertake monitoring, beyond the 
basic requirement for them to submit representative data to the regulator on the level of their 
emissions. Since they only occasionally monitored their emissions to provide these data, these 
sites learnt very little about the factors impacting upon the environmental performance of their 
process, and as a result felt less able to improve their performance. This meant that weak 
cultures of compliance were often associated with poorly developed capacities for compliance. 
These differences then affected the nature of the technological and organisational responses to 
LAPC that were adopted by the sites interviewed.
In those sites with a stronger culture of compliance, the relatively high cost of end-of-pipe 
technologies tended to stimulate their interest in cleaner technologies and techniques which 
avoided the need for abatement equipment. In other words, these sites sought to draw upon and 
develop their capacities to reduce their emissions by improving the efficiency of the design and 
operation of their existing process. Such responses demanded a fuller understanding of existing 
processes, more sustained inputs of managerial time and attention, and a willingness to 
experiment with and disrupt current practice. The HSE manager of one medium-sized site [3] 
explained that, “Changing processes, not looking at end-of-pipe solutions, really made a big 
difference to us”. They realised that by looking at the system as a whole, far greater efficiency 
improvements could be gained than any abatement technology could offer. However, this 
demanded a much more integrated approach to managing and running the process, since “you 
couldn’t run one bit efficiently unless you were running the others efficiently as well”. An
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integrated management approach was more difficult and it took a lot of effort to make the 
individual operators understand the impacts of their work on the system as a whole. 
Nevertheless, it was felt that this effort had paid off: “With our quality management systems we 
were able to quantify what the benefits were and we’re very pleased we did it”.
In most of the sites that had explored the potential of clean technologies and techniques, the 
costs and the associated risks were commonly offset by the reduced need to invest in end-of- 
pipe technologies and by improvements in process efficiency. Reducing or even eradicating the 
need for inputs which led to regulated emissions also better enabled them to comply with other 
forms of legislation, most notably health and safety regulations:
The big benefit is not having to buy end-of-pipe -  it also puts our people at less risk 
from a health and safety point of view. It saves us money not having to use flameproof 
materials, special protective clothing and rooms and special washing equipment. We’re 
not buying solvents which are quite expensive, we’re not recycling solvents which we 
had to pay for as well. So there’s quite a significant knock on [effect] really... it also 
released money to invest in other things [5].
The medium-term benefits of cleaner technologies and techniques were felt across those sites 
that had adopted them. This created an overlap between economic and environmental concerns, 
or in other words a ‘regulatory space’ within which compliance with LAPC was made much 
more palatable. However, it was widely recognised that the ability of cleaner technologies and 
techniques to deliver longer-term, sustained improvements in the economic and environmental 
performance of existing processes was limited:
You do quickly get into the laws of diminishing returns through process change, that 
has to be said, but there are a lot of gains in the early years. When we get to the point of 
no returns we’ll have to look at it again [11].
However, these diminishing returns were associated primarily with the ‘fine-tuning’ of existing 
production processes. Where these production processes were replaced periodically, step- 
changes in environmental performance became possible. In some instances, then, compliance 
with LAPC was secured almost as a serendipitous by-product of technological advances that 
had been adopted for other reasons. Inadvertently revealing that he been happy to operate older 
process technologies that generated emissions that were almost twice the legal standard, the 
manager of one small site stated:
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We’ve just added a new machine to our process because the old ones weren’t paying 
their way any more and they kept breaking down. It cost us nearly half a million to get 
it in and running. That increased our capacity by 40% and our emissions stayed about 
the same because it’s so much better than what it replaced, which was only three years 
old. The old one got us to 90 parts per million (ppm) emissions, our limit is 50ppm and 
the supplier says we’ll get there with the new one [15].
Technological dynamism had therefore enhanced the prospects for compliance even in 
companies without a strong culture of compliance. In general, though, those sites with a weaker 
culture of compliance tended to be the smaller sites with simpler processes. In many of these 
sites, technological dynamism was comparatively unusual and the managers felt that there were 
fewer opportunities for existing processes to be fine-tuned in order to improve their 
environmental performance. While this was certainly the case in some instances, the reluctance 
of these managers to invest even in monitoring technologies also limited their understanding of 
the factors that affected the environmental performance of their processes. In turn, this reduced 
their capacity to recognise or to explore any such opportunities. As a result, these managers 
were much more likely to respond to LAPC by investing in end-of-pipe solutions. These 
responses could often be readily sourced and evaluated, and easily added to their existing 
process with relatively predictable results. Although they often demanded significant financial 
investments in the short-run, they did not disrupt the existing process or demand significant or 
sustained amounts of managerial time and attention. As a consequence they were often seen by 
these sites to be the most expedient response to LAPC:
Our scrubber cost £70,000 -  we bought it, bolted it on and our emissions fell by 80% or 
more... it reduced the problem to a level that was hardly discernible which was well 
within the limits set by the local authority [15].
Expedient though they could be, abatement technologies nevertheless remained beyond the 
means of some regulated sites. For these companies, the kit they needed was prohibitively 
expensive: the general manager of a micro-sized process engineering site explained that the 
company would be forced to close down if the regulator insisted that they put in the necessary 
abatement technologies; “The profit margins just aren’t there so we don’t do it” [17],
Meanwhile, for those sites that could afford to purchase and install end-of-pipe technologies, the 
common perception was that although they enabled the sites to secure compliance without 
demanding a great deal of managerial time and attention, they did not actually generate any 
economic benefit:
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All it does is enable us to comply with the law, it’s not giving us any benefits 
production wise or cost wise. There’s no cost reduction, even the recycling side costs us 
more in admin -  like any small company we were already recycling whatever we could 
to use again or to sell for scrap but it’s a lot of hassle and I’ve got a lot of better things 
to do with my time [10].
For some of the managers interviewed, then, the perception that the opportunities for process 
change were very limited was allied with a reluctance to invest in end-of-pipe technologies 
because of the initial cost and the subsequent lack of economic benefit. In combination, these 
factors tended to prevent them from securing compliance with LAPC -  something they could 
get away with given the lack of monitoring or public scrutiny.
- On internal resources
Investment resources were limited in all of the companies interviewed. However, in those sites 
with a strong culture of compliance, the managers suggested that investments in environment, 
health and safety were often assessed using different criteria from other, purely economic, 
investment opportunities. This meant that investments in environmental improvement did not 
have to compete for scarce resources on an equal footing with all of the other investment 
requirements and opportunities. In other words, compliance with he environment was put before 
immediate financial concerns, although of course, where investments in environmental 
improvement were made, the lowest investments with the highest rate of return tended to be 
funded first and the efficiency of any investments made remained a key issue.
In those sites with a weaker culture of compliance, however, environmental initiatives had to 
compete for financial resources with the wider range of investment requirements and 
opportunities encountered by the company. These included both those that stemmed from the 
need for sites to comply with a wider range of HSE regulations than LAPC alone, and those 
relating to the broader investment needs and opportunities within regulated sites. In relation to 
the former, the sites interviewed generally saw other regulatory frameworks with more 
established monitoring regimes or with tougher sanctions for non-compliance as being a higher 
priority. Investments that would secure compliance with health and safety legislation, for 
example, therefore usually took precedence over those that would satisfy the requirements of 
LAPC. In relation to the latter, competition for investment resources was fiercer, as the 
managers were keenly aware that any investments that they made to improve their 
environmental performance would draw resources away from other core business areas.
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In these sites, there was a perception that it was economically risky for scarce investment 
resources to be drawn away from core-business areas and diverted toward what were considered 
to be secondary concerns such as environmental performance. The result was that 
environmental initiatives found it even harder to compete for resources where compliance was 
not seen as an absolute requirement or where environmental performance was not seen to be a 
core-business issue.
While access to financial resources was a critical issue in all of the sites interviewed, for many 
companies access to human resources was a bigger problem. Within all of the sites included in 
the study, responsibility for environmental management and for compliance with the 
requirements of LAPC had been combined with a wider range of other management 
responsibilities. For the managers in the medium-sized firms, these tended to relate to other 
forms of health, safety or environmental legislation; however, for those in the smaller firms 
these related to every other area of the business. In both instances, other concerns commonly 
took precedence and the resources that were available internally that could be drawn upon to 
work towards compliance with LAPC were often very limited.
- On intra-firm and inter-firm networks
Within all of the smaller sites interviewed, there was a lack of specialist expertise and 
understanding where environmental management was concerned. This was also the case for 
some of the medium-sized sites interviewed, although these sites were often part of a wider 
group which gave them the opportunity to exchange information and expertise between their 
various sites. Where they took place, these exchanges led to an accelerated process of learning 
which enabled them to improve the efficiency of process management and to reduce the risks 
associated with new initiatives. Similarly, exchanges of information and expertise between 
similar sites within the same group were seen to have reduced the costs associated with 
searching for new technologies and techniques and the risks associated with their adoption:
When we needed to put the scrubber in, we had experiences with it in our German plant. 
So we were able to find out at no cost what we could achieve... I went over there and 
saw how they’d done it so we could share the technology. It’s one of the advantages of 
being a big company. Also each location can tackle a separate bit of the problem and 
make everyone else aware of the results [8].
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The quality of the information that flowed within these intra-firm networks was seen to be 
particularly good, as in general the information and experience was willingly shared by 
colleagues in similar sites with similar working patterns. As a consequence, it was specific 
enough to be readily usable and it incorporated tacit understanding as well as formal 
information. Their ability to access the resources that they needed internally meant that the 
managers of the medium-sized or group-owned sites rarely if ever participated in external 
networks to enable compliance. This was particularly apparent at the local level, where these 
sites were generally sceptical about the potential for external networks to add to the specialist 
information and understanding that was available internally:
We’ve don’t need local links really -  we think we’ve got enough information from our 
own world on what the regulations say and on how we can respond... But we’re big 
enough not to have to, those sorts of things are for the smaller players [3].
In contrast to the medium-sized or group-owned sites, the managers of the smaller or more 
independent sites generally confirmed that they had to rely on external networks in order to 
access resources such as information and understanding. However, the common view was that 
the information they gained by participating in these networks was often too generic. The 
managers wanted specific information that would give them a clear understanding of whether a 
particular technology or technique would work in their particular context, and whether it would 
secure compliance with the requirements of LAPC. Although information of this nature was 
made available by some technology suppliers and consultants who engaged with various 
external networks to market their products and services, the managers interviewed tended to be 
sceptical about the integrity of the information, since claims about the performance of new 
technologies or techniques had rarely been independently evaluated. As a result, they did not 
feel confident to compare the various ways in which they might respond to the requirements of 
LAPC.
Given their lack of access to information and resources, various support mechanisms had been 
introduced to enable smaller companies to comply with regulations such as LAPC. These 
support mechanisms included some schemes initiated by central government and some initiated 
by the various local authority economic development offices and business development 
agencies. Other schemes had also been introduced by the local chambers of commerce and 
universities, and a ‘green business club’ had been established by various actors in the local 
economy to facilitate networking between firms. The sites interviewed were therefore eligible 
for, and indeed were the targets of, business support in various forms from a range of different 
organisations and networks.
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While the managers of the smaller sites were commonly aware that these support mechanisms 
existed, they were generally reluctant to engage with them. Aside from further scepticism about 
the value of generic support in their specific context, their reluctance to apply for business 
support to aid compliance was based on the suspicion that there were complicated and 
protracted application procedures that had to be completed, which would draw upon their 
already scarce managerial time and resources. They also predicted that even if an application for 
support was successful, the schemes would not provide support at the time or in the form in 
which it was needed. Many of the business support schemes were in fact designed to consider 
and cater for these factors, but they were unable to overcome the regulated sites’ suspicions and 
persuade them to engage in these business support networks. The one site in this study that had 
applied for and had been granted support to improve its environmental performance -  a 
medium-sized packaging company -  had found the process and the support it eventually 
provided to be very useful. However, this site had already overcome its suspicion about the 
relevance of these networks, as it already had well-established links with the local economic 
development officer and was already very active in various other business support networks. 
Trust, therefore, appeared to be an important factor influencing the level of engagement in 
external networks.
Due to their scepticism about the value of external networks, many of the managers of the 
smaller and more independent sites included in the study suggested that they had to rely upon 
their limited internal resources alone as they sought to respond to the demands established by 
LAPC. However, there was one common exception in the form of alliances which had emerged 
between the suppliers of some inputs and their customers, who were regulated by LAPC solely 
because they used these inputs. These alliances had enabled some suppliers to develop and 
introduce new products that had reduced their customers’ emissions, thereby enabling them to 
comply with the requirements of LAPC. In many instances, after an initial period of 
experimentation, the redesigned products that were developed through these alliances had both 
economic and environmental benefits:
Environmental legislation has driven us to say to our suppliers that we need an 
alternative to this. We put pressure on them to come up with something and they’ve 
managed to design a product that works as well now as the old ones used to -  although 
they didn’t initially and it took a bit of time to get them right. They’re actually cheaper 
than the old ones too [13].
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Competition between suppliers, together with cooperation between some suppliers and their 
customers, therefore helped some of the sites interviewed to secure compliance with the 
requirements of LAPC. In some cases these alliances were based on cooperation, common 
understanding and mutual benefit, as they simultaneously protected a market for the 
manufacturers and enabled the users of such inputs to comply with the requirements of LAPC. 
However, interactions within the supply chain were sometimes based more on control than 
cooperation. This was particularly the case where large customers put pressure on their smaller 
suppliers to improve their environmental performance:
The big customer holds these supplier seminars where they get all of their supplier 
companies in and tell them how they’re going to deal with them and things like that. It’s 
all very good but they tell us what we have to do if we want to supply them, and that 
always includes showing that we comply with all of the different regulations, and I 
wonder whether we can afford it... If they started banging the drum too hard then we’d 
probably tell them to go and buy the product elsewhere [11].
For some of the managers interviewed, these pressures from their customers related particularly 
to the emissions that were regulated by LAPC. Indeed, in some instances compliance with the 
requirements of LAPC was monitored and enforced more rigorously by some of their private 
sector customers than by the public sector regulators of regulated sites. Depending on the 
relative power of the different actors therefore, external networks served not only as networks 
for cooperation to enable compliance, but also as networks of control to enforce compliance 
with the requirements of LAPC.
On environmental performance
Depending on the ways in which they had responded to the regulations, the managers 
interviewed had different perspectives on the influence that LAPC had had on their 
environmental performance. Some of the managers explained that because of their desire to 
comply with LAPC and their subsequent investments in monitoring technologies, they were 
much more aware of the factors that shaped the environmental performance of their site. In a 
sense, they suggested, the LAPC regulations had made them much more able to manage their 
processes in ways which reduced their emissions. They had learnt to substitute polluting inputs 
with cleaner ones and to improve the efficiency of their production process so that it generated 
lower levels of emissions.
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This contrasted with the perception that was common amongst those managers of the sites with 
a weaker culture of compliance, that LAPC had done little to build their understanding of their 
processes or their capacity to improve the environmental performance of those processes. 
Unless the suppliers of these sites had been able to develop cleaner products that would allow 
them to improve their environmental performance, these sites tended to respond to LAPC by 
adopting end-of-pipe technologies. If they were used, these technologies enabled them to 
capture their emissions, thereby reducing the extent to which they damaged the air environment, 
but possibly increasing the level of their emissions to water or land. Other than this, some of the 
managers interviewed suggested that they had done little to ensure that their processes complied 
with the LAPC regulations and that their environmental performance had not been influenced 
by the presence of the regulations. For these sites, the absence of a response to LAPC was made 
possible by the lack of monitoring, by the absence of stakeholder pressures and by the 
perception that no cheap and easy improvement options were available.
On costs and benefits
Amongst the sites included in the study, the costs and benefits of compliance with LAPC 
appeared to vary quite considerably. Competition for scarce investment resources was generally 
significant across all the regulated sites. In some instances, however, the investments that were 
needed to comply with LAPC were able to compete for funding with other investment 
opportunities on purely economic grounds. This was particularly the case in the medium-sized 
sites, where there had been more opportunities for a series of incremental process changes to 
lead to both economic and environmental returns. In such instances, environmental regulation 
commonly triggered a process of learning, often involving the regulator. This gave the company 
a new perspective on process management which enabled them to re-evaluate materials and 
energy flows and to improve process efficiency. For some sites, this allowed investments in 
process efficiency to generate competitive rates of return:
There’s always competition for resources. There’s a standard rate of return - 1 think it’s 
15% -  our targets are three-year paybacks. But for some environment-related projects 
we still manage to meet that so of our capital spend about 15% is on environment, 
health and safety even with the competition for resources [7].
Competitive rates of return were not available in all sites at all times, however. Some of the 
medium-sized sites interviewed suggested that the ability of the environment to compete for 
scarce investment resources on economic grounds was beginning to diminish, as most of the 
easy options had already been exploited. In the smaller sites with simpler processes, the
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perception was that such opportunities had never existed, largely because in simpler processes 
there were fewer opportunities for learning and for incremental improvement. In both the 
medium-sized and the smaller sites, therefore, it was commonly felt that if existing process 
technologies remained in place, the only way to continue to improve environmental 
performance was to invest in and run abatement technologies.
The costs and benefits of regulation also varied according to a range of other factors, since the 
economic context within which they existed and operated differed considerably from sector to 
sector and from firm to firm, as well as over time. Some of the sites that operated in particularly 
competitive markets, or that were struggling to compete for any number of other reasons, argued 
that at the margin, the costs of securing compliance with LAPC were in danger of putting them 
out of business. Obviously this led to a reluctance to invest in the measures needed to secure 
compliance with LAPC, if such investments would put the site at a competitive disadvantage in 
the short term. The general manager of one site [14] remarked that the company was simply too 
busy trying to survive as a business, and simply could not spare the time to meet the 
requirements of LAPC.
These concerns about the competitive implications of the LAPC regulations were even more 
acute in the smaller and more independent sites, which felt that they were operating in highly 
competitive markets. These sites were less likely to be able to accommodate any of the short­
term cost implications associated with securing compliance, by raising their prices or by 
drawing on the profits made by other parts of the group. The risks of diverting scarce 
managerial and financial resources away from core business areas were also seen to be 
pronounced for such sites. In contrast, those sites that did not operate in such competitive 
markets or that were part of a larger group were generally more willing to invest in new 
technologies and techniques even if they had short-term cost implications.
While many of the smaller and independent sites saw the need to secure compliance as a source 
of competitive disadvantage, differences in the short-term capacity for compliance were seen by 
some of the medium-sized and group-owned sites to be a source of competitive advantage. As 
has been discussed above, in a number of instances, regulated sites had actively encouraged 
central and local government to apply stricter standards more forcefully and more consistently, 
as they suspected it would drive their competitors out of business. Indeed, one of the managers 
interviewed explained that his company identified targets for takeover by looking for the sites in 
their sector that were having difficulty complying with LAPC and with other regulations, as 
they felt that this was an indication that such sites were inefficient or poorly managed.
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Relating the Empirical Discussion to the Analytical Variables
To complete the analysis of the LAPC implementation process and the presentation of the 
empirical results more generally, the discussion in this chapter has examined the perspectives 
that the managers of the regulated sites have of the factors that shape the nature and influence of 
the implementation process. Within the discussion, reference has been made recurrently to the 
range of analytical variables that this thesis is interested in, namely the character and resources 
of the central actors, the presence of any resource inter-dependencies and incentives for 
cooperation, the nature of the strategies adopted in response to these incentives, the significance 
of any associated institutional factors and the influence of these strategies on the outputs and 
outcomes of the implementation process.
Specifically, the discussion has looked at the influence that these variables can have on the ways 
in which the different actors interact within the implementation process. Further, the discussion 
has explored the ways that these interactions influence both the demands that are made by 
regulators and the ways in which regulated firms respond to these demands. This chapter will 
conclude by examining the influence of each of the variables in turn, drawing these issues out of 
the discussion so that their conceptual relevance can be examined in the comparative analysis 
that follows in Chapter 8.
The character and resources o f the regulated firms
The sites that are regulated by LAPC and that were included in the study can be divided into 
two categories:
Those medium-sized and/or group-owned sites that were subjected to stakeholder pressure 
and that had a strong culture of compliance. The managers of these sites tended to have 
access to the resources needed to work towards compliance both internally and through 
intra-firm networks; and
Those smaller and/or independent sites that were less visible to stakeholders and that had a 
weak culture of compliance. The managers of these sites commonly lacked access to 
resources internally and sometimes engaged in external networks in an attempt to comply 
with the regulations.
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Although the characteristics of the sites regulated by LAPC differed in a number of ways, the 
managers that interacted with the regulators in the implementation process drew upon a similar 
range of resources. These included their ability to:
Collectively ignore or resist the regulations, thereby forcing the regulator to take the 
initiative and to engage in cooperative relations in the implementation process in order to 
operationalise the regulations;
Grant the inspectors ready access to the site-specific information that they needed to put the 
regulations into practice;
Collect and grant the inspectors access to the accurate monitoring data that they needed to 
assess whether compliance had been achieved;
Respond to requests to move back into compliance when breaches were detected and/or 
complaints were made to avoid the imposition of formal sanctions;
Raise the costs of implementation or threaten the reputation of the local authority or its 
inspectors by launching appeals.
The nature o f any resource inter-dependencies within the implementation process
Although the managers had access to various resources that they could draw upon in the 
implementation process, they also depended upon a range of resources that were held by the 
inspectors in the local authorities. These included the inspectors’ ability to:
Understand and interpret the legislation in order to translate generic principles into site- 
specific standards;
Use their discretionary powers in the standard setting process;
Resisting influence from regulated companies or third parties by referring to the published 
guidance;
Grant or withhold flexibility relating to the times at which standards should be achieved; 
Detect any breaches of compliance through complaints from the public and/or other firms 
seeking to promote consistency; and
Choose whether or not to apply formal sanctions in response to any cases of non-compliance 
that were detected or complaints that were made.
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The extent to which any resource inter-dependencies provide
incentives fo r  cooperation within the implementation process
These resource inter-dependencies established some incentives for cooperation with the 
inspectors at certain stages of the implementation process. In particular, the managers argued 
that by cooperating they could:
Influence the ways in which the inspectors exercised what discretionary powers they had in 
the interpretation and standard setting phase;
Ensure that they were granted some flexibility relating to the times at which standards 
should be achieved, thereby giving them more freedom to explore alternative approaches to 
compliance and to reduce the costs of compliance; and
Build trusting relationship with the inspectors to insulate themselves against the prospect of 
formal sanctions being immediately imposed in response to any breaches of compliance that 
were detected or complaints that were made.
However, they also argued that because the inspectors lacked expertise on their process and on 
the ways in which they might comply, there were few benefits from cooperating with the 
inspectors in terms of building their capacities for compliance or reducing the costs of 
compliance.
The strategies that the regulated firms adopted in response to any such incentives
As a response to these incentives, the managers of the regulated firms adopted some common 
and some contrasting strategies. As a result:
The managers of all sites sought to cooperate with the regulator in the standard setting 
phase;
For those sites with a strong culture of compliance, the managers commonly sought to 
pursue compliance voluntarily even in the absence of rigorous monitoring; and 
For those sites with a weaker culture of compliance, the managers commonly sought to 
minimise the time and money they spent working towards compliance because:
by spending time and money working towards compliance they thought they would be 
put at a competitive disadvantage, as they suspected that their competitors were not 
necessarily being forced to comply with the same standards;
in the absence of rigorous monitoring or complaints from the public they thought that 
the chances of being caught were low; and
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in many instances they felt they could avoid the imposition of formal sanctions by 
cooperating with the inspectors and by working to restore compliance.
The extent to which different institutional structures constrain or enable these strategies
Although the managers appeared to be responsive to the incentives that they associated with the 
different ways of engaging with the regulators within the implementation process, their 
activities were both constrained and enabled by a range of institutional factors. These factors 
related to:
The presence of different and sometimes competing regulatory frameworks that existed 
alongside LAPC;
The limited resources that were made available to the inspectors that they interacted with in 
the implementation process;
The design of the legislation that established the potential for a flexible approach to 
implementation;
The lack of complete preconditioning that allowed the implementing inspectors to exercise 
some discretion in the implementation process;
The presence of some preconditioning that enabled the implementing inspectors to defend 
themselves against undue influence from regulated firms and some third parties;
The perceived absence of many economically beneficial improvement options;
The presence of various intra-firm and inter-firm networks that they could draw upon as 
they sought to comply with the regulations; and
The presence of interested stakeholders that could detect and complain about some incidents 
or breeches of compliance.
The influence that different forms o f interaction have on regulatory outputs and outcomes
This approach to implementation shaped the practical nature of the demands that the inspectors 
made, and the ways in which the firms responded to these demands. In particular, the approach 
meant that:
The standards that were set were shaped by the guidance, although firms that cooperated 
still gained some influence in the interpretation of the guidance;
The practical imperatives that were established were generally seen to be weak because of 
the absence of a rigorous monitoring regime;
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Larger sites with stronger cultures/capacities for compliance and opportunities for process 
change sought to minimise emissions and to avoid need for investments in end-of-pipe 
technologies;
Smaller sites with weaker cultures/capacities for compliance generally lacked opportunities 
for process change and therefore tended to invest in end-of-pipe technologies to control their 
emissions;
Some sites engaged in external supply-chain networks to redesign their inputs to avoid the 
need to invest in end-of-pipe technologies;
Some sites also complied as a by-product of technological dynamism and major process 
change;
Impacts on the environmental performance of the regulated firms and on the costs of 
compliance were therefore variable; and
The common perception amongst the managers was that compliance placed demands on 
scarce resources whilst generating little or no economic benefit.
It is apparent, then, that the managers of the sites that were regulated by LAPC had contrasting 
views of the factors that shaped the nature and influence of the implementation process. While 
all of the managers sought to cooperate with the inspectors at the standard setting and 
enforcement stages, few of them felt that they could raise their capacity for compliance or 
reduce their costs of compliance by cooperating with the inspectors. While the capacity for 
cooperation in the implementation process was therefore seen to be limited, in the absence of a 
rigorous monitoring regime all of the managers felt that the inspectors’ capacity for control was 
also restricted. As a result, the discussion has suggested that the outcomes of the LAPC 
implementation process depended not only upon the nature of the interactions between 
regulators and regulated firms but also upon the characteristics of the regulated firms, most 
notably their cultures and capacities of compliance, and on the presence of stakeholders who 
could detect and complain about any breaches of compliance.
This chapter completes the presentation of the perspectives that both the inspectors within the 
regulatory agencies, and the managers of the regulated sites, have of the IPC and LAPC 
implementation processes. The thesis will now move on to compare and contrast the factors that 
shape the nature and influence of both implementation processes. In so doing, the discussion 
will seek to examine the validity of the hypotheses that were established earlier in the thesis. It 
will also refer back to the conceptual discussion on the theories of cooperation and collective 
action and on the concepts of policy networks and economic networks, in order to evaluate the 
extent to which these theories have helped us to understand the empirical cases, and the extent
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to which the experiences that have emerged from the empirical cases can be drawn upon to 
reinforce or refute the central claims of the theories.
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CHAPTER 8
Comparative Analysis and Conceptual Review
Structure
> Introduction
> Comparative Analysis
Resource Allocations 
Inter-dependencies and Incentives 
Strategies and Interactions 
Institutional Influences 
Regulatory Outputs and Outcomes
> The Explanatory Value of the Different Theories of Cooperation and Collective Action
> The Validity of the Hypotheses
> Conclusions from the Comparative Analysis 
Introduction
Based on the results of a comparative analysis of the empirical findings that were presented in 
the preceding chapters, this chapter examines the explanatory value of the contrasting 
theoretical perspectives on the basis for cooperation and collective action in the implementation 
process and the validity of the hypotheses that are at the heart of the thesis. These factors, which 
were established on the basis of the conceptual discussion that was presented in Chapter 2, are 
summarised in Table 8.1. An overview of the analytical variables that were influential in each 
case is presented in Table 8.2 for IPC and Table 8.3 for LAPC.
Despite some similarities both in the design of IPC and LAPC and in the context for their 
implementation, the comparative analysis finds that the significant differences in the nature and 
influence of the two case-study implementation processes can indeed be explained by referring 
to the influence of the central analytical variables. More particularly, it finds that the
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Table 8.1: Hypotheses, Theoretical Perspectives, Analytical Variables.
• Theoretical Perspectives
In seeking to understand the basis for cooperation in the implementation process, the thesis considers the 
explanatory value of two contrasting theoretical perspectives:
The rational choice perspective which suggests that rational and responsive actors will cooperate with 
each other where the incentive structures favour such forms of behaviour and where certain conditions 
are in place. The inferred causality that is associated with this perspective is that resource inter­
dependencies generate the incentives that encourage the different actors to co-operate and to exchange 
resources in order to realise their objectives.
The institutional perspective which suggests that the conditions that lead to cooperation between actors 
are likely to be more complicated than the rational choice perspective assumes. Instead, the 
institutional perspective suggests that the implementation process cannot be separated from its broader 
institutional context and that particular forms of behaviour are likely to emerge, evolve and become 
institutionalised within the implementation process. The strategies adopted by the different actors will 
therefore be both enabled and constrained by the institutional structures within which the actors are 
embedded.
• Hypotheses
Reflecting aspects of both the neo-classical and the institutional perspectives, the thesis hypothesises that:
actors within the implementation processes will be able to derive influence through their access to a 
broad range of resources;
various resource interdependencies will emerge in the implementation process which establish 
incentives for cooperation as securing compliance becomes a 'collective action problem’; 
cooperative interactions within the implementation process will be institutionalised within different 
forms of network which will influence both the outputs and outcomes of the implementation process; 
because of these inter-dependencies the implementation process will display some of the advantages of 
co-operation (i.e. increases in administrative viability and an enhanced ability to secure compliance 
through collective action) and some of the disadvantages of regulatory capture (i.e. reduction of 
standards and loss of accountability).
• Analytical Variables and Lines of Causality
In order to examine the validity of these hypotheses, the thesis focuses on the influence of a number of 
central analytical variables. However, the explanatory value of the contrasting theoretical perspectives, and 
hence the validity of some of the hypotheses, depends upon the nature of the inter-relations between these 
analytical variables: The rational choice perspective predicts a relatively simple, linear chain of causality 
whereby inter-dependencies create the incentives that shape the behaviour of economically responsive 
actors; the institutional perspective predicts a more complex set of inter-relations where the inter­
dependencies, incentives and strategies all interact both within the implementation process and within the 
broader institutional context.
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Table 8.2: The central analytical variables in the case of IPC
IPC
REGULATORS FIRMS
Resources
Their ability to:
• Exert legal authority and apply discretionary 
powers to establish site-specific standards
• Engage and adopt a hands-on relationship
• Offer expertise to build capacities for compliance
• Offer flexibility to reduce the costs of compliance
• Argue that compliance could often be secured in 
economically acceptable ways
• Detect cases of non-compliance
• Respond to cases of non-compliance by applying a 
range of informal and formal sanctions
• De-legitimise firms in the eyes of stakeholders
Their ability to:
• Offer access to site-specific information
• Develop and draw upon commitments to and 
capacities for compliance
• Commit financial and managerial resources and to 
take risks to explore the potential of new 
technologies and techniques
• Influence the costs and the reputation of the 
regulatory agency
Inter-dependencies and Incentives
Needed to interact in ways 
which enabled them to;
Gain access to information 
Build capacities for compliance 
Stimulate the adoption of clean technologies 
Reduce the costs of compliance 
Avoid resistance and legal action
Needed to interact in ways 
which enabled them to:
• Gain access to information and expertise
• Gain access to influence and flexibility
• Build capacities for compliance
• Reduce costs of compliance
• Avoid imposition of legal authority
• Secure legitimation__________________
Strategies
Promoted cooperation in the implementation
process by:
• Only offering information, expertise and flexibility 
to cooperative firms
• Seeking to raise capacities/reduce costs of 
compliance for cooperative firms
• Adopting a tiered approach to enforcement to 
promote compliance and maintain cooperative 
relations
• Maintaining capacity for control and the ability to 
sanction uncooperative firms___________________
Promoted cooperation in the implementation
process by:
• Only offering information and expertise to 
cooperative regulators
• Seeking to comply as long as costs o f compliance 
were seen to be acceptable
• Threatening to withdraw cooperation if costs of 
compliance escalate.
Institutional enablers/constraints
This approach to implementation was shaped by:
Historical precedents which also constrained changes to an alternative.
The design of the legislation that established legal authority and discretionary powers and that demanded 
case-by-case interpretation.
The inability of external stakeholders to exert sufficient influence to undermine the basis for cooperation. 
The presence of resources within the agency that enabled expert staff to engage in frequent and sustained 
interactions with firms, thereby enabling trust and mutual understanding to emerge.
The temporary availability of economically acceptable improvement options within regulated firms and 
potential for different forms of interaction to create/extend the life of such options.
The presence of interested and potentially influential stakeholders that increased the value of compliance.
Influence on outputs and outcomes
These interactions and the associated institutions:
Gave regulated firms some influence on standards to be complied with in the SR.
Encouraged firms to explore the potential of cleaner technologies and techniques before investing in end-of- 
pipe technologies.
Enabled firms to reach higher standards and to reduce costs of compliance in the MR.
Improved environmental performance and reduced risk amongst the majority of firms.
This approach to environmental improvement seemed likely to encounter diminishing marginal returns and 
escalating costs of compliance in the MR-LR.
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Table 8.3: The central analytical variables in the case of LAPC
LAPC
REGULATORS FIRMS
Resources
Ability to:
• Exert legal authority and apply discretionary 
powers to establish site-specific standards
• Offer flexibility to reduce costs of compliance
• Receive complaints about non-compliance
• Respond to complaints by applying informal and 
formal sanctions
Ability to:
• Grant access to information
• Develop and draw upon commitments to and 
capacities for compliance
• Influence the costs and the reputation of the 
regulatory agency
Inter-dependencies and Incentives
Needed to interact in ways 
which enabled them to:
• Gain access to information
• Avoid resistance from firms
• Reduce the number of complaints
• Reduce the need for legal action
Needed to interact in ways 
Which enabled them  to:
• Gain access to information
• Gain access to influence and flexibility
• Minimise the need to spend time and money 
working towards compliance
• Avoid the imposition of formal sanctions
Strategies
Engaged with the
implementation process by:
• Taking the initiative and offering information and 
flexibility to all but the most resistant firms.
• Adopting an arms-length approach to monitoring.
• Adopting a complaints driven approach to 
enforcement.
• Adopting a tiered approach to enforcement to 
reduce complaints and to avoid the need for legal 
action.
Engaged with the
Implementation process by:
• Only offering information to cooperative 
regulators
• Seeking to comply where there were strong 
cultures of compliance or complaints from the 
public.
• Resisting or ignoring the regulations where there 
were weak cultures of compliance or where there 
were no complaints from the public.
Institutional enablers/constraints
This approach to implementation was shaped by:
• Historical precedents had favoured a reactive, complaints driven approach.
• Competing objectives within the regulatory agency restricted resources available for implementation, thereby 
preventing inspectors from adopting a more proactive approach.
• Lack of opportunities/capacities for economically acceptable improvement options amongst many regulated 
firms precluded the adoption of a more proactive approach.
• In the absence of rigorous monitoring, prospects for compliance depended upon the strength of the cultures of 
compliance and/or by the presence of stakeholders that were able to detect and complain about cases of non- 
compliance.
• Inconsistencies and concerns about the costs of compliance encouraged resistance in some firms.___________
Influence on outputs and outcomes
These interactions within the implementation process:
• Gave regulated firms some influence on standards to be complied with.
• Lack of monitoring reduced practical imperatives imposed by regulator.
• Medium-sized and group-owned sites with stronger cultures/capacities for compliance and opportunities for
process change sought to minimise emissions and to avoid need for investments in end-of-pipe technologies.
• Smaller and more independent sites with weaker cultures/capacities for compliance generally lacked 
opportunities for process change and therefore tended to invest in end-of-pipe technologies to control their 
emissions.
• Some sites engaged in external supply-chain networks to redesign their inputs to avoid the need to invest in 
end-of-pipe technologies, others complied as a by-product of technological dynamism and major process 
change.
• Impacts on environmental performance and associated costs of compliance were therefore highly variable.
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explanatory value of the rational choice perspective on the basis for cooperation and collective 
action in the implementation process is fundamentally limited. Although it recognises the 
potential for inter-dependencies to incentivise the initiation of cooperative relations, it ignores 
the extent to which the incentives for cooperation can be shaped over time both by the broader 
institutional context within which the implementation process takes place and by the emergence 
of various institutionalised forms of behaviour within this process. By acknowledging the 
significance of these factors, and by highlighting the influence of the dynamic and at times self- 
reinforcing nature of the interactions that shaped the implementation processes examined, the 
chapter concludes that the analysis was able to develop a much fuller understanding of the 
factors that shape the nature and influence of the implementation process where it adopted the 
institutional perspective.
As well as influencing the validity of the hypotheses, the conclusion that the institutional 
perspective offers a fuller understanding of the factors that shape the nature and influence of the 
implementation process is of great practical significance. Under some circumstances, it suggests 
that cooperative interactions between regulators and regulated firms can become embedded 
within particular paths or trajectories that can be very difficult to change. This degree of 
embeddedness may be seen to be a good thing where cooperation is seen to be desirable, as it 
may be from the perspective of those regulators and firms who perceive cooperation to build 
capacities for compliance and to generate more effective and more efficient regulatory 
outcomes. However, from the perspective of those stakeholders who are concerned not so much 
with the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory outcomes as with the accountability of the 
regulatory process the fact that cooperative approaches to implementation can become deeply 
embedded may be seen as a significant obstacle to change. These issues will be discussed 
further in the final chapter that examines the wider implications of an institutional perspective 
on regulation and implementation.
Comparative Analysis 
Resource Allocations
In relation to the initial allocation of resources, inspectors in each of the regulatory frameworks 
examined were awarded some legal authority by the statutes that established the regulations. 
They were also able to draw upon some discretionary powers as they interpreted the regulations 
and established site-specific standards. However, their discretionary powers, which stemmed 
from the need to interpret flexible regulatory principles such as BATNEEC on a case-by-case
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basis, were curtailed to differing degrees by the guidance that was published to precondition the 
implementation process. For IPC, the relative complexity of the sites and the expertise of the 
inspectors meant that the generic guidance was often seen only as an initial reference point in 
their standard setting activities. For LAPC, the relative simplicity of the sites and the prospects 
for inconsistencies to emerge and for appeals to be made meant that the guidance played a more 
significant role. Consequently, the discretionary powers that could be drawn upon by the 
inspectors were more influential in the case of IPC than in that of LAPC.
Despite these differences, the ability of the inspectors to understand and to interpret the 
requirements of the regulations was an important resource in each instance, as was the 
managers’ ability to grant or withhold the information that the inspectors needed to establish 
site-specific standards. Thus, although they used them in different ways, the actors in each 
implementation process had access to a similar range of resources during the standard setting 
phase. At subsequent stages of the implementation process however significant differences in 
the resource allocations emerged.
In the case of IPC, the inspectors were able to offer the regulated firms information and 
understanding both on the regulations and on the ways in which they might comply. Drawing 
upon their discretionary powers, they were also able to offer some flexibility relating to the 
times at which compliance had to be secured. These resources could be drawn upon by the 
regulated firms to increase their capacities for compliance and to reduce their costs of 
compliance (see below). In turn, this enabled the inspectors to argue that compliance could be 
achieved in economically acceptable ways -  a rhetorical device that became an important 
resource for the inspectors.
The managers of the firms that were regulated by IPC were also able to draw upon some 
significant resources as they engaged in the implementation process. As well as granting or 
withholding ready access to information, the managers were able to decide whether or not to 
develop some commitment to compliance and to mobilise their financial and managerial 
resources in order to work towards compliance. If they withheld their information and resisted 
the regulations, they also had the ability to increase the costs and damage the reputation of the 
implementing agency and its inspectors.
Where individual firms exercised their ability to resist or ignore the regulations, the IPC 
inspectors were able to detect cases of non-compliance and to resort to the imposition of both 
informal and formal sanctions. The managers of the firms that were regulated by IPC saw the 
inspectors’ ability to impose informal sanctions to be significant as they would lead to the
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withdrawal of their access to the resources that were held by the inspectors but that they valued. 
They also felt that the IPC inspectors’ ability to call for the imposition of formal sanctions was 
an important resource. This was not only because of the significance of the sanctions 
themselves, but also because the managers felt that by imposing such sanctions the inspectors 
could de-legitimise the firms operations in the eyes of its stakeholders.
In contrast, once the LAPC regulations had been interpreted and standards had been established, 
the inspectors generally left it to the managers of the regulated firms to decide how to comply. 
Shortages of resources, relating both to the level of expertise that the inspectors had in the 
nature of the sites that they were regulating and to the time that they could spend with each 
company, meant that the inspectors were commonly unable to work with the managers of the 
regulated firms to build their capacities for compliance or to reduce their costs of compliance. 
The inspectors’ also lacked opportunities to engage with the firms to encourage them to pursue 
economically acceptable forms of compliance (see below). Consequently, their ability to argue 
that compliance could be achieved in economically acceptable ways was much more restricted 
than in the case of IPC.
The firms that were regulated by LAPC were much more likely to draw upon their ability to 
resist or to fail to pay much attention to the regulations. This was because compliance was seen 
to be costly and because there were a range of other regulations competing for their resources. 
Whereas the IPC inspectors were able to detect cases of non-compliance through regular 
monitoring, the LAPC inspectors were less able to do so, again because of resource pressures. 
Instead, they adopted a reactive and complaints driven approach to monitoring and enforcement. 
For those cases of non-compliance that were detected, the LAPC inspectors were less able to 
encourage the firms to restore compliance through the application of informal sanctions than 
were the IPC inspectors. Aside from the costs of compliance, this was also because the firms 
that were regulated by LAPC tended to place a lower value on the resources that the inspectors 
could offer to cooperative and compliant firms. Consequently, the inspectors often had no 
alternative but to resort to the application of formal sanctions. Although these formal sanctions 
were seen to be significant by the firms, the sites that were regulated by LAPC were less 
concerned about the de-legitimation of their sites in the eyes of stakeholders than were their IPC 
counterparts as they generally had a much lower public profile.
Inter-dependencies and Incentives
In combination, these differences in resource allocation and use gave rise to contrasting inter­
dependencies and incentives in each of the implementation processes. In both the IPC and the
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LAPC frameworks, information and understanding were particularly important resources during 
the standard setting phase. While the inspectors needed to gain access to the site-specific 
information that was held by the managers of the regulated firms, so the managers depended 
upon the inspectors’ understanding of the regulations and their ability to interpret the 
regulations to establish site-specific standards and to exercise their discretionary powers 
sympathetically as they did so. These inter-dependencies gave rise to incentives for information 
exchange and for cooperation at the standard setting phase of each implementation process.
At later stages of the implementation process however different inter-dependencies emerged. In 
the case of IPC, both the inspectors and the managers sought to further their mutual interest in 
reaching compliance through the wider adoption of cleaner technologies and techniques. 
Opportunities for the adoption of clean technologies were relatively prevalent because the plants 
were large and complex. Consequently, in many instances there were opportunities for 
environmental performance to be improved by re-organising and fine-tuning existing 
technologies. As these forms of response enabled the prevention rather than the capture and 
treatment of emissions, they were seen to be an environmentally effective outcome by the 
inspectors. In time, they had also come to be seen as an economically acceptable outcome by the 
managers of the regulated sites as they allowed them to avoid the need to invest in end-of-pipe 
technologies and to improve the materials and energy efficiency of their operations.
In order to secure the wider adoption of these technologies and techniques, both the inspectors 
and the managers had resources that were needed by the other. As firms had the managerial and 
financial resources needed to explore the feasibility and the viability of different options, as well 
as the ability to decide whether or not to take risks as they explored different forms of 
compliance, so regulators had some ability to raise their capacity to do so by offering 
information, understanding and flexibility. As a result, securing compliance based on the 
adoption of cleaner technologies and techniques essentially became a collective action problem 
and significant incentives for co-operation and the exchange of resources emerged. These 
incentives were increased by the common perception amongst both the inspectors and the 
managers that alternative approaches to implementation, and alternative forms of response, were 
likely to be less effective and more costly.
In the case of LAPC, although the inspectors and the managers were also concerned about the 
costs of compliance, there were more limited opportunities for compliance to be secured 
through the wider adoption of cleaner technologies and techniques. In part, this was because the 
regulated processes tended to be smaller and simpler and so there were fewer opportunities for 
their environmental performance to be improved through reorganisation or fine-tuning.
170
However, it was also because the inspectors were less able to draw upon their resources to build 
the capacities for these approaches to compliance amongst the regulated firms. Instead, end-of- 
pipe responses, which imposed extra costs and generated very few economic benefits, were the 
predominant form of response. The opportunities for the inspectors and the managers to 
exchange their resources to realise a mutual benefit (environmental efficacy for the inspectors, 
economic acceptability for the firms) were therefore more restricted. As a result, the inter­
dependencies were less pronounced and the incentives for cooperation were less apparent in the 
LAPC implementation process than in the case of IPC.
During the enforcement stage, however, the IPC and LAPC implementation processes shared a 
common range of inter-dependencies and incentives. In each case, the inspectors suggested that 
there were disincentives associated with legal action as it would increase their costs and damage 
their reputation. As a result, when cases of non-compliance were first detected there were 
incentives for the inspectors to cooperate and to offer their resources to non-compliant firms in 
an attempt to draw them back into compliance. Where these resources were of value to the 
regulated firms, as in the case of IPC, such approaches established significant incentives for 
cooperation and compliance amongst the regulated firms and the need for legal action was 
commonly avoided. However, as stated above, these resources were seen to be less significant 
in the case of LAPC. As a result, in the case of LAPC, the ability of the inspectors to incentivise 
compliance by threatening to restrict the extent to which non-compliant firms could access their 
resources was lower than in the case of IPC. This meant that, even when cases of non- 
compliance were detected, the inspectors were more likely to resort to the application of legal 
authority in the case of LAPC than in the case of IPC.
Strategies and Interactions
In the standard setting phase, the inspectors and the managers in both cases had eventually 
recognised and responded to the different inter-dependencies and incentives by adopting 
cooperative strategies and exchanging their resources. While early in the life of the IPC 
framework the inspectors had adopted a more arms-length and less cooperative approach, this 
had engendered (or had at least done little to challenge) a collective reluctance to comply with 
the regulations amongst the managers of the regulated sites. As this reluctance emerged at a 
time when the regulatory agency was under pressure to operationalise the regulations, the 
inspectors were soon drawn back into cooperative relations with the managers of the regulated 
firms so that they could meet their deadlines. Similarly, in the early stages of the LAPC 
implementation process, the inspectors felt that the levels of awareness and concern about the 
regulations amongst the regulated firms were so low that they were forced to take the initiative.
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As a result, they sought to identify and to approach those sites that were to be regulated and to 
build their understanding of their responsibilities and of the need to comply. In both instances 
then cooperative relations were initiated or restored by the inspectors as they sought to 
overcome resistance or inertia and to gain access to the information that they needed to put the 
regulations into practice.
Later in the implementation process, however, the actors in the case of IPC adopted strategies 
that actively sought to shape as well as to respond to the various inter-dependencies and 
incentives. Through their cooperative and hands-on approaches, the IPC inspectors were able to 
offer resources that the firms could draw upon to build their capacities for compliance and to 
reduce their costs of compliance. Furthermore, by adopting a 'tiered’ or 'responsive’ approach 
to enforcement, they were able to introduce a range of incentives and disincentives that 
rewarded cooperative behaviour amongst the firms by granting them access to their resources 
and that punished defection with the withdrawal of access to these resources and the imposition 
of sanctions. The strategies adopted by the IPC inspectors were therefore of a 'tit-for-tat’ nature 
-  they cooperated where the firms cooperated and defected where the firms defected. However, 
where firms defected, the strategies adopted by the inspectors were also relatively forgiving as 
they were willing to restore cooperative relations once the firms came back into compliance. 
Thus, their strategies clearly influenced the incentives and disincentives that were encountered 
by the regulated firms.
In this way, the inspectors were able to create, define and extend an area of mutual interest that 
can be likened to a metaphorical 'cooperative regulatory space’ within which they could interact 
with the managers of the regulated firms. While the strategies adopted by the IPC inspectors 
enabled them to shape this cooperative regulatory space, the existence of such a space depended 
upon the firms’ abilities to secure improvements in environmental performance in economically 
acceptable ways. At the time of the study, such opportunities were seen by the managers of the 
regulated firms to be fairly widely available. Indeed, the question of what might constitute an 
'excessive cost’ was rarely raised other than in those instances where firms had no option other 
than to invest in costly end-of-pipe technologies. As in the case of IPC the costs of compliance 
were commonly seen to be acceptable at the time of the interviews, the managers were generally 
happy to work with the inspectors to improve their environmental performance. However, the 
managers also suggested that the costs of compliance would escalate if the inspectors continued 
to demand further improvements in environmental performance. If they ever decided that these 
costs had reached unacceptable levels, the managers suggested that they would defect from the 
cooperative approach, thereby raising the costs and threatening the reputation of the regulatory 
agency. In this way, the managers created an incentive for the inspectors to continue to interact
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in ways that built the capacities for compliance and reduced the costs of compliance, thereby 
prolonging the life of the cooperative regulatory space. Thus, like the IPC inspectors, the 
managers also adopted a tit-for-tat strategy, although their willingness to do so depended upon 
availability of economically acceptable improvement options.
Although cooperation emerged fairly consistently in the standard setting phase of the LAPC 
implementation process, the range of strategies that could be adopted by the LAPC inspectors 
later in the process was severely constrained by the human and financial resources that were 
available to them. Had there been incentives for greater cooperation, it is unlikely that the 
inspectors would have been able to respond because of these resource shortages. However, as 
has been stated, such incentives for cooperation were not seen to be present because the 
opportunities for firms to find economically acceptable improvement options were seen to be 
more limited amongst the LAPC regulated firms than had been the case amongst the firms 
regulated by IPC. These factors limited the LAPC inspectors’ capacities and incentives for 
cooperation. They also restricted their capacity to impose controls 'from above’ effectively, as 
the LAPC inspectors were less able to undertake regular monitoring and thus to detect cases of 
non-compliance. Instead, the inspectors adopted an arms-length and reactive or complaints 
driven approach to enforcement.
While the strategies adopted by the firms regulated by DPC were relatively consistent, the 
strategies adopted by the LAPC regulated firms as a response to the arms-length and complaints 
driven approach to enforcement can be divided into three categories. Firstly, those generally 
medium-sized or group owned sites with a strong culture of compliance sought to comply in the 
absence of both incentives for cooperation and compliance and of regular monitoring and well 
developed capacities for control. Secondly, those generally smaller and/or independently owned 
sites that had a weak culture of compliance but that were the subjects of complaints from 
stakeholders were eventually forced to comply as the inspectors responded to sustained 
complaints by adopting a sanctions-based approach to enforcement. Thirdly, those generally 
smaller and/or independently owned sites with a weak culture of compliance that were not the 
subject of complaints were often able to avoid the need to make much of an effort to comply 
with the regulations. The strategies for compliance adopted by the LAPC regulated firms were 
highly variable therefore. These variations, the associated inconsistencies and the potential for 
free-riding undermined the incentives for cooperation and compliance amongst other LAPC 
regulated firms. Despite these inconsistencies however, some sites within each category 
managed to comply with the regulations almost serendipitously either through the technological 
dynamism that changed their production processes and improved their environmental
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performance or through supply-chain alliances that enabled them to remove or reduce their 
demand for the inputs that generated the regulated emissions.
Institutional Influences
a) The significance o f the broader institutional context
Decisions about the strategies to be adopted by the different actors in each implementation 
process were heavily influenced by historical precedent. In the case of IPC, a relatively 
cooperative and hands-on approach to implementation had been prevalent prior to its adoption. 
As a result, cooperative relationships between the actors were well established and the 
relationships between the inspectors and the managers of the regulated sites were already based 
on a degree of trust and mutual understanding. Thus, some social capital had been carried over 
from the previous legislation in the form of an implementation network that was based upon the 
presence of relatively close, trusting, reciprocal relationships between inter-dependent actors. 
The pre-existence of this network, and the nature of the relationships within it, encouraged the 
adoption of a similarly cooperative approach to the implementation of IPC. Although the 
legislation changed with the adoption of IPC, therefore, the nature of the networks associated 
with the implementation process proved to be more resilient.
The maintenance of this cooperative approach to implementation was made possible by the 
continued availability of human and financial resources within the regulatory agency and by the 
lack of effective pressure from external stakeholders. At various times, concerns emerged both 
internally within the regulatory agency and externally amongst stakeholder groups relating to 
the accountability and the expense of this approach to implementation. Indeed, upon the 
inception of the IPC regulations, the regulatory agency sought to respond to these concerns by 
adopting a less cooperative and more arms length approach to implementation. However, the 
companies responded by restricting the inspectors’ access to their own resources and by raising 
the prospect of mass inactivity and/or non-compliance. As the regulatory agency was unwilling 
or unable to force the regulated firms to take steps to work towards compliance, and as external 
stakeholders lacked the ability to force change, the brief experiment with an alternative 
approach to implementation was seen to fail and cooperative relations within pre-existing 
network forms quickly re-emerged. Thereafter, support for the cooperative approach evolved 
amongst the inspectors and the managers and the approach became further embedded as each 
adopted 'tit-for-tat’ strategies that rewarded cooperation and sanctioned defection. At the time 
of the interviews at least the inspectors had been able to secure the financial and human 
resources they needed to maintain such an approach.
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In the case of LAPC, the approach to the implementation of pre-existing regulations in related 
areas had tended to be more reactive and sanctions-based. Upon the inception of LAPC, there 
was some support for the adoption of a more cooperative approach which would encourage and 
enable compliance as such an approach was seen to have the potential to reduce the impact that 
the regulations would have on local economic development. However, opportunities for such a 
change of regulatory style were constrained by the funding structures within the local 
authorities. Although the LAPC system should have been self-funding, the inspectors had to 
compete for financial and human resources with the other functions both within the 
environmental health departments and the local authorities at large. As these functions were 
often more visible and more politically sensitive than the control of air emissions, LAPC was 
often awarded a lower priority and the implementation process tended to be under funded. Thus, 
although inspectors commonly engaged in cooperative relations to allow them to gain access to 
the information that they needed to issue authorisations, later in the implementation process 
resource shortages forced them to revert to a complaints-driven and sanctions based approach. 
The subsequent suspicions about inconsistencies, and the inability of the inspectors to reduce 
resistance and to generate trust by promoting economically acceptable forms of compliance, 
meant that a change away from this approach became even more difficult over time. The 
interactions between the inspectors and the managers of the regulated firms therefore took place 
in loosely coupled networks where interactions were less frequent and, from the firms 
perspective at least, were more likely to be based on suspicion and resistance than on trust, 
mutual understanding and open engagement.
Aside from issues relating to historical precedent and the availability of funding within the 
implementing agencies, the strategies that were adopted in each implementation process also 
related to the technological and economic conditions that were encountered by the regulated 
firms. As has been stated, in the case of IPC, opportunities existed for the regulators and the 
managers to work together to promote the wider adoption of cleaner technologies and 
techniques. This was the case not only because the regulated processes were typically large and 
complex and therefore amenable to reorganisation and fine-tuning. It was also because the firms 
were able to access the financial and managerial resources needed to exploit these opportunities, 
particularly through their links within intra-firm networks. They also benefited from the extent 
to which they could access to the resources held by the inspectors. In the case of LAPC, by 
contrast, the opportunities for the wider adoption of cleaner technologies and techniques were 
much more limited. This was because the regulated processes were much smaller and simpler 
and hence less amenable to reorganisation or fine-tuning. However, it was also because the 
managers of the processes regulated by LAPC often found it much more difficult to access the
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managerial and financial resources that were needed if they were to redesign or reorganise their 
production technologies. Amongst the firms regulated by LAPC, access to such resources was 
commonly restricted by the absence of intra-firm networks and by the lack of participation in 
external or inter-firm economic networks. The managers also found it harder to access these 
resources through their interactions with the inspectors who tended to lack the time and the 
expertise needed to build their capacities for compliance.
It is apparent therefore that the strategies adopted by the different actors in each of the 
implementation processes were not only a response to the incentives that stemmed from any 
resource inter-dependencies. They were also influenced heavily by historical precedent, by the 
institutional context within which the implementing agency operated and by the technological 
and economic context within which the regulated firms existed and operated.
b) The emergence o f institutionalised modes o f behaviour
In addition to the influence of the wider range of contextual factors that shaped the 
implementation process, a number o f ' feedback loops’ emerged in the relationship between 
some factors that had a significant impact on the behaviour of the different actors. Instead of 
there being a simple, linear set of causal relationships between the analytical variables, where 
resource inter-dependencies generated incentives that shaped the strategies adopted by the 
different actors (Figure 8.1a), the presence of these feedback loops meant that the different 
variables were in fact co-produced within a more complex web of inter-relations (Figure 8.1b). 
These feedback loops took a number of forms.
Firstly, the strategies that were adopted by the inspectors served to create as well as respond to a 
range of inter-dependencies. This was evident in the case of IPC where the inspectors’ attempts 
to promote particular forms of compliance increased their dependence on the ability of the 
regulated firms to access and invest the financial and human resources that were needed if new 
technologies and techniques were to be adopted. As they sought to explore the potential of such 
technologies and techniques, the regulated firms came to depend more on the information, 
understanding and flexibility that could be offered by the inspectors as they sought to innovate. 
As their inter-dependence led to cooperation, therefore, so cooperation led to greater 
interdependence. Such inter-dependencies were much less apparent in the case of LAPC where 
the regulators were less likely to engage with the regulated firms in an attempt to shape the 
ways in which they complied with the regulations.
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Figure 8.1: Perspectives on the Relationship between the Central Analytical Variables
a) Rational Choice Perspective b) Institutionalist Perspective
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Secondly, the strategies that were adopted by the different actors served to shape the incentives 
that were encountered by the other actors. This was particularly the case in relation to the 'tit- 
for-tat’ strategies that were adopted by the different actors in the IPC implementation process as 
both the inspectors and the managers sought to reward the other actors’ cooperation by 
cooperating themselves and to sanction defection by defecting themselves. In the case of LAPC, 
'tit for tat’ strategies were also adopted to some extent during the enforcement stage, however 
the ability of the inspectors to detect defections amongst the regulated firms was limited by the 
absence of an effective monitoring regime. As a consequence, the incentives for firms to 
cooperate with the regulator were reduced.
Thirdly, where cooperative strategies were adopted, these helped to secure mutually beneficial 
outcomes for the different actors. In the case of IPC, cooperation raised the capacity of the 
regulated firms to adopt environmentally effective and economically acceptable forms of 
compliance. Over time, such cooperation served to generate a degree of trust and mutual 
understanding between the different actors, which raised the capacity, and increased the 
incentives, for further cooperation. Again, such opportunities for the actors to realise mutual 
benefits through cooperation were less apparent in the case of LAPC.
The presence of these feedback loops, and the potential for the co-production of the inter­
dependencies, incentives and strategies that shaped the implementation process, is significant. It 
suggests that the interactions within the implementation process can evolve along and become 
embedded within particular trajectories as different routines of behaviour emerge and become 
institutionalised within different forms of network. In turn, this helps to explain why the actors 
within each implementation process found it difficult to move away from the historic precedent 
even though there were pressures and/or incentives for them to do so. In the case of IPC, this 
was because the incentives for such an approach, which had been actively shaped and reinforced 
by the different actors over time, were strong enough to draw the different actors back into a 
cooperative approach should they attempt to defect. In the case of LAPC, this was because the 
regulatory agency lacked the resources that were needed to initiate a more cooperative approach 
and the regulated firms lacked the incentives needed to overcome their inertia and resistance to 
the regulations in order to engage with such an approach.
Regulatory Outputs and Outcomes
Collectively, the factors that have been examined in the preceding sections influenced both the 
outputs (i.e. the practical nature of the demands made by the regulators) and the outcomes (i.e. 
the ways in which the firms responded to these demands) of each implementation process.
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In the case of IPC, the cooperative approach to implementation enabled the regulators to put the 
regulations into practice. In essence, cooperation increased the administrative viability of the 
regulatory function. It also gave firms some influence in the standard setting process. In 
particular, it enabled cooperative firms to gain some flexibility relating to the times at which 
compliance should be achieved and the point at which sanctions would be imposed as a 
response to minor breeches of compliance. In the short term, then, the cooperative approach was 
associated with weaker outputs both because the standards that had to be achieved were reduced 
through negotiation and because a more forgiving approach to enforcement was adopted. These 
are important issues as they are closely related to the view that cooperation led to capture in the 
IPC implementation process.
However, both the inspectors and the managers were firmly of the view that the cooperative 
interactions that defined the IPC implementation process played a role in building the capacities 
for compliance and the commitment to environmental improvement amongst the regulated sites. 
In turn, these capacities and commitments enabled the firms to explore the potential of the 
cleaner technologies and techniques. In so doing, the regulated firms were able to improve their 
environmental performance by avoiding rather than capturing and controlling their emissions, 
thereby reducing the need to invest in end-of-pipe technologies and hence the costs of 
compliance. In essence, then, inspectors and the managers felt that although the cooperative 
approach was associated with weaker outputs in the short term, it generated more effective and 
more efficient outcomes in the medium term. In the longer term, however, the managers 
expected that their attempts to improve their environmental performance would eventually 
encounter diminishing marginal returns and that the costs of compliance would escalate if the 
standards that they were required to reach continued to be increased.
In the case of LAPC, the cooperative approach to standard setting also enabled the inspectors to 
interpret the regulations and issue authorisations. It also allowed the firms to gain some 
flexibility relating to the times at which standards should be achieved. Again therefore the short­
term outputs from the implementation process were weakened through cooperation. However, 
the lack of resources available to the inspectors and the absence of regular monitoring meant 
that in practice these outputs were weakened further as cases of non-compliance, or defections 
from the cooperative approach, were often not detected. As a result, the response of the firms to 
these outputs depended upon their culture of compliance. Those firms with a strong culture of 
compliance sought to comply even in the absence of effective controls from the regulator, while 
those firms with a weak culture of compliance were able to do little unless there were serious 
incidents or complaints from the public. Where there were strong cultures of compliance or
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complaints from the public, the nature of their response depended on their ability to access 
resources both internally and through their engagement in broader economic networks. Their 
response also depended on the extent to which they could avoid the need to invest in end-of- 
pipe technologies by substituting their inputs or by redesigning their production process. 
Although this had happened in some instances, for example as a by-product of broader 
technological changes or as a result of inter-actions within supply chains, the predominant form 
of response to LAPC was to invest in end-of-pipe technologies. To some extent, the outcomes of 
the regulations were effective as the end-of-pipe technologies allowed the firms to capture their 
emissions and to render them harmless. However, the regulations would have generated more 
effective and more efficient outcomes if the firms had been able to prevent and/or minimise 
their emissions by adopting cleaner technologies and techniques. The regulations would also 
have generated more consistent or equitable outcomes if the inspectors had been able to monitor 
performance more effectively and to detect cases of non-compliance without relying on 
complaints from the public.
It is apparent then that the strategies adopted by the different actors generated different outputs 
and outcomes and that these were shaped not only by the incentives and strategies of the 
different actors and by the institutional factors shaping the implementation process but also by 
the factors that shaped the opportunities and capacities for technological change within the 
regulated firms.
The Explanatory Value of the Different Theories of Cooperation and Collective Action
The preceding comparative analysis considered the interaction between the inter-dependencies, 
incentives and strategies that helped to shape the practical nature of each of the two case-study 
implementation processes. It also examined the influence of various institutional factors and the 
ways in which these factors combined to influence the outputs and outcomes of each 
implementation process. With this in mind, the analysis will now examine the extent to which 
the nature and influence of each implementation process can be explained by referring to the 
two contrasting theoretical perspectives on the basis for cooperation between inter-dependent 
actors, namely the rational choice and the new institutional perspectives. These perspectives 
were presented earlier in the thesis and are summarised in Table 8.1.
Within the results of the comparative analysis, qualified support for the rational choice 
perspective can be found in a number of forms. However, support for this perspective is
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fundamentally limited as in every instance the factors that the rational choice perspective holds 
to be significant are themselves shaped by a range of important institutional dimensions:
Causality. As the rational choice perspective suggests, the resource inter-dependencies that 
were evident in each implementation process did indeed generate incentives for cooperation 
and collective action. However, these inter-dependencies and incentives became more 
apparent in the case of IPC where the regulators actively engaged with the regulated firms 
in an attempt to promote compliance than in the case of LAPC where the regulators adopted 
a more arms-length and sanctions-based approach. This adds an important institutional 
dimension to the analysis as it indicates that the inter-dependencies and hence the incentives 
for cooperation were not exogenously defined. Instead, they were created and shaped both 
by the institutional context within which the implementation processes took place and by 
the strategies adopted by the different actors.
Scone for reciprocity. As the theory proposed by Axelrod (1984) suggests, the analysis 
found that certain conditions, relating particularly to the scope for reciprocity and the 
potential for mutual benefit, had to be met if cooperation was to emerge. These conditions 
were met in the case of IPC where the actors were able to cooperate and exchange their 
resources to exploit the potential for those forms of compliance that would be both 
environmentally effective and economically acceptable. In the case of LAPC, by contrast, 
the basis for cooperation was more restricted as such opportunities for mutual benefit were 
less readily available and/or exploitable. As the rational choice perspective would predict, 
cooperation in the LAPC implementation process was therefore more limited than in the 
IPC process. Again, however, there are some important institutional dimensions as the 
potential for mutual benefit depended upon the resources that were available to each actor. 
Both the regulators and the regulated firms gained access to resources through their 
participation in wider networks. Furthermore, a critical resource, namely the ability of 
inspectors to argue that compliance could be achieved in economically acceptable ways, 
depended upon the expertise available in the regulatory agencies and the technological 
conditions that existed within the regulated firms.
Incentive structures and responsiveness. As is depicted in Figure 8.2a, the incentives 
structures associated with each implementation process can be presented in a way that 
reflects the game theoretic approach as proposed by Axelrod (1984). As each actor could 
choose whether to cooperate or defect in response to the incentives that they encountered, 
four possible scenarios emerged: mutual cooperation, top-down control, bottom-up capture 
or mutual adversarialism. Where there were resource inter-dependencies, and where each
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Figure 8.2: Game theoretic perspectives on interactions in the implementation process.
a. Generic model (adapted from Axelrod, 1984).
Regulatory Agency
Co-operate Defect
Regulated
Firms
Co-operate Cooperation Top-down
Control
Defect Bottom-up
capture
Adversarial ism
1. Co-operative relations -  regulators cooperate to promote compliance, firms cooperate to reduce costs of 
compliance and to avoid the imposition of sanctions.
2. Top-down control -  regulators adopt a sanctions based approach. This approach is only available temporarily 
given firms ability to defect.
3. Bottom-up capture -  firms adopt an uncooperative approach and fail to secure compliance. This approach is only 
available temporarily unless regulators lack capacity to detect or respond to cases of non-compliance.
4. Adversaria] relations -  firms fail to secure compliance, regulators recognise breeches and respond by adopting a 
sanctions based approach.
b. The case of IPC
Regulatory Agency
Co-operate Defect
Regulated
Firms
Co-operate 1,5,9 2,8
Defect 4 ,6 3 ,7
1. Initial position upon inception of IPC regulations; cooperative approach to pollution control.
2. Regulator’s brief attempt to adopt a more arms-length approach in the early days of IPC.
3. Firms’ reaction to withdrawal of regulator’s cooperation results in brief period of mutual defection.
4. Regulator responds to prospect of mass non-compliance by initiating the restoration of cooperative relations.
5. Firms respond by cooperating and working towards compliance.
6. Occasional and/or non-serious breeches occur, but defecting firms tend back to cooperation because of 
incentives and threatened/actual imposition of informal sanctions.
7. Serious or sustained breeches of compliance by defecting firms trigger regulator’s defection and the imposition 
of formal sanctions.
8. Defecting firms avoid the imposition of further sanctions by regaining compliance and initiating the restoration 
of cooperative relations.
9. Forgiving regulators respond and cooperative relations are gradually restored pending further breeches.
c. The case of LAPC
Regulatory Agency
Co-operate Defect
Regulated
Firms
Co-operate 2, 3 ,7 6
Defect 1,4 5
1. Regulators take the initiative in order to operationalise the regulations.
2. Firms cooperate with the regulators to gain understanding and influence in the standard setting phase.
3. Firms with a strong culture of compliance continue to cooperate and work towards compliance in the absence of
regular monitoring and/or complaints from the public or other firms.
4. Firms with a weak culture of compliance do little in the absence of regular monitoring and/or complaints.
5. Firms with a weak culture of compliance do little but where breeches are detected through complaints regulators
respond by imposing formal sanctions.
6. Firms begin to cooperate with the regulators and work towards compliance to avoid the imposition of further 
formal sanctions.
7. Forgiving regulators respond by restoring cooperation but the response of firms is uncertain in the absence of 
regular monitoring and/or complaints.
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actor could recognise and respond to the strategies of the other, the evidence supports the 
theory in that the 'first best’ option for either actor (top-down control for the regulators or 
bottom-up capture for the regulated firms) was simply not available where there were 
sustained interactions between the different actors. This was because the tit-for-tat strategies 
that were adopted by the actors meant that defection from one would eventually trigger 
defection from the other. As a result, the actors had to decide whether cooperative or 
adversarial approaches represented the more desirable 'second best’ option.
As is depicted in Figures 8.2b, the strategies that emerged in the IPC implementation 
process were responsive to these incentive structures. From an initial starting point of 
mutual cooperation (position 1), the regulator attempted to defect and shift to a pattern of 
top-down control (2). However, as this triggered a defection from the firms (3), the 
regulator offered renewed access to its resources (4) and the firms responded by cooperating 
themselves (5). Although occasional defections or breeches of compliance by the firms were 
detected (6), in most instances the imposition of informal sanctions and the threat of formal 
sanctions was enough to tempt defecting companies back into compliance. However, 
periods of mutual adversarialism sometimes occurred where the firms' defections were more 
sustained or where breeches of compliance were more serious (7). In such instances, the 
imposition of sanctions commonly encouraged firms to restore cooperative relations (8) in 
an attempt to encourage the regulators to move away from a sanctions-based approach 
towards a compliance-based approach based on mutual cooperation (9). Experience in the 
case of IPC therefore indicates that the interactions between the regulators and the regulated 
firms were highly responsive and that behaviour was shaped by the nature of the incentive 
structures facing the different actors.
As is depicted in Figure 8.2c, rather different dynamics emerged in the case of LAPC. 
When the regulations were introduced, the regulators took the lead and sought to cooperate 
with the reluctant or resistant firms in order to operationalise the regulations (position 1). 
Most firms responded by cooperating with the regulator during the standard setting phase 
where there were clear inter-dependencies (2). However, in the absence of the monitoring or 
the complaints that would have enabled the inspectors to recognise and respond to 
defections or breeches of compliance, once standards had been established the firms 
response depended upon their culture of compliance. Thus, those firms with a strong culture 
of compliance willingly cooperated (3) while those with a weak culture of compliance were 
able to defect undetected, unless there were complaints or serious breeches of compliance 
(4). Where breeches of compliance were detected, the inspectors responded by withdrawing 
their cooperation and imposing sanctions (5), a strategy which encouraged the firms to
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cooperate and to come back into compliance in an attempt to avoid the imposition of further 
sanctions (6). As inspectors tended to be relatively forgiving, cooperative relations re- 
emerged once compliance had been regained (7), although without more detailed 
monitoring or further complaints the inspectors found it difficult to recognise subsequent 
defections. Experience in the case of LAPC therefore also suggests that the strategies of the 
different actors were shaped by the incentive structures but that responsiveness of the 
regulators was limited by their relative inability to detect defections amongst the regulated 
firms.
It is apparent therefore that behaviour in each implementation process was responsive to the 
incentive structures that were encountered. However, as has been stated, these incentives 
structures both shaped and were shaped by the strategies adopted by the different actors. 
They were also influenced by the institutionalised modes of behaviour that emerged over 
time -  for example, as cooperation generated social capital and reciprocal benefits, so the 
costs of further cooperation decreased while the benefits became more apparent. Strategies 
that had been cooperative in the past were therefore more likely to be cooperative in the 
future. In essence, this 'positive feedback’ meant that certain forms of behaviour emerged 
and became institutionalised and self-reinforcing. This adds an important evolutionary 
dimension to the analysis that indicates that behaviour in the implementation process was 
responsive, but only within particular trajectories.
Temporal dimensions. The rational choice perspective suggests that each actor’s decisions 
on strategy will be determined by the nature of the incentive structures that they encounter. 
However, the evidence suggests that change was not ffictionless or costless and that the 
different actors needed to have access to resources to invest in the short-term if they were to 
realise the benefits of cooperation in the medium term. In the case of IPC, the inspectors 
were able to invest their resources to initiate cooperative relations, although the levels of 
investment needed were not great because a historical precedent had already been 
established that favoured cooperation in the implementation process. In the case of LAPC 
however, resource shortages meant that the regulators were not able to make the 
investments that were needed to move away from a more arms-length and reactive historical 
precedent. The evidence suggests that the presence of incentives for cooperation was not 
enough, therefore, as the actors also needed an ability to recognise and respond to those 
incentives, particularly by investing in the short term to realise benefits in the medium term, 
if cooperative strategies were to emerge.
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The evidence indicates that the rational choice perspective has some explanatory value therefore 
as it helps to explain how resource inter-dependencies generate the incentive structures that 
encourage cooperation. It also helps to identify the conditions that need to be in place if actors 
are to recognise and respond to these incentives. However, the evidence suggests that many of 
the preconditions for cooperation that are associated with the rational choice perspective need to 
be qualified with an extra institutional dimension. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the 
rational choice perspective ignores a number of other critical factors that can be included within 
a broader institutional analysis:
Institutional context. As the institutional perspective would predict, the resource allocations 
that shaped the inter-dependencies and thus the incentives for cooperation in each of the two 
case-study implementation processes were not exogenously defined. Instead, they were the 
result of the broader institutional context within which the implementation processes took 
place. Thus, factors such as historical precedent, legislative design, the structures, cultures 
and capacities of both the regulatory agencies and the regulated firms were all found to be 
significant in both cases.
Institutionalised modes of behaviour. The conceptual analysis highlighted the potential for 
various feedback loops to emerge between the inter-dependencies, incentives and strategies 
that shape the implementation process. However, rather than institutional factors exerting a 
general influence in the relations between all of the analytical variables (see Table 8.1), the 
empirical analysis found that these feedback loops took a number of specific forms (see 
above and Figure 8.1b).
These feedback loops were particularly apparent in the case of IPC where the compliance- 
oriented approach that was adopted by the inspectors increased their dependence on the 
willingness and ability of the managers to explore the potential of particular technologies 
and techniques. In turn, the managers became more dependent on the ability of the 
inspectors to offer the information, understanding and flexibility that they needed to 
innovate. As both actors sought to draw the other into the cooperative approach by adopting 
tit-for-tat strategies, experience accumulated and the capacity of the different actors to work 
together to secure the adoption of mutually beneficial outcomes developed. In this way, the 
cooperative approach became more deeply embedded over time.
In the case of LAPC, by contrast, the strategies that had been adopted by the different actors 
had not led to significant inter-dependencies, to accumulated experience or to further 
incentives to cooperate. The relative absence of cooperation in the past also meant that the
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trust and mutual understanding that might have enabled cooperative interactions to take 
place were not as readily apparent as in the case of IPC. As a result, switching from the 
arms-length and reactive approach to a more cooperative approach would have required 
investments of time and resources that neither the regulators or the regulated firms were 
able to make.
The enabling and constraining role of networks With the added influence of the feedback 
loops discussed above, the evidence also indicates that the forms of interaction that emerged 
and evolved within each implementation process became institutionalised within different 
forms of network. Following Ostrom et al (1993) and Rydin and Pennington (2000), these 
networks can be likened to the 'social infrastructure’ that makes cooperation and collective 
action possible in some settings. However, as Granovetter (1985) and Grabher (1993) argue, 
interactions within these networks can become so embedded that the opportunities for 
change are restricted, even where there are incentives for change. This reinforces the 
importance of the temporal dimensions outlined above, as it suggests that the investments 
needed to move away from an established approach, and to transform the networks that 
underpin it, can be significant. It also suggests that interactions within the implementation 
process may be responsive to incentives, but only within the broader trajectories associated 
with existing network forms.
In the case of IPC, a tightly-bound cooperative network emerged between the inspectors and 
the managers of the regulated firms based on their inter-dependence and the incentives for 
cooperation. The ways in which the different actors engaged with this network also 
depended upon their engagement with broader networks: the engagement of the inspectors 
depended upon their ability to secure resources from within the implementing agency, 
whilst for the managers their engagement depended upon their ability to access the 
resources needed to work towards compliance through their participation in intra-firm 
networks. While these networks enabled the actors to work together to secure effective and 
efficient forms of compliance, the extent of the inter-dependencies also restricted the ability 
of either actor to shift towards an alternative approach. In the case of LAPC, by contrast, a 
much more loosely-bound network emerged. Although the different actors cooperated at 
those stages of the implementation process where there were inter-dependencies, closer 
cooperation was precluded by the limited availability of resources in the regulatory 
agencies, by the lack of opportunities for mutual benefit and by the firms inability to access 
resources through intra-firm and inter-firm networks.
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In essence then the analysis suggests that the boundaries of the rational choice perspective on 
the potential for cooperation and collective action are too narrow and that the proposed lines of 
causality which link resource inter-dependencies with incentives for cooperation are too 
simplistic. Because it extends the analysis to consider the significance of the institutional 
context and the role that feedback loops play in creating institutionalised forms of behaviour, 
and thus path-dependencies, in the implementation process, the analysis suggests that the 
explanatory value of the institutional perspective is much more complete.
The Validity of the Hypotheses
Having assessed the explanatory value of the contrasting theoretical perspectives, we can now 
consider the extent to which the analysis supports or refutes the validity of the hypotheses that 
were generated earlier in the thesis.
Hypothesis 1 -  that implementation processes will be shaped not only by the ability of public 
sector regulators to resort to the hierarchical application of legal authority but also by the extent 
to which regulated actors derive influence in the implementation process from their access to a 
broader range of resources.
This hypothesis is supported by strong empirical evidence in each case. In each 
implementation process, both the regulators and the regulated firms sought to exert 
influence and to achieve their objectives by drawing upon a wide range of resources 
(see Tables 8.2 and 8.3). However, in each of the two cases, legal authority remained an 
important resource that the regulators could apply as they deemed necessary. Thus, the 
interactions between actors in each of the implementation processes can be seen to have 
taken place in the 'shadow of hierarchy’.
Hypothesis 2 -  that various resource inter-dependencies will emerge in the implementation 
process which mean that compliance depends upon co-operation and the exchange of resources 
as regulatory objectives effectively become 'collective action problems’.
This hypothesis is fully supported in the case IPC where the regulators engaged with the 
regulated firms in an attempt to promote and/or shape compliance. This approach 
generated inter-dependencies which meant that securing particular forms of compliance 
did indeed become a collective action problem that could be solved through cooperation 
and the exchange of resources. In the case of LAPC, by contrast, the regulators adopted 
a more arms-length, reactive and sanctions-based approach which generated fewer
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inter-dependencies and hence incentives for cooperation. In the absence of such 
incentives, the validity of the hypothesis depends upon the cultures of compliance 
amongst the regulated firms. Within those firms with a strong culture of compliance, 
compliance did not depend upon cooperation with the regulator and hence under these 
conditions the hypothesis is refuted. For those companies that lacked such a culture of 
compliance, compliance appeared to depend upon the regulators’ ability to detect and 
respond to breeches of compliance through the application of their legal authority. 
However, where breeches were detected, incentives for cooperation again emerged 
based on the shared desire to avoid the negative impacts of sustained adversarialism. 
Once more, therefore, cooperative strategies were adopted to secure compliance and 
hence, for those companies with a weaker culture of compliance, the hypothesis is again 
supported.
Hypothesis 3 -  that cooperative interactions within the implementation process will be 
institutionalised within different forms of network that will influence both the outputs (i.e. the 
practical nature of the demands made by regulators) and the outcomes (i.e. the ways in which 
the regulated firms responded to these demands) of the implementation process.
This hypothesis is fully supported in each case. Where inter-dependencies and hence 
incentives for cooperation were apparent throughout the implementation process, as in 
the case of IPC, the actors were drawn into a tightly-bound network where 
implementation was based on frequent interaction, mutual understanding and reciprocal 
exchange. The emergence of such a cooperative network influenced the outputs of the 
implementation process as cooperation led to negotiation, flexibility and compromise 
and hence to a weakening of the short-term demands made by the regulators. However, 
in the medium term, cooperation also influenced the nature of the regulatory outcomes, 
not by imposing standards but by building capacities for compliance. By drawing upon 
these capacities, the regulated firms were able to secure more effective (i.e. more 
preventative) and more efficient (i.e. more economically acceptable) outcomes. Where 
inter-dependencies did not emerge, as in the case of LAPC, networks were more loosely 
coupled with less frequent interaction, less trust and less reciprocity. While cooperation 
in the standard setting phase still led to weaker outputs, the subsequent lack of 
cooperation meant that the ability of the regulators to promote/shape compliance was 
reduced. In the absence of cooperation, the capacities for compliance among the 
regulated firms remained under-developed and the outcomes achieved were less 
effective (i.e. they were reactive) and less efficient (i.e. they generated significant costs 
and very few if any benefits) than those secured in the case of IPC.
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Hypothesis 4 - that because of these inter-dependencies, the implementation process will 
display some of the advantages of co-operation (i.e. increases in administrative viability and an 
enhanced ability to secure compliance through collective action) and some of the disadvantages 
of regulatory capture (i.e. reduction of standards and loss of accountability).
This hypothesis is fully supported in the case of IPC where the regulators cooperated 
with the regulated firms in an attempt to promote or shape compliance. This cooperation 
led to more administratively viable but less publicly accountable regulatory decision­
making processes. It also led to more effective and efficient regulatory outcomes. By 
implication, the hypothesis is also supported in the case of LAPC where the regulators 
adopted a sanctions-based approach. This approach generated fewer inter-dependencies, 
and was as a result less cooperative. In the absence of such cooperation, the 
accountability of the regulatory process was better maintained, but the regulators lost 
some ability to secure effective or efficient outcomes. They also come to depend more 
upon their ability to detect and respond to cases of non-compliance.
The validity of the hypotheses in these cases therefore depends upon the nature of engagement 
between the regulators and the regulated in the implementation process. Where the regulators 
adopted a hands-on approach in a proactive attempt to promote compliance, inter-dependencies 
emerged which generate incentives for cooperation. The cooperative networks that then 
emerged reduced the accountability of the implementation process but increased its ability to 
solve collective action problems and to secure more effective and efficient outcomes. 
Conversely, where the regulators adopted a more arms-length and reactive approach, fewer 
inter-dependencies emerged and so the incentives for cooperation were reduced. As a result, the 
accountability of the implementation process was better maintained while its ability to promote 
more effective and efficient outcomes was restricted.
Conclusions from the Comparative Analysis
On the basis of this comparative analysis, it can be concluded that resource inter-dependencies, 
and hence incentives for cooperation, are likely to emerge where regulators engage with the 
regulated firms in an attempt to promote particular forms of compliance. Under such 
circumstances, the validity of the hierarchical model of the implementation process, which 
assumes that compliance can be secured through the top-down imposition of legal authority, is 
challenged. However, the validity of the hierarchical model is more apparent where regulators
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adopt an arms-length and reactive approach which seeks not to promote compliance directly, but 
instead to detect and sanction cases of non-compliance. In such instances, resource inter­
dependencies are more limited and the basis for cooperation in the implementation process is 
restricted. Even in such instances, however, the analysis concludes that resource inter­
dependencies are still likely to become apparent which encourage cooperative approaches to 
emerge at different stages of the implementation process.
Theoretically, the analysis concludes that the rational choice perspective on the basis for 
cooperation and collective action in the implementation process had only a limited amount of 
explanatory value. Whilst it highlights the degree to which resource inter-dependencies can 
generate incentives for cooperation in the implementation process, it ignores a range of 
important institutional dimensions that are likely to exert a defining influence on the behaviour 
of the different actors. As a result, it mistakenly suggests that behaviour within the 
implementation process can be readily changed by altering the nature of the resource allocations 
made available to the different actors and hence the extent of their inter-dependence. In contrast, 
the institutional perspective acknowledges the significance of the broader institutional context 
within which the implementation process takes place. Whilst accepting that the strategies 
adopted by particular actors can be responsive to the incentives that they encounter, the 
institutional perspective also suggests that various feedback mechanisms provide a basis for 
self-reinforcing modes of behaviour that can become so embedded that the potential for change 
within the implementation process is restricted. The wider implications of this institutional 
perspective on regulation and implementation will be discussed further in the final chapter.
More practically, the analysis concludes that under some circumstances cooperation in the 
implementation process might be seen to be desirable, most notably where it can build 
capacities for joint problem solving that enable regulation to secure more desirable outcomes. 
However, it also recognised that cooperation between the regulators and the regulated actors can 
reduce the accountability of the regulatory decision making process. Thus, the comparative 
analysis highlights the tensions that surround the question of whether it is more desirable to 
have accountable regulatory decision making processes or more effective and efficient 
regulatory outcomes. Different actors are likely to have contrasting perspectives on the 
desirability of these criteria. Simplistically, it might be expected that both the regulators and the 
regulated are likely to have a preference for cooperative approaches that lead to more effective 
and efficient outcomes. Similarly, it can be predicted that those stakeholders who don’t trust 
regulatory agencies to cooperate and to exercise their discretion in ways that further the public 
interest are likely to advocate the adoption of less cooperative processes. The tensions between
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these different viewpoints, which are of much broader policy relevance, will be discussed in 
more detail in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusions: The Wider Implications of an 
Institutional Perspective on Regulation and Implementation 
Structure
> Introduction
> The origins and evolution of cooperation in the implementation process
> The influence of cooperation in the implementation process
y  Cooperation without capture?
> Implications for broader notions of regulation and governance
> Suggestions for further research
Introduction
On the basis of the previous chapter’s conclusion that the institutional perspective offers a much 
fuller explanation of the factors that shape the practical nature of the implementation process, 
the discussion that follows in this chapter will examine the wider implications of an 
institutionalist perspective on regulation and implementation. Thus, the discussion will consider 
the factors that shape the origins, evolution and influence of cooperative approaches to 
implementation. It will then examine the tensions between the different criteria for evaluation, 
recognising that whilst cooperation and collective action can generate more effective and 
efficient regulatory outcomes, these are achieved at the expense of the accountability of the 
implementation process and the extent to which it can be managed by governments or 
influenced by external stakeholders. The discussion then considers whether the trade-offs 
between these different criteria might be reduced by requiring regulators and regulated firms to 
operate within a transparent framework of targets and performance measures. Were such a 
framework adopted, it is argued that the implementation process could realise the benefits of 
cooperation whilst reducing the prospects for regulatory capture. Ultimately, the chapter
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considers the implications of the conceptual and empirical analysis for broader debates on the 
future of regulation and the nature of governance.
The Origins and Evolution of Cooperation in the Implementation Process
Traditional conceptions of command and control regulation associate it with some degree of 
public sector control over private sector activities. However, this thesis has shown that 
hierarchical power, expressed in terms of the legal authority of the regulatory agency, is only 
one of a wider range of resources that both the regulators and the regulated actors can draw 
upon as they interact and attempt to exert influence within the implementation process. As has 
been illustrated, in addition to their legal authority, resources that are of particular importance to 
regulators include their ability to:
• exercise discretion as they interpret and apply the regulations,
• build capacities for compliance amongst the regulated firms by offering information, 
understanding, expertise and flexibility
• change cultures or build commitment amongst the regulated firms by identifying 
economically acceptable forms of compliance
• empower particular actors or interests within the regulated firms
• detect breeches of compliance and respond by imposing both formal and informal sanctions
• legitimise or de-legitimise regulated firms in the eyes of their stakeholders.
However, the analysis has also indicated that regulators depend upon some key resources that 
are controlled by regulated firms if they are to secure compliance with the regulations that they 
are charged with implementing. In particular, the analysis found that these include their ability 
decide whether or not to:
• Offer the regulator access to information
• Develop and draw upon some commitment to compliance
• Invest resources and take risks to work towards compliance
• Influence the costs and the reputation of the regulatory agency and its inspectors by 
appealing against the demands of the regulators or the legitimacy of the regulations.
As the institutional perspective suggests, and as the empirical analysis has shown, the extent to 
which particular regulators or firms can access these resources depends very much upon the 
specific institutional context within which they operate. For example, while some regulators are
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able to access the resources needed to pursue a relatively expert and hands-on approach to 
regulation, others find it difficult to access the resources needed to meet even the most basic 
requirements of the regulations that they are charged with implementing. Similarly, while some 
companies are able to access the resources needed to explore the potential of the most effective 
and efficient forms of compliance, others face such severe resource constraints that in practice 
only the most expedient responses are available to them. In all instances, actors have some 
ability to seek out new resources and to draw upon existing resources in different ways. The 
resource allocations that shape behaviour in the implementation process do not simply exist 
therefore, they both shape and are shaped by the specific institutional contexts within which the 
different actors exist and operate.
The analysis has also shown that these institutionally-defmed resource allocations can have a 
significant impact on the ways in which the different actors interact within the implementation 
process. As each actor tends to control resources that are needed by the other, resource inter­
dependencies are likely to emerge that generate incentives for cooperation in the 
implementation process. Again, however, the analysis suggests that there is an important 
institutional dimension, as these inter-dependencies are not only the result of initial resource 
allocations, they are also influenced by the strategies adopted by the different actors. Indeed, the 
analysis indicates that compliance-based strategies are likely to generate more inter­
dependencies, and hence greater incentives for cooperation, than sanctions-based strategies. 
From an institutional perspective, behaviour is not solely determined by resource allocations or 
by the broader institutional context, therefore, as actors have some ability to shape the incentive 
structures that both they and their counterparts encounter.
Although the empirical analysis concluded that resource inter-dependencies are likely to be 
more extensive where regulators adopt a compliance-based rather than a sanctions-based 
strategy, it also found that some resource inter-dependencies, and hence incentives for 
cooperation, are likely to emerge in either instance. While these inter-dependencies and 
incentives may provide the initial 'spark' that leads to the emergence of cooperative relations, 
thereafter the ability of the different actors to shape the incentive structures that they encounter 
in the implementation process remains. Thus, if cooperation generates mutual benefits, so the 
actors are able to adopt strategies that incentivise further cooperation. Furthermore, reflecting 
the findings of Ostrom et al (1993) and Rydin and Pennington (2000), the analysis indicates that 
successful cooperation can generate positive externalities where it leads to the development of 
social capital that reduces the costs and the risks and increases the benefits of further 
cooperation. Implementation processes that have been cooperative in the past are therefore more 
likely to be cooperative in the future. In this way, the empirical analysis provides support for the
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institutional perspective by highlighting the ways in which cooperative strategies can emerge, 
evolve and become institutionalised over time.
However, the analysis also indicates that various conditions have to be met if cooperation is to 
evolve in this way. Supporting Axelrod (1984), the analysis suggests that cooperation depends 
upon repeated interaction, some scope for reciprocity and an ability amongst the interacting 
parties to recognise and respond to different forms of behaviour. Where these conditions are 
met, the optimum outcome for either actor, namely top-down control for regulators or bottom- 
up capture for regulated firms, is available only temporarily as the other actors are able 
recognise and respond to these strategies by withdrawing their own resources, thereby triggering 
a period of adversarialism. However, with some iteration and learning, and some scope for 
reciprocal exchange or mutual benefit, cooperative approaches can emerge and evolve 
according to the conditions outlined above. Where these conditions are not met, as was 
illustrated in the case of the regulatory agency that lacked the capacity to monitor the behaviour 
of the regulated firms effectively, the basis for cooperation in the implementation process is 
undermined. In such instances, other options, such as regulatory failure or bottom-up capture, 
became available as the sustainable outcome.
However, the analysis also indicates that these were not the only conditions for cooperation. As 
Scholz (1984, 1991) recognises, and as will be discussed below, cooperation in the 
implementation process can also depend either on the regulators being trusted enough by 
external stakeholders to exercise their discretionary powers on behalf of the public interest or on 
the effective exclusion of mistrusting public interest groups. If these groups are able to constrain 
the discretionary powers of the regulatory agency, they have the potential to limit the resources 
available to the regulator and hence to restrict the basis for cooperation. The fact that they were 
not able to do so in either of the cases examined suggests again that the broader institutional 
context is an important factor shaping the basis for cooperation in the implementation process.
Where these conditions are met, both the institutional perspective and the empirical analysis 
indicate that, after some initial cooperation has been triggered by resource inter-dependence, 
cooperative approaches can assume their own dynamic and evolve according to their own 
internal logic. This is critically important as it indicates that cooperative forms of behaviour can 
become self-reinforcing, and that over time they can become deeply embedded in the 
institutional structures that evolve to support them. Such an institutionalisation can 
simultaneously encourage and enable further cooperation whilst constraining the ability both of 
the actors themselves and of external stakeholders to instigate change and to promote a switch 
to an alternative, less cooperative approach. Thus, while the interactions between regulators and
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firms can be responsive to a range of factors at the micro-level, at a higher level the 
implementation process can become highly path-dependent. The institutional perspective and 
the empirical analysis therefore indicate that behaviour within the implementation process can 
be seen to be responsive to the influence of a range of different factors, but only within broader 
trajectories.
The institutional perspective therefore paints a picture of the implementation process where 
institutional factors are important both externally, as the nature of the implementation process is 
shaped by the institutional context within which it takes place, and internally, as within that 
context particular forms of interaction can become highly institutionalised over time. As the 
institutional perspective highlights the potential for cooperative approaches to emerge, evolve 
and become institutionalised over time, the question is whether such cooperation is in the 
broader public interest.
The Influence of Cooperation in the Implementation Process
From a rational choice perspective, the fact that cooperative strategies exist in some settings 
suggests that cooperation can be in the interests of the actors that exert influence within the 
implementation process, most notably the regulators and the regulated firms,. Where the day-to- 
day interactions between these actors are out of the control of governments and away from the 
influence of other stakeholders, cooperation in the implementation process may be a feature of a 
self-serving bureaucracy and a self-interested community of regulated firms. From a broader 
public interest perspective, this still doesn't tell us whether cooperation leads to collective action 
or to regulatory capture. The answer to this question depends on the particular criteria for 
assessment that are adopted and on the perspective of the assessor.
If administrative viability, efficacy and efficiency are the central criteria for evaluating the 
feasibility of regulatory processes and the desirability of regulatory outcomes, then the analysis 
indicates that cooperation may be in the public interest. The empirical examination found that 
without cooperation regulators may not get access to the resources they need to operationalise 
regulations and to secure compliance. It also found that while cooperation can lead to some 
short-term reductions in standards, in the medium term it can build commitments to, and 
capacities for, compliance and so can enable the realisation of more effective and efficient 
regulatory outcomes. This is particularly the case where economic behaviour is embedded 
within existing habits and routines and where companies lack awareness about, and confidence 
in, alternative approaches. In such settings, by engaging in sustained processes of interactive
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learning with the regulated firms, regulators can collect, analyse and transfer information and 
understanding between firms which can reduce the costs and the risks, whilst also emphasising 
the benefits, of alternative approaches. As is discussed below, this suggests that regulation and 
implementation can be as much about facilitating and enabling more desirable forms of social 
and economic activity as about controlling and sanctioning the negative side-effects of such 
activity.
By contrast, if consistency and accountability are the key criteria for evaluating regulatory 
processes, then the analysis suggests that cooperative approaches to implementation do not 
perform well. As the empirical analysis has shown, many of the resources that regulators draw 
upon to exert influence in the implementation process stem from their ability to exercise their 
discretion and to be flexible in the way that they interpret, apply and enforce regulations. As 
discretionary decision-making processes can be unpredictable and unaccountable, judgements 
on whether or not regulators exercise their discretion in ways that further their own or the wider 
public interest must be taken on trust, particularly in the absence of clear measures of regulatory 
performance. If stakeholder groups are suspicious about the desirability of cooperative 
approaches to implementation but are excluded from influence, then discretionary approaches 
can continue, although the legitimacy of such approaches is likely to be questioned. 
Alternatively, if stakeholder groups have the ability to influence the implementation process, for 
example by lobbying governments or by resorting to legal action to challenge the discretionary 
behaviour of the implementing agency, then regulatory agencies must be trusted to exercise 
their discretion in the public interest if cooperative approaches are to continue (see Scholz, 
1984, 1991).
Regardless of which of these criteria are used to assess the desirability of cooperation in the 
implementation process, it is also important to consider the extent to which governments and 
other stakeholders are able to manage or control the implementation process. The analysis 
suggests that cooperative approaches can become highly institutionalised and deeply embedded 
because of the influence of self-reinforcing modes of behaviour. As a result, external actors may 
find it difficult to disrupt existing approaches and the networks that surround them in order to 
install alternatives that better reflect evolving public preferences or emergent political priorities. 
As was illustrated by the empirical analysis, in some settings cooperative approaches to 
implementation can become so deeply embedded that they can survive the introduction new 
legislation, the reorganisation of implementing agencies and the introduction of initiatives to 
adopt more arms-length approaches. Highly institutionalised cooperative approaches to 
implementation are therefore to some extent immune to the influence of governments and other 
stakeholders. Taking the 'manageability' or 'controllability' of the implementation process as
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another criterion for evaluation, the analysis indicates that cooperative approaches to 
implementation again perform badly.
It is therefore apparent that trade-offs may have to be made between the efficacy and efficiency 
of cooperative approaches to regulation on the one hand and the accountability and 
manageability of such approaches on the other. Given the tensions between these different 
criteria, is it possible to come to an overall conclusion on the desirability of such approaches to 
implementation? Here, Hutter's (1997) distinction between the conflict and consensus theorists 
as discussed in Chapter 1 becomes particularly relevant. While the conflict theorists argue that 
regulations are so weakened through negotiation and compromise that they come to serve the 
interests of the dominant groups within society rather than the society at large, the consensus 
theorists suggest that regulations can deliver social benefits, even if they are not as demanding 
as those who are primarily concerned with the social and environmental benefits of regulation 
would want or as lenient as those who are primarily concerned with the costs of compliance 
would prefer. With this in mind, it would appear that cooperative approaches to implementation 
can display aspects of both collective action (i.e. that they can be effective and efficient) and 
regulatory capture (i.e. that they can be unaccountable and unmanageable), with judgements on 
which is the more prevalent or important depending upon the perspective of the adjudicator.
Cooperation without capture?
As stated in Chapter 1, the search for better regulation has included the search for forms of 
regulation that are politically acceptable and administratively viable and that generate effective, 
efficient and equitable outcomes through accountable and in some instances participatory 
regulatory decision-making processes. While all of these criteria are important, as discussed 
above, the empirical analysis suggests that trade-offs may have to be made between the different 
criteria. However, based on both the empirical cases and the wider theoretical literature, it can 
be speculated that the extent of these trade-offs may not be fixed and therefore that it may be 
possible to have accountable regulatory processes that generate effective and efficient 
regulatory outcomes.
The responsive regulation concept as proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1999) is particularly pertinent in this respect. As has been stated, 
within the cases examined empirically the inspectors adopted 'responsive' approaches whereby 
they offered those firms that cooperated and complied access to their resources, such as 
information, understanding and flexibility, which the firms could draw upon to build their
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capacities and to reduce their costs of compliance. However, when faced with an uncooperative 
or non-compliant firm, the inspectors gradually withdrew access to these resources, whilst 
eventually resorting to the application of their legal authority and drawing upon their ability to 
de-legitimise the regulated firms in the eyes of their stakeholders. The ways in which the firms 
responded to this 'tiered' or responsive approach depended upon the value that they attached the 
resources held by the regulatory agency and upon their own cultures of compliance. Although 
there were some exceptions, in general the regulators were able to achieve their goals by 
adopting such responsive approaches.
However, as well as depending to a great degree upon the ability of the regulators to recognise 
and respond to breaches of compliance, the empirical analysis suggests that the ability of the 
regulators to adopt a responsive approach depends upon their ability to exercise discretion when 
deciding how to apply their resources. As is discussed above, it is the flexible application of 
these discretionary resources that renders the implementation process unaccountable and at 
times inequitable. While at first sight it may appear that the implementation process would 
become much less responsive if this discretion was removed, it may be possible to formalise the 
various tiers of enforcement and the factors that would lead to a movement from one tier to 
another so that the process became more transparent and accountable. This has been done in 
some cases through the adoption of clear and explicit enforcement policies and, increasingly, 
this is being pursued through the development of 'worst-first' or 'risk-based' approaches to 
implementation and enforcement. However, in the absence of a complete pre-conditioning or 
programming of the implementation process from above, discretionary elements are likely to 
remain as a central feature of the micro-level interactions that define the implementation process 
in practice. Concerns about the accountability of flexible and discretionary implementation 
processes are likely to remain therefore.
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and Gunningham and Granosky (1999) suggest that it is possible 
to enhance the accountability of such approaches to implementation by involving not only the 
regulators and the regulated firms in the decision-making process but also external stakeholders. 
While there are issues relating to the extent to which particular stakeholder groups can claim to 
represent the wider public interest, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) suggest that these can be 
resolved ensuring that the role of 'guardian of the public interest' is readily contestable. 
However, significant problems relating to the willingness and ability of public interest groups to 
engage with a large number of complex and iterative regulatory decision-making processes 
remain. Although the incentives for public interest groups to engage in debates relating to the 
broader legislative principles and over-arching regulatory structures are clearer, at the micro­
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level, where discretion is regularly exercised on a case-by-case basis, the expected costs and 
benefits of engagement are likely to be much more limited.
Thus, instead of seeking to promote accountable regulatory decision-making processes, it may 
be more feasible to introduce frameworks of targets and performance measures against which 
stakeholders can judge regulatory outcomes. From an institutional perspective, the introduction 
of such a framework could be significant as it would allow governments to allow highly 
institutionalised and deeply embedded cooperative approaches to remain in place whilst 
changing the context within which they operate to ensure that they are more goal-oriented and 
accountable. However, there may be some resistance to the introduction of performance 
measures as for some the absence of such measures can be highly convenient. By adopting 
flexible regulatory principles and maintaining discretionary regulatory decision-making 
processes, the micro-level conflicts and compromises that are an integral facet of many 
regulatory frameworks take place away from the gaze of public scrutiny. Thus, whilst 
stakeholders may call for greater accountability, governments and regulators may prefer to be 
left to do the best that they can with the available resources. The gradual erosion of public trust 
in the regulatory functions of government, if indeed this is the case, may suggest that such an 
approach is no longer tenable however.
While the formulation of such a framework of targets and performance would require a process 
of deliberation and negotiation, if such a framework was adopted the benefits of cooperative 
approaches could be maintained as the regulators and the regulated firms could be allowed or 
even encouraged to work together to decide how best to meet their targets. As long as reliable 
data was provided on the impact of such forms of collective action on regulatory outcomes, 
external stakeholders would be able to tell whether these cooperative approaches actually 
generated effective social outcomes. In order to provide such reliable data, it would be 
necessary to divide responsibility for implementing regulations from responsibility for judging 
performance however, and consequently broader issues emerge relating to the question of who 
regulates the regulator.
Another alternative is to adopt a purely goal-oriented approach to regulation where regulated 
firms are set targets and where sanctions are imposed if they fail to meet these. Such an 
approach is compatible with the arms-length, sanctions-based approach to implementation 
discussed above. Arguments for such an approach have been put forward on the basis that it is 
the regulated firms that know best how to achieve particular targets and that regulatory 
interference merely distorts market behaviour. However, the empirical analysis suggests that 
proactive and hands-on approaches to implementation where there is regular interaction
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between regulators and business can play a critical role in challenging preconceptions, changing 
cultures and in transferring information, understanding and expertise and, therefore, in raising 
capacities for compliance and for continuous improvement. Without these approaches, the 
analysis suggests that responses to regulation that are expedient in the short- term rather than 
effective and efficient in the medium-term will prevail and that the costs of further 
improvements in environmental performance will escalate more rapidly. Some combination of 
process-oriented and goal-oriented approaches to regulation would therefore appear to be 
preferable to an approach which relied entirely upon either one.
Implications for broader notions of regulation and governance
By emphasising the influence of inter-dependence rather than hierarchy in the relations between 
the regulators and the regulated, and by highlighting the role that regulation can play in 
encouraging and enabling as well as controlling and sanctioning, the thesis has developed a 
different conception of regulation from that associated with traditional notions of command and 
control. Whilst accepting that the cases examined and the context within which they exist are 
not necessarily representative of the broader range of experiences, a number of issues arise from 
the thesis that are of relevance to wider debates on regulation and implementation. These relate 
to the role that command and control regulations can play as part of a broader policy mix and to 
the ways in which cooperative approaches to regulation can be applied as part of a broader 
strategy for governance.
In relation to the influence of command and control regulations, the thesis suggests that they 
need not merely control the negative side-effects of economic activities, they can also play a 
role in changing the nature of those activities. Hands-on and cooperative approaches to 
implementation that seek to promote compliance are therefore more interventionist than arms- 
length and deterrence-based approaches that seek to detect and sanction cases of non- 
compliance. As a result, where cooperative approaches emerge, the implementation process can 
come to resemble a partnership between the public and private sectors where regulators become 
an important player in the change or innovation process.
By highlighting the ways in which cooperation in the implementation process enables regulators 
to change cultures and build capacities for change within regulated firms, the thesis has 
suggested that some of the traditional criticisms of command and control regulations, namely 
that they are static and rigid and that they fail to incentivise improvements in performance, are 
not necessarily valid. Instead, the thesis has found that, under some conditions, cooperative
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approaches to the implementation of command and control forms of regulation can be dynamic 
as compliance is continuously renegotiated as capacities for compliance are built and as new 
opportunities for further improvement arise. It has also found that they can be flexible enough to 
reflect the varying circumstances of different sectors and firms, including differences in their 
cultures, capacities and costs of compliance. And finally, it has found that they can generate a 
range of incentives and disincentives as regulators reward companies that seek to exploit the 
potential of socially desirable regulatory outcomes.
More generally, it can be argued that by imposing imperatives, incentivising improvement and 
building capacities command and control regulations display many of the features of the 
complementary policy mix that is often advocated. While it is likely their influence could be 
enhanced if they were applied in concert with a range of other instruments, the analysis suggests 
that command and control measures do more than merely establish minimum standards. In other 
words, they have a fuller role to play than being the 'instrument of last resort’ within a broader 
policy mix, particularly where they are applied within a context where the performance of 
regulators and regulated firms can be readily scrutinised.
In relation to the relevance of the thesis to broader debates on the changing nature of 
governance, the thesis suggests that cooperative approaches to regulation represent something of 
a transition from what Baldwin, Scott and Hood (2000) recognise as being the narrowest 
definition of regulation, namely the top-down imposition of controls, towards a broader 
definition where governments seek to encourage and enable as well as impose and enforce. The 
provision of information to empower stakeholders so that they can more readily hold regulators 
and regulated firms to account could also contribute to the emergence of the wider forms of 
social regulation. Indeed, as the thesis has illustrated, the emphasis that some regulated firms 
appear to place on the ability of regulators to legitimise or de-legitimise their operations in the 
eyes of their stakeholders suggests that this form of information-based regulation could be very 
influential (see also Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova, 1998 and Tietenberg, 1998).
It appears therefore that in some settings at least there has been a transition from traditional 
forms of government towards a position where regulations are one element of a broader 
framework of governance as discussed by authors such as Glasbergen (1998) and Rydin and 
Pennington (2000). In part, this transition has been driven by an implicit acknowledgement that 
the state's capacities for control are limited (see Hanf and Jansen, 1998). However, it also 
reflects changes in the broader nature of public-private relations and the emergence of a 
'facilitator' rather than a 'controller’ state (see Ostrom, 1990). While for many such a transition 
is seen to be desirable, models of governance which recognise the inter-dependence of the range
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of different actors are inherently more complex. As this thesis has shown, inter-dependencies 
mean that each actor, including those that are the targets of regulation, is able to exert influence 
within regulatory decision-making processes. With a weak state and stakeholders that have 
failed to mobilise or that are excluded from influence, it may be that it is the regulated actors 
themselves that control the pace and direction of change. However, with a stronger and more 
goal-oriented state that actively empowers its stakeholders, this thesis has suggested that new 
approaches to regulation might emerge that have the potential to deliver effective and efficient 
improvements within accountable decision-making processes.
Suggestions for Further Research
By adopting a qualitative, case-based approach to comparative policy analysis, this thesis has 
developed both a conceptual and an empirical understanding of the origins and influence of 
cooperation in the implementation process. This approach has had a number of clear 
advantages:
• by basing its empirical study upon an examination of different theories of cooperation
and collective action, the thesis was able to identify clear hypotheses conceptual 
perspectives to be tested and the empirical study was able to be more focused and 
incisive.
• by adopting a qualitative and case-based approach to empirical research, the thesis was
able to build a detailed understanding of the wide range of factors that combine to 
shape the nature and influence of the implementation process in practice.
• by adopting a comparative approach which examined two very similar regulatory
frameworks that were applied in broadly similar contexts, the thesis was able to isolate 
the influence of certain factors and to illuminate the factors shaping the relations 
between different actors in different contexts.
• by examining these cases in detail, and by considering the perspectives of both the
regulators and the managers of the regulated firms, the study has built a critical 
understanding of the factors shaping the performance of two significant regulatory 
frameworks that have seldom been examined before.
• by relating the empirical findings back to the conceptual research, the thesis has been 
able to reject some perspectives and to support or refine others. Aside from its case- 
based relevance, the major contribution of the thesis relates to its development of an 
institutional perspective on regulation and implementation.
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However, this approach has not been able to examine the influence of every factor that exerts an 
influence on the implementation process in equal detail. Thus, there are also some areas where 
further research is needed:
• By focusing on the interactions between the two main sets of actors, namely the 
regulators and the regulated, the thesis has not always fully explained the influence of 
other actors, notably governments and external stakeholders. Consequently, there is 
scope for further research on the broader networks shaping the implementation process.
• By basing its qualitative analysis on the perceptions of the regulators and the managers 
of the regulated firms, the thesis has taken their views, for example on the efficacy and 
efficiency of different approaches to implementation, as being true. There is scope for 
these views to be verified through quantitative research, looking for example at the 
influence of different approaches on the performance of regulated firms and on the 
costs of compliance.
• Although the analysis confined itself to an examination of regulatory practices that are
already in place, in the conclusions it also claimed that the adoption of broader 
frameworks of targets and performance measures could allow cooperative approaches 
to implementation to continue whilst also reducing the prospects for regulatory capture. 
As such frameworks have yet to be adopted, at least within the context of the cases 
examined, their actual influence is unclear. However, as they have been adopted in 
other settings, there is scope for comparative research to support or refute the
predictions made in this thesis.
• Finally, the need to understand the wide range of factors that combine to shape the
nature and influence of the implementation process meant that the thesis pursued a 
depth rather than a breadth of analysis. As it is not clear how generalisable the findings 
of the case-based empirical study are, there is scope for the validity of the results of the 
thesis to be examined in other settings.
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Appendix A: Details of the UK’s Framework for Pollution Control
The Origins and Evolution o f Pollution Control Regulations in the UK
Although some regulations relating to pollution control in the UK date back to the 14th century, 
the contemporary framework of industrial environmental regulation has its origins in the mid- 
to-late 19th century. At this time, various regulations were introduced to protect public health 
and the environment from the effects of increasing industrialisation and urbanisation. The Alkali 
Acts of 1863 and 1874 for example imposed emissions limits on a range of industrial processes 
as a response to widespread concern about the social, economic and environmental impacts of 
acidic air emissions from alkali works. Similarly, the first Public Health Act of 1848 established 
various municipal and industrial water pollution controls while the Rivers Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1876 made it a criminal offence for any body to pollute the water environment (NSCA, 
1998).
Rather than prohibiting emissions from regulated processes entirely or establishing uniform 
emissions limits, early environmental regulations in the UK adopted a more pragmatic approach 
that linked levels of environmental control to the availability of control technologies. The early 
Alkali Acts for example required regulated industrial processes to apply the 'Best Practicable 
Means’ to control emissions to air. Similarly, the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act allowed 
polluters of the water environment to defend themselves against criminal prosecution by 
showing that they had adopted 'the best practical and available means’ to render harmless their 
discharges to the water environment (NSCA, 1998).
By basing environmental regulation upon these technology-based principles, the early Acts 
demanded that the various regulatory agencies that were responsible for implementation and 
enforcement interpreted and applied legislative requirements on a case-by-case basis. Although 
the various agencies that have since been charged with the implementation of environmental 
legislation have exercised the discretion awarded to them in different ways, legislative 
flexibility and administrative discretion have been an important if not a defining feature of the 
framework of environmental regulation in the UK since its inception in the mid-to-late 19th 
century.
The Acts that defined the nature of environmental regulation from the late 19th century have 
since been amended and extended on numerous occasions1. However, the flexible,
1 Of the many legislative changes, the Clean Air Act of 1958 and the Control of Pollution Act o f 1974 brought 
significant changes to the framework of air pollution control whilst the Water Resources Act of 1963 and the Water
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discretionary, technology-based principles for pollution control that were adopted in the early 
legislation remained at the heart of UK’s framework of environmental regulation for over a 
century. In recent years, significant changes have been made to the framework of environmental 
regulation because of the increasing influence of European Union regulations and the adoption 
of domestic legislation such as the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, the 1991 Water 
Resources Act and the 1995 Environment Act and most recently the 1999 Pollution Prevention 
and Control Regulations which will revise the central aspects of the IPC framework and some 
aspects of the LAPC framework (see below). However, in the central aspects of industrial 
environmental regulation, various commentators have suggested that the evolution of the 
framework of environmental regulation in the UK has been characterised by a high degree of 
continuity rather than change (Jordan, 1993; Smith, 1997). Contemporary approaches to the 
implementation of environmental regulation therefore continue to reflect the regulatory cultures 
and traditions that have been established for well over a century.
The 1990 Environmental Protection Act: IPC and LAPC
The Environmental Protection Act (EPA) of 1990 was introduced as an enabling Act under 
which various regulations could be issued relating to a range of environmental issues. Part 1 of 
the 1990 EPA established the two separate but closely related frameworks of regulation that 
provide the focus for the thesis, namely the systems of IPC as implemented by the Environment 
Agency in England and Wales and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in 
Scotland and the system Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC) as implemented by various local 
authorities in England and Wales and by SEPA in Scotland. The following discussion, and the 
empirical analysis contained within the thesis, focuses solely on the implementation of the DPC 
and LAPC frameworks in England and Wales.
- Implementing Agencies
In England and Wales, responsibility for the implementation of the IPC system was initially 
delegated to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP). However, the 1995 Environment 
Act established the legal provisions that in 1996 led to the creation of a new Environment 
Agency. This Agency combined the pre-existing functions of HMIP with those of the Waste 
Regulation Authorities and the National Rivers Authority. Its primary functions are to protect 
the environment and to protect against floods and other natural hazards. As HMIP represented a
Acts of 1973 and 1989 also lead to important changes to the framework of water pollution control. The Control of 
Pollution Act in 1974 also established legislation governing the collection and disposal of solid waste.
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relatively small part of the broader agency, internal relations between the different functions are 
often seen to be significant (see for example Carter and Lowe, 1995).
The 1995 Environment Act established the frameworks that govern the powers and duties of the 
Environment Agency as well as its funding, responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. In 
accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Agency is managed by a board of directors that is 
appointed by and is answerable to the Secretary of State and the relevant Ministers in both the 
UK Government and the devolved Welsh Assembly. As well as setting the budget of the 
Agency, guidance on the objectives, functions and modes of operation to be adopted by the 
Agency can be issued by the central government through the Secretary of State and the relevant 
Ministers. Appeals against any decision made by the Agency can also be taken by the Secretary 
of State who has the power to over-rule any decision made by such an executive agency. 
Ultimately then the Environment Agency with responsibility for implementing IPC is politically 
controlled and is accountable to the relevant Secretary of State. Aside from its relations with 
central government, the Agency is also obliged to co-ordinate its activities with those of other 
agencies and authorities and to give regard to the concerns of various statutory consultees. It 
must also appoint and consult with a variety of advisory committees relating to its various 
functions at the regional and local levels. As well as being subject to various forms of central 
control, therefore, the Agency is also influenced by regional and local interests and conditions 
as articulated through the consultative links that it is legally bound to establish with various 
other agencies.
By contrast, responsibility for the implementation of the LAPC system in England and Wales is 
delegated to a large number of district and borough councils in England and to county and 
county borough councils in Wales. Various port health authorities throughout England and 
Wales are also responsible for the implementation of LAPC for industrial processes located in 
port areas (DETR, 1999). The local authorities responsible for the implementation of the LAPC 
system are also responsible for a number of other aspects of environmental protection and for a 
wide range of other functions including the promotion of economic development and the 
provision of land-use planning controls. Environmental protection in general, and air pollution 
control in particular, are therefore only a small part of a much wider range of functions 
undertaken by local authorities. The external interactions between different local authorities and 
the internal interactions between the different functions within each individual authority are 
therefore likely to be significant.
In England and Wales local authorities are democratically accountable at the local level. 
However, they are also governed by the statutes and by the funding decisions of central
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government. Local authorities therefore exist and operate in what Rydin (1993, p i90) describes 
as an 'uneasy partnership with both claiming authority because of their elected nature but with 
central government clearly in a position of greater power through various financial and 
administrative controls’. These aspects of the relationship between the central and the local are 
reflected in the implementation process that operationalises the LAPC system. Under the 
conditions of the EPA, while they are charged with the interpretation of BATNEEC for each 
regulated process, local authorities must give regard to the guidance issued by central 
government on the implementation of the LAPC system. Appeals against the decisions taken by 
local authorities during the implementation process can also be taken by the Secretary of State 
who has the power to over-rule any decisions made at the local level. Consequently, there is a 
significant element of control in the relationship between central and local government that 
governs the implementation of the LAPC system. However, there is also an element of co­
operation as local authorities have access to various forms of central support, most notably 
through the advice and information that is made available through central government and the 
DETR. Again therefore central-local interactions are therefore significant.
- Target Actors
The IPC system regulates emissions to air, water and land from approximately 2,000 larger and 
more environmentally significant processes while the LAPC system regulates emissions to air 
only from approximately 13,000 smaller and less environmentally significant processes. Both 
the IPC and the LAPC systems came into force for all new or significantly altered regulated 
processes from 1991 and at various times between 1992 and 1996 for existing processes in 
different sectors.
Under the requirements of the Part 1 of the 1990 EPA, processes regulated under either IPC or 
LAPC must not be operated without an authorisation from the relevant implementing agency. 
To obtain such an authorisation, operators of prescribed processes must submit an application 
for authorisation to the implementing agency that should contain:
details about the operator and the location of the process;
a description of the proposed process and of the proposed technologies and techniques 
to be used to prevent or minimise emissions of prescribed substances and to render 
harmless emissions of all substances to air for LAPC and to air, water and land for IPC; 
assuming the technologies and techniques have been fitted and are operational, details of 
the source, nature and amount of current and/or anticipated emissions from the process;
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for processes regulated by IPC, an assessment to demonstrate that any proposed 
emissions to air, water or land are compatible with the BPEO or, where the BPEO has 
not been selected on cost grounds, a justification for this;
an assessment of the likely environmental consequences of any emissions to air for 
LAPC and to air, water and land for IPC;
proposals for monitoring, sampling and measurement of emissions to air for LAPC and 
to air, water and land for IPC ;
for existing operations, an outline programme for upgrading to new plant standards for 
BATNEEC (DoE, 1991a; NSCA. 1998).
Thus, regulated actors are legally obliged to collect information and to present it to the 
regulatory agencies as part of the authorisation process. Upon submission, applications for 
authorisation must also be accompanied by the relevant application fee, the level of which is set 
centrally. Application fees and the subsequent subsistence charges that are levied on holders of 
authorisations are designed to enable implementing agencies to recover the costs associated with 
the implementation and enforcement of the IPC and LAPC systems. In essence then the 
regulatory function should be financed at least to some degree by the fees paid by regulated 
actors.
- Interpreting Regulatory Principles
All applications received from operators of prescribed processes are then considered by the 
relevant implementing agency. All applications for authorisation to operate a prescribed process 
must then be sent by the implementing agency to a range of statutory consultees for comment. 
For IPC applications, details must be sent to the local authority for the area within which the 
process is operated and to the range of bodies responsible for agriculture, fisheries, conservation 
and heritage. For LAPC applications, details must be sent to the relevant environment agency 
and to the range of conservation and heritage bodies. Thus, although responsibility for 
implementation is formally delegated to a single agency, a broader network of different 
organisations has been given the right to input into the implementation process.
Within any authorisations that are issued, implementing agencies must set out conditions that 
are designed to ensure that the regulated process is operated using BATNEEC to prevent and 
minimise emissions of prescribed substances and to render harmless any substance that may be 
emitted (DETR, 1999). To promote consistency in the way that BATNEEC is interpreted and 
applied, a number of General Guidance Notes (GG Notes) and a series of Process Guidance 
Notes (PG Notes) have been issued by the Department of the Environment (DoE), now the
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Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). At a generic level, the 
various components of BATNEEC have been defined in general guidance as set out in Table 
Al.
In addition to the general guidance that has been issued on the interpretation of BATNEEC, a 
series of PG Notes has been issued by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions. These PG Notes attempt to establish a definition of BATNEEC for each of the 
prescribed processes regulated under IPC and LAPC. These guidance notes are formulated on 
the basis of dialogue between central government, relevant government agencies, associations 
and enforcing authorities, trade associations and individual firms and a subsequent phase of 
wider consultation. Although they do not prescribe particular technologies or techniques, they 
usually contain details of indicative emissions limits and controls, monitoring, sampling and 
measurement requirements, general maintenance and training requirements and provisions for 
the response to accidents and abnormal emissions (DoE, 1991b; NSCA, 1998). Such PG notes 
are periodically reviewed to reflect changes in environmental conditions and advances in 
technology and scientific understanding (DETR, 1999).
By issuing both general guidance and process-specific guidance notes, central government has 
sought to programme or to precondition the implementation process associated with the IPC and 
LAPC systems which operationalises the legal principles established by the 1990 EPA. General 
guidance for the LAPC system for example suggests that 'Process Guidance Notes should be 
regarded by local authorities as their primary reference document for determining BATNEEC in 
drawing up authorisations’ (DoE, 1991b, p9). However, reflecting the long established tradition 
of flexibility in regulatory processes in the UK, it is also acknowledged for LAPC (DoE, 1991b, 
p9) that:
In general terms what is BATNEEC for one process is likely to be BATNEEC for a 
comparable process. But in each case it is in practice for local authorities (subject to 
appeal to the Secretary of State) to decide what is BATNEEC for the individual process 
and the local authority inspector concerned should take into account variable factors 
such as configuration, size and other individual characteristics of the process when 
doing so.
Thus, notwithstanding the influence of the controls exerted by central government on the 
implementing agencies as discussed above, the implementation process is not fully programmed 
or preconditioned from above. Instead, implementing agencies and inspectors are given some 
amount of discretion in determining what may constitute BATNEEC for a particular process.
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Table A.1: The Interpretation of BATNEEC
> 'Best’ must be taken to mean the most effective in preventing, minimising or 
rendering harmless polluting emissions. There may be more than one set of techniques 
that achieves comparable effectiveness -  that is there may be more that none set of 
'best’ techniques.
> 'Available’ should be taken to mean procurable by the operator in question. It does 
not imply that the technique is in general use, but it does require general accessibility. 
It includes a technique which has been developed (or proven) at a scale which allows 
its implementation in the relevant industrial context with the necessary business 
confidence. It does not imply that sources outside the UK are “unavailable”. Nor does 
it imply a competitive supply market. If there is a monopoly supplier the technique 
counts as being available providing that the operator can procure it.
> 'Techniques’... embraces both the process and how the process is operated. It should 
be taken to mean the concept and design of the process, the components of which it is 
made up and the manner in which they are connected together to make the whole. It 
also includes matters such as numbers and also the design, construction, lay-out and 
maintenance of buildings.
> 'Not Entailing Excessive Cost’ needs to be taken in two contexts, depending on 
whether it is applied to new processes or existing processes. For new processes, the 
presumption should be that the best available techniques are used, but that 
presumption can be properly modified by economic considerations where the costs of 
applying the best available techniques would be excessive in relation to the nature of 
the industry and the environmental protection to be achieved. For existing processes, 
the best available techniques should be applied whilst taking into account the 
environmental situation and the desirability of avoiding excessive costs for the plants 
in question, having regard to the economic circumstances of the industrial sector 
concerned.
> In relation to the emissions standards, clearly BATNEEC may be expressed in 
technological terms -  i.e. a requirement to employ specified hardware. It may also be 
expressed in terms of emissions standards. Having identified the best techniques and 
the emissions values they are capable of producing, it will be possible to express 
BATNEEC as a performance standard: that is, a technique which produces emissions 
standards of X or better where X are the values yielded by the identified BATNEEC. 
The process guidance notes generally express BATNEEC in these terms so as not to 
constrain the development of cleaner technologies or to restrict unduly operators’ 
choice of means to achieve a given standard.
Source: Adapted from DoE (1991b).
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-  Establishing Regulatory Controls
Once comments have been received from the various statutory consultees and attention has been 
paid to the relevant guidance, authorisations can be formulated which interpret BATNEEC to 
establish site-specific operating conditions and emissions limits for a particular process. 
Particularly in relation to LAPC, this process is subject to a range of general guidance notes that 
set out the criteria to be used in drafting authorisation conditions (DoE, 1991c). This guidance 
suggests that implementing authorities need to take care in drafting specific conditions to ensure 
enforceability, clarity, relevance and workability. Thus, the general guidance suggests that 
authorisations should:
include clear conditions which clearly and precisely state what is required of the 
operator and which can be objectively measures so that they are readily capable of 
enforcement in the courts should this prove necessary;
create certainty by only including conditions that are unambiguous and explicit so that 
industry knows exactly what basic standards it must achieve;
be designed for the purpose of reducing air pollution and relate only to the control of air 
pollution from the process in question;
only include conditions that have a clearly defined purpose and that are capable of 
achieving that purpose.
Once authorisations have been issued, the application and all subsequent details of compliance 
conditions, inspection, monitoring, upgrading requirements and responses to non-compliance 
must then be put on the public register unless a case can be made that the publication of such 
information would breach commercial confidentiality or that it would prejudice national 
security.
- Monitoring and Enforcement
To ensure compliance with any conditions and standards that are included in the authorisation, 
implementing agencies have powers of entry, inspection, sampling, investigation and seizure of 
articles or substances that are a cause of imminent danger or serious harm (DETR, 1999). For 
both EPC and LAPC, implementing authorities have the powers to issue a range of different 
notices relating to compliance and non-compliance. These notices can take a variety of forms:
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variation notices which can be issued if current conditions no longer represent 
BATNEEC; enforcement notices which require action to be taken in cases of actual or 
potential non-compliance;
prohibition notices which require an operator to close down all or part of a process 
where there is an imminent risk of serious pollution; and
revocation notices where authorisations are withdrawn if the annual subsistence charge 
relating to authorisation has not been made or where the process has not been 
operational within the last 12 months.
Operators of prescribed processes can appeal to the Secretary of State both against the 
conditions set out within the authorisations and against the various forms of notice that can be 
issued by implementing authorities. In addition to any enforcement activities, implementing 
authorities can also prosecute offenders. Such prosecutions can be taken against both offending 
companies and against responsible officers within those companies where it can be shown that 
the offence was committed with their consent or because of their neglect. Prosecution can lead 
to up to 6 months imprisonment and/or a £20,000 fine in the Magistrates Courts of up to 5 years 
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine in the Crown Court. The full costs associated with any 
investigations and legal proceedings can also be recovered from the offending organisation or 
individual.
Contemporary Policy Developments and the Continued Relevance o f IPC and LAPC
Since the introduction of the 1990 EPA and its phased introduction for different processes 
throughout the early and mid 1990s, additional changes have been made to the broader 
framework of legislation relating to air pollution control and air quality management, notably by 
the adoption of the 1991 Water Resources Act, the 1993 Clean Air Act and the 1995 
Environment Act. Although this legislation contains provisions that are distinct from those of 
the 1990 EPA, there are links between the provisions of the 1990 EPA and the objectives of 
other legislation that establishes environmental quality objectives (EQOs). Consequently 
provision is made within the requirements of the 1990 EPA to vary emissions standards or 
destinations according to the need to achieve particular EQOs.
The contemporary framework of industrial environmental regulation in the UK is also being 
revised to comply with the requirements of various international agreements and EU Directives. 
A notable development in this respect has been the adoption of the EU Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive in 1996 which has been transposed into the UK 
legislative framework through the introduction of the 1999 Pollution Prevention and Control
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(PPC) Regulations which for pre-existing industrial processes are scheduled to come into force 
on a rolling schedule until the last processes switch from IPC or LAPC regulations to the new 
PPC regulations in 2007.
The coverage of the IPC system will also be extended by the 1999 Pollution Prevention and 
Control (PPC) Regulations. However, local authorities in England and Wales will retain 
regulatory responsibilities for some of the installations that will be transferred from the current 
LAPC system into the new system of PPC Regulations when they eventually take effect. The 
coverage of the LAJPC system, which is currently implemented by local authorities in England 
and Wales and SEPA in Scotland, will be slightly reduced by the introduction of the 1999 PPC 
Regulations.
Despite these important changes, which are summarised in Table A.2, the principles that 
underpin IPC and LAPC will remain largely intact within the new PPC system which will 
regulated approximately 6,000 industrial processes whilst approximately 11,500 processes will 
continue to be regulated under the existing framework of LAPC in England and Wales. Studies 
on the implementation and impact of IPC and LAPC therefore continue to be of relevance both 
because some of the regulations are still in place in the UK and because the principles which 
underpin the regulations are being extended and adopted in other areas of the UK policy 
framework and throughout the EU as member states adopt and enact the legislation which is 
called for by the IPPC Directive.
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Table A.2: The Evolving Framework of Industrial Environmental Regulation in the UK
The 1990 Environmental Protection Act -  Part 1
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC)
Regulations adopted for approximately 
2,000 industrial processes
Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC)
Regulations adopted for approximately 
13,000 industrial processes in England and 
Wales.
The 1999 Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC) Bill
Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC)
Regulations adopted for an estimated 
6,000 industrial installations including:
2,000 IPC regulated industrial 
processes*
1,500 LAPC regulated industrial 
processes*
upto 3,000 landfill sites 
upto 2,500 installations in the food, 
drink and intensive livestock 
sectors.
* Industrial installations regulated by 
the PPC Regulations may contain more 
than one of the industrial processes 
previously regulated by IPC/LAPC 
Regulations.
Local Air Pollution Control (LAPC) Regulations
These regulations remain in force for 
approximately 11,500 industrial processes in 
England and Wales that will not be directly 
affected by the introduction of Pollution 
Prevention and Control (PPC) Regulations.
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Appendix B:
Details of the interactive workshop
In order to feed the preliminary results back to the regulators, the managers of the regulated 
firms and the broader range of stakeholders, an interactive workshop was held at the Eco- 
Management and Auditing Conference that took place at the University of Leeds in July of 
1998. This workshop, which lasted for 90 minutes, presented the findings of a preliminary 
analysis of the empirical results. This analysis focused on the influence of the central analytical 
variables and the significance of various forms of interaction within the implementation process. 
Although the discussion validated the central findings of the preliminary assessment, it also 
encouraged a re-conceptualisation of other aspects, relating particularly to the pros and cons of 
cooperative approaches and to the influence of third parties.
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